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In their seminal studies in literary theory and poetics, the Russian formalists 
(Šklovskij, Tynjanov, Jakobson, etc.) famously claim that aesthetic experience 
amounts to a self-valuable, concrete act of perception functionally induced and 
conditioned by the formal structure of a work of art or literature. This aesthetic 
principle, christened by Šklovskij as “estrangement” (ostranenie), played an 
instrumental role in the formalists‟ contribution to the establishment and development 
of literary theory as an autonomous scientific discipline. It has also regularly inspired 
other thinkers and provided the impetus for productive new insights on art or 
literature, a fact that seems to underline its acuity and relevance. At the same time 
however, the formalists‟ “strange” account of art and literature has been routinely 
disparaged for being altogether inadequate, philosophically flimsy and descriptively 
too narrow. Critics have pointed out that the formalists‟ assertions on the topic of 
perception rest but on a set of ad hoc psychological hypotheses and are overly 
determined by their specific scientific aims and modernist prejudices. Worse, the 
principle of estrangement has been credibly attacked for being semiotically naïve and 
for stripping art and literature of any “content” or meaning, to say nothing of any wider 
social, cultural, political or ideological signification. 
Taking cue from the apparent contradiction between the proven fruitfulness of the 
Russian formalists‟ principle of estrangement and its palpable theoretical brittleness, 
the objective of the forthcoming study will be to reassess its conceptual scope and 
the whole vision of aesthetics it implies. To be more specific, I wish to argue that the 
formalists‟ claims as to the “estranging” perceptual powers and function of art and 
literature involves a truly original philosophical perspective, which can be expressed 
in rigorous terms and cast a serious and interesting light on the nature and meaning 
of aesthetic experience. 
Since its focus will be to re-evaluate the theoretical vitality of the Russian formalists‟ 
key aesthetic intuitions, this study can correctly be construed as an attempt to defend 
or at least to reassess the general validity of their vision of aesthetics. I wish to stress 
here, though, that my ambition will definitely not be to rehabilitate the formalists' 
aesthetic ideas as such, nor to suggest that they are directly defensible as a coherent 
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theory. Despite the historical significance of the formalists‟ work, there can be no 
doubt that their ideas – including estrangement itself – are resolutely obsolete and 
display too many significant and obvious flaws. Further, the formalists themselves 
never provided nor sought to provide a coherent, systematic theory of art, let alone a 
philosophically consistent aesthetic model. More than the formalists' concepts 
themselves, it is thus the original perspectives they suggest and the potential thereof 
to be formulated in strict theoretical terms that will interest me here. As such, the 
methodological orientation of this study will be to investigate whether the formalists‟ 
brilliant but still crude insights into the nature of art, literature and aesthetic 
experience might be refined and given a sturdier formulation. 
This attempt to reframe and reassess the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic tenets, I wish 
to add, constitutes by no means a purely speculative exercise. Quite to the contrary, 
it finds a justification in the fact that the formalists‟ initially raw intuitions actually 
underwent a positive if complex evolution towards greater conceptual maturity and 
were successfully transposed in a much more solid theoretical framework. In 
particular, the core tenets of Russian formalism were recycled by the Prague 
structuralists and subsequently played a notable role in the development of 
structuralism in France. Because of this historical role, structuralism effectively 
provides both a specific example of the conceptual potential of formalist ideas and a 
concrete template for reassessing the extent of their relevance as a rigorous theory. 
For this reason, the focus of this study will be to explore the full significance and 
potentialities of the formalists‟ aesthetics in a structuralist perspective. Since the 
formalists‟ ideas also share close if often misleading affinities with those of Husserl 
(or the Russian philosopher Špet) and find an interesting echo in the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, I will extend my analysis to phenomenology and its own relations with 
structuralism. 
Evidently, a central premise of my project is that a conclusive assessment of the 
philosophical implications of the Russian formalists‟ conception of art and literature is 
still missing and that, as such, it possesses untapped or unexplored potential in 
connection with both structuralism and phenomenology. Such a presumption might 
seem surprising at first, since both the formalists and their structuralist legacy have 
received more than abundant critical attention over the years and that, 
notwithstanding the putative convergences with Husserl or Merleau-Ponty, 
phenomenology has been seen as a competing model, incompatible on many crucial 
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points with both the formalists' ideas and those of structuralism. The contingent 
historical circumstances that presided over the evolution and the reception of early 
Soviet thought, I will argue, do however provide me with a solid case. In effect, it has 
been shown ever more clearly since the 1990s that averse conditions such as the 
rise of Stalinism, the outbreak of WWII and the advent of the Cold War contributed to 
obscure much of the specific dynamics and originality of the work of as influential 
figures as Bachtin, Jakobson, Vygotskij and the formalists themselves. As a result, it 
can fairly be said that their role and signification in the evolution of both structuralism 
and phenomenology have indeed been misunderstood or neglected.  
To carry out my project, I will proceed in two distinct stages. Firstly, I will outline the 
philosophical originality of the Russian formalists' aesthetic principles and argue that 
it has been partially squandered (Part I). Secondly, I will seek to diffuse the most 
important criticisms usually directed against these principles by reconsidering the 
modalities of their adaptation in frameworks such as those of structural linguistics 
and phonology, as well as their further affinities with phenomenology (Part II). The 
outcome of these investigations should be to show that the formalists' apparently 
problematic and restrictive intuitions as to the "strange", formal nature of art, literature 
and aesthetic experience can be given philosophical foundations and be expressed 
in coherent fashion, through a structural and phenomenological theory of perception. 
In short, the defining feature of such a theory is to postulate that we experience 
reality and its objects as the differentiated, hierarchised concretion of intransitive, 
phenomenological contents or meanings. To put it differently, this means that the 
empirical world itself crystallises in perception in the shape of expressive, meaningful 
but yet concrete and material structures. This phenomenological, structural and 
expressive vision of experience involves an ontology of Heideggerian inspiration and, 
in turn, suggests a consistent and compelling vision of art as a prime mean of 
actualising and “lending form” to reality. 
This study will touch upon a number of themes (the structure of perception, 
language, meaning, the nature of the sign, embodiment, etc.) which have been at the 
centre of the considerations of many disciplines (linguistics, literary theory, 
psychology, semiotics, philosophy, etc.) and some of the most influential intellectual 
traditions of the last century (Gestalt psychology, hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
structuralism, etc.). The limited scope of my project, however, means that I have 
mostly refrained from contextualising its findings or sought to apply them critically in 
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this larger horizon. All I have attempted to achieve here is to bring further 
clarifications to the philosophical dimension of the Russian formalists‟ foundational 
aesthetic ideas and to highlight in clearer, more systematic terms the actual and 
potential lines of their conceptual maturation in the complementary frameworks of 
structuralism and phenomenology. 
 
On a technical note, I will be using a “Czech” transliteration for words written in 
Cyrillic (Šklovskij – Шкловский, vyraţenie – выражение), including very common 
names (Tolstoj, Bachtin) but excluding foreign ones originally spelled with Latin 
characters (Eichenbaum, Jakobson). If not otherwise specified (or quoted from a 
translated version), translations are my own. 
I also wish here to extend my sincerest thanks to the people who helped me bring my 
endeavour to fruition: my supervisor Josef Vojvodik, of course, for his faultless 
support and friendly guidance at every stage and all levels of my doctoral studies; 
Jean-Philippe Jaccard for his encouragements during the very early phase of this 
project and his assistance towards obtaining various grants; Petr Bìlek for the 
positive reaction to my initial dissertation project that decided me to take the plunge 
at Charles University; Georg Witte for welcoming me at the Peter Szondi-Institut of 
the Free University in Berlin on a year-long exchange; Maryse Dennes, Libuše 
Heczková, Stefan Kristensen, Patrick Sériot and Sergeï Tchougounnikov; and last 
but not least, my family and friends, for ensuring I had a life outside the infamous 
ivory tower. 
 





Ve svých základnìch literárně-vědeckých a básnických studiìch, ruštì formalisté 
(Šklovskij, Tynjanov, Jakobson, atd.…) slavně prohlašujì, ţe se estetická zkušenost 
rovná konkrétnì aktu vnìmánì, funkčně spuštěnému formálnì strukturou uměleckého 
nebo literárnìho dìla. Tento estetický princip, který Šklovskij nazval „ozvláštněnì“, hrál 
pomocnou roli v přispěnì ruských formalistů při zaloţenì a rozvoji literárnì teorie jako 
autonomnì vědecké disciplìny. Také pravidelně inspiroval jiné myslitele a přinášel 
impulzy k produktivnìmu novému pohledu na uměni nebo literaturu, coţ je fakt, který 
podtrhuje svou důleţitost a závaţnost. Současně ovšem, „zvláštnì“ úvahy formalistů 
o vnìmatelné-formálnì podstatě uměnì a literatury podléhaly kritice za to, ţe jsou 
přìliš úzké a nepostačujìcì. Kritici často poukazovali na to, ţe navzdory své povrchnì 
působivosti se klìčová tvrzenì ruských formalistů opìrajì jen o řádku pro tento účel 
vytvořených psychologických hypotéz a jsou přespřìliš podmiňovány svými 
specifickými vědeckými cìli a modernistickými předsudky. A coţ je ještě horšì, jejìch 
přìstup byl důvěryhodně napadán za to, ţe je epistemologicky a sémioticky naivnì a 
z toho, ţe zbavuje uměnì a literaturu „obsahu“ nebo významu, nemluvě o širšìm 
sociálnìm, kulturnìm, politickém nebo ideologickém významu. 
V souvislosti se zřejmým protikladem mezi vytrválou plodnosti umělecké-literárnì 
intuice ruských formalistů a jejì patrnou teoretickou křehkosti, účelem této studie 
bude přehodnocenì skutečného konceptualnìho rozsahu jejich “estetika ozvláštněnì“. 
Abych byl přesnějšì, rád bych dokázal, ţe postulát ruských formalistů, ţe uměnì nebo 
literatura majì jak moc, tak i funkci ovlivnit proces vnìmánì sebe samotné zahrnuje 
skutečně originálnì filozofické perspektivy, coţ je moţno vyjádřit přesnými termìny a 
vrhat uţitečné světlo na podstatu a význam estetické zkušenosti. 
Poněvadţ se tato studie zaměřuje na přehodnocenì teoretické vitality klìčových 
estetických pojmů ruských formalistů, můţe být vykládána jako pokus bránit nebo 
alespoň přehodnotit obecnou platnost jejich vize estetiky. Avšak rád bych zde 
zdůraznil, ţe mou ambicì určitě nenì rehabilitovat estetické myšlenky ruských 
formalistů jako takové, ani nechci naznačit, ţe je moţno je přìmo bránit jako 
koherentnì teorii. Navzdory historickému významu práce ruských formalistů nenì 
pochyb o tom, ţe jejich myšlenky, včetně „ozvláštněnì“ samotného, jsou v kaţdém 
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přìpadě zastaralé a zobrazujì přìliš mnoho významných a zřejmých trhlin. A navìc, 
ruštì formalisté sami nikdy neposkytli – ani se nesnaţili poskytnout – koherentnì, 
systematickou teorii uměnì, dokonce ani filozoficky konzistentnì estetický model. Vìce 
neţ koncepty ruských formalistů samy, se proto budu zabývat originálnì 
perspektivou, kterou přinášejì a z nì plynoucìm potenciálem, který budu systemizovat 
v přìsnějšìch teoretických pojmech. Metodologickým zaměřenìm této studie bude 
hledat způsob, jak by bylo moţno vytřìbit a přizpůsobit oslnivý, ale stále robustnì 
pohled ruských formalistů na podstatu uměnì a poskytnout mu ještě robustnějšì 
formulaci.  
Je třeba dodat, ţe tento pokus rekoncipovat estetické teze ruských formalistů do 
ještě preciznějšì teorie nenì v ţádném přìpadě čistě spekulativnì úkol. Naopak, je 
ospravedlněno faktem, ţe původně hrubé intuice ruských formalistů ve skutečnosti 
prošly pozitivnìm, pokud ne přìmo komplexnìm vývojem směrem k většì koncepčnì 
vyzrálosti a byly úspěšně přeneseny do mnohem pevnějšìho teoretického rámce.  
Předevšìm základnì principy ruského formalizmu byly opětovně pouţity praţskými 
strukturalisty a následně hrály významnou roli v rozvoji strukturalismu ve Francii.  
Kvůli této historické úloze poskytuje strukturalismus jak specifický přìklad 
systematického potenciálu myšlenek formalizmu, tak i konkrétnì šablonu pro nové 
vyhodnocenì rozsahu relevance jako systematické a přesné teorie. Z tohoto důvodu 
se tato studie zaměřì na hledánì plného významu a potenciálu estetiky ruských 
formalistů ve strukturalistické perspektivě.  Protoţe myšlenky ruských formalistů májì 
těsný, ale často zavádějìcì blìzký vztah s myšlenkami Husserla (nebo ruského 
filozofa Špeta) a nacházejì zajìmavou odezvu v práci Merleau-Pontyho, rozšìřìm svůj 
rozbor také na fenomenologii a jejì vztah k strukturalismu.  
Samozřejmě ţe centrálnì premisou mého projektu je, ţe přesvědčivé hodnocenì 
filozofických implikacì koncepce uměnì a literatury ruských formalistů stále chybì a ţe 
jako takové nabìzì neodhalený a neprozkoumaný potenciál ve spojenì jak se 
strukturalismem, tak i s fenomenologiì. Takový předpoklad se můţe zprvu zdát 
překvapivý, neboť jak ruským formalistům, tak i jejich strukturalistickému dědictvì se 
za ta léta dostalo vìce neţ hojnosti kritické pozornosti. Navìc, nehledě na 
předpokládané sbliţovánì s Husserlem a Merleau-Pontym, fenomenologie je obvykle 
povaţována za soupeřìcì model, v mnoha důleţitých bodech neslučitelný 
s myšlenkami ruských formalistů i s myšlenkami strukturalismu. Jisté historické 
okolnosti, které předcházely vývoji a přijetì raných sovětských myšlenek mohou ale 
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jasně zdůvodňovat můj záměr. V celkovém výsledku, jak se jiţ ukazuje od 90. let 20. 
stoletì, nepřìznivé podmìnky, jako nástup stalinismu, vypuknutì 2. světové války a 
nástup studené války přispěly k zamlţenì specifické dynamiky a originality práce tak 
vlivných postav jako byli Bachtin, Jakobson, Vygotskij a ruštì formalisté sami. Jako 
výsledek můţeme řìci, ţe jejich role a význam ve vývoji jak strukturalismu, tak 
fenomenologie byly špatně pochopeny nebo opomenuty a ţe tradičnì vysvětlenì 
genealogie strukturalismu  byly také významně pokřiveny.   
Ve svém projektu budu postupovat ve dvou odlišných etapách. Nejprve načrtnu 
filozofickou originalitu estetických principů ruských formalistů a předloţìm argumenty, 
ţe byla poničena (část I). Potom se budu snaţit rozptýlit nejdůleţitějšì kritiku, obvykle 
zaměřenou proti těmto principům a znovu uváţìm modality jejich adaptace v rámci 
jako je strukturálnì lingvistika a fonologie, ale i dalšì těsný vztah s fenomenologiì 
(část II). Takové pátránì by mělo ukázat, ţe zjevně problematické a restriktivnì intuice 
k „zvláštnì“ formálnì podstatě uměnì, literatury a estetické zkušenosti můţe dostat 
filozofický základ a můţe být vyjádřena logicky promyšleným způsobem, pomocì 
strukturálnì a fenomenologické teorie vnìmánì. Ve stručnosti, definujìcìm prvkem 
takové teorie je předpoklad, ţe zaţìváme skutečnost a jejì předměty jako 
diferenciované, hierarchicky seřazené splývánì nepřechodných, fenomenologických 
obsahů nebo významů. Jinými slovy, to znamená, ţe empirický svět sám sebe vytřìbì 
ve vnìmánì tvarově expresìvnìch, smysluplných, ale přesto konkrétnìch, materiálnìch 
struktur. Tato fenomenologická, strukturálnì a expresìvnì vize zkušenosti zahrnuje 
ontologii Heideggerianovy inspirace a postupně navrhuje soustavnou a přesvědčivou 
vizi uměnì jako prvotnìho prostředku aktualizace a „propůjčenì formy“ realitě.  
Tato studie se bude týkat různých témat (struktura vnìmánì, jazyk, smysl, podstata 
znaku, tělesnost, atd.), které stály v centru úvah mnohých disciplìn (lingvistiky, 
literárnì vědy, psychologie, sémiotiky, filozofie atd.) a některých z nejvýznamnějšìch 
intelektuálnìch tradic minulého stoletì (psychologie Gestaltu, hermeneutika, 
fenomenologie, strukturalismus, atd.). Omezený rozsah mého projektu však 
znamená, ţe jsem se většinou zřekl moţnosti zařadit jejì závěry do širšìho kontextu 
popřìpadě hledat moţnosti, jak je kriticky aplikovat v širšìm horizontu. Vše, čeho se 
zde pokoušìm dosáhnout, je dále objasnit filozofickou dimenzi základnìch estetických 
myšlenek ruských formalistů a  zdůraznit jasnějšì, systematičtějšì náleţitosti 
aktuálnìch a potenciálnìch spojenì koncepčnìho zránì v doplňkovém rámci 
strukturalismu a fenomenologie.   
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The Fate and Promises of the Russian Formalists’ Aesthetics 
 
In April of 1930, in the year consecutive to Stalin‟s decisive rise to power in the 
Soviet Union, the great Russian poet and playwright Vladimir Majakovskij shot and 
killed himself. In the unfinished poem he left as his suicide note, one comes across 
these famous lines: 
As they say, the incident is closed 
The love boat has crashed against the everyday.1 
 
Majakovskij‟s sombre words obviously concern first and foremost his suicide and the 
turmoil of his own life. Beyond their eminently personal signification, though, these 
stanzas also resonate as a clairvoyant commentary on the "crashes" and "closures" 
that affected Soviet culture and intellectual life more generally, as a direct result of 
the tremendous social and political changes wrought by the fierce onset of Stalinism. 
As a matter of fact, Majakovskij‟s suicide itself conveniently stands out as an 
emblematic symptom of two closely related episodes in this chapter of the history of 
the USSR often referred to as the “Great Turn” (Velikij perelom).2 
Above all, as none other than Roman Jakobson promptly and shrewdly diagnosed in 
"The Generation That Squandered its Poets",3 Majakovskij's disappearance 
coincided with the ultimate decline of the aesthetic, cultural and social aspirations of 
the revolutionary Russian avant-gardes and, consequently, with the untimely ebb of 
the high tide of Modernism in the Soviet Union. To recall, the three or so decades 
contiguous with the collapse of tsarist Russia and the birth of the Soviet Union 
witnessed an intense blossoming in literature and the arts in general. During that 
period, luminaries such as Chagall, Kandinskij, Malevič, Eisenstein, Achmatova, 
Mandelstam and Pasternak came to the fore – to name here but the most famous 
                                                 
1
 Kak govorjat, incident isperčen/Ljubovnaja lodka razbilas’ o byt’(Majakovskij,[1930] 1973)  
2
 Stalin’s « year of the Great Turn » was of course 1929, but the events of 1930 mentioned 
here were fully part of the upheavals it involved. 
3
 This landmark essay was only published in 1931 but penned by Jakobson in direct reaction 
to his friend’s suicide 
- 10 - 
 
amongst the many creative geniuses who formed together the rich, diverse cultural 
phenomenon known loosely as “Russian Modernism”. Majakovskij himself figured 
prominently in this setting, amongst other as the leader and, at the time of his death, 
the last remaining exponent of the so-called Cubo-futurist movement. His role, in fact, 
was crucial: Majakovskij's Cubo-futurists were the most fervent stalwarts of Russian 
Modernism and effectively powered the surge of the whole avant-garde, first by 
sweeping away the waning influence of Russian Symbolism in favour of a more 
radical vision of art and literature, and then by spawning many of the movements or 
trends (the LEF,4 Suprematism, Constructivism) that defined Modernism from the 
Russian revolution onwards. 
With Majakovskij‟s sudden death, Russian Modernism could undeniably be said to 
have lost one of its primary engines and catalysts. Worse still according to Jakobson, 
it was left to face the absence of “any replacements, [or] even any partial 
reinforcements” (Jakobson, 1979 [1931], p.380). To be sure, the disappearance of 
Majakovskij was met by the triumphant on-march of the state-imposed dogma of 
Socialist Realism and the entailing repression of dissident creative voices, which 
combined to bring a premature end not only to Cubo-futurism, or rather to its latter 
offshoots,5 but also to the flock of other noteworthy avant-garde movements 
(Acmeism, Imaginism, the Oberiu, Productivism, etc.) that existed alongside them.6 
Without constituting its primary cause, Majakovskij‟s suicide portended the passing 
into the shadows – well over a decade and a half before the fading of their European 
and American alter egos – of an entire “generation” of modernist poets, novelists, 
artists, architects, composers, choreographers, filmmakers and theatre directors, 
whose accomplishments define a formidably innovative period in Russian arts and 
letters, and a precious contribution to World culture. 
Next to this cultural upheaval, Majakovskij‟s death also relates to a break in the 
evolution of the Russian and Soviet human sciences. In effect, the creative explosion 
and swift demise of Russian Modernism was mirrored by an impressive but relatively 
short-lived bout of scientific and intellectual activity, which was not only largely 
inspired by the practices and principles of Modern art and literature, but was intent on 
                                                 
4
 Acronym for the Left Front of Art (Levyj Front Isskustva) 
5
 The « wave » of Cubo-futurism as such lasted from 1910 to 1914 (cf. Markov, 1968). With 
regard to the dating of the Russian avant-gardes, cf. Hansen-Löve (1993) 
6
 On the topic of the end of the avant-garde, cf. also Jaccard (1991) 
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justifying and systemising them from a theoretical standpoint. First and foremost, this 
scientific and intellectual activity involved the motley group of literary scholars and 
linguists known as the Russian Formalists (Viktor Šklovskij, Jurij Tynjanov, Boris 
Eichenbaum, Roman Jakobson, Osip Brik, Lev Jakubinskij, Evgenij Polivanov, Boris 
Tomaševskij, etc.), who formulated pioneering ideas in linguistics and poetics, and 
cast the foundations of modern literary theory. They were seconded in their 
endeavours by the closely related yet methodologically distinct and sometime rival 
“formal-philosophical school” (Gustav Špet, Viktor Vinogradov, Viktor Vinokur, Nikolaj 
Ţinkin, Viktor Ţirmunskij, Boris Jarcho, etc.).7 Further, exiled Russian scholars with 
close ties to the formalists (Jakobson himself, Nikolaj Trubeckoj, Petr Bogatyrev, 
Sergej Karcevskij, etc.) also played a decisive role in the creation of the Cercle 
Linguistique de Prague, effectively founding structural phonology and inspiring the 
influential Prague School of linguistics and literary theory. Finally, alongside the lively 
and diverse “formalist” faction, outstanding figures such as Lev Vygotskij, Michail 
Bachtin, Valentin Vološinov and Pavel Medvedev put forward path-breaking theories 
in fields as varied as aesthetics, literary criticism, cultural history, linguistics, 
sociology, psychology or the philosophy of language. 
Sadly, all this original, modernist-inspired intellectual activity (with the exception, for 
obvious reasons, of the Prague School) was soon caught up in the process of the 
stalinisation of Soviet society and culture and ruthlessly curtailed. In the late 1920s, 
the institutions that had most helped to foster innovation and to encourage the novel 
links between modernist artists and intellectuals, such as the Institute of the Living 
Word (Institut Ţivogo Slova) and the State Institute for the History of the Arts (GIII – 
Gosudarstvennyj Institut Istorii Iskusstv) in St-Petersburg, as well as the State 
Academy of Artistic Sciences (GAKhN – Gosudarstvennaja Akademia 
Khudoţestvennych Nauk) in Moscow, were shut down. As to the aforementioned 
thinkers, most of whom had benefited from their affiliation to either one of these 
institutions to promote and give greater credibility to their innovative work, they were 
either corseted into a rigid Marxist mould, silenced or later even arrested and 
executed, as was the tragic fate of Špet and Polivanov.8 
                                                 
7
 Despite its name, the formal-philosophical "school" was not a well organised body but a 
loose group of like-minded scholars, some of whom (Ţirmunskij, Vinogradov) are sometimes 
categorised as “pure” formalists. 
8
 Špet was shot in Tomsk in 1937 ; Polivanov was executed at an unknown location in 1938. 
A number of other, lesser-known figures suffered a similar fate. 
- 12 - 
 
In this generally dismal context, Majakovskij‟s suicide and the demise of Russian 
Modernism specifically contributed to bring a premature closure to the productive and 
original phase of the work of the Russian formalists – the group of scholars which 
arguably functioned as the principal, if polemical and vehemently contested vector of 
the young Soviet human sciences‟ development.9 As the story goes (cf. Depretto, 
2005; Tchougounnikov, 2005), the Russian formalists‟ scientific endeavours had by 
1928 reached something of a breaking point anyway. Starting with Lenin‟s death and 
the publication under the auspices of Trotsky of a fascicule (Literature and 
Revolution, 1924) directly aimed against their “formal method”, they had had to face 
increasingly vehement attacks from their Marxist critics (cf. Günther, 1976). Under 
pressure, the formalist movement started to dislocate progressively. Eichenbaum, for 
example, drifted towards a more traditional approach to literary studies during the 
mid 1920s (cf. Any, 1994). At the same time Jakubinskij and Polivanov 
spontaneously diverged towards heterodox Marxist positions. One of Russian 
formalism‟s leading lights, Jakobson, left for Czechoslovakia as early as 1921. 
The Russian formalists were of course well aware of this centrifugal dynamic, which 
was especially problematical to them because the conceptual vigour of their common 
project originally derived from an intense process of constant debate, exchanges and 
cross-fertilisation of ideas. Victor Erlich, a prominent scholar of Russian formalism, 
maintains for instance that “[The Formalist methodology] was a product of intellectual 
teamwork rarely paralleled in the history of literary scholarship” (Erlich, 1955, p.51). 
In defiance of the increasingly unfavourable odds accumulating against them, a 
committed core of formalists including Šklovskij, Tynjanov and Jakobson thus sought 
to fend off the mounting political pressures and breathe a new lease of life into their 
common enterprise. As they understood it, the success of their venture hinged on the 
reinstatement of a closer collaboration between themselves, and ultimately, on the 
prospect of repatriating Jakobson from his exile in Czechoslovakia. Majakovskij‟s 
death, however, put a definitive end to that hopeful outlook.  
                                                 
9
 The controversies with formalism were one of the most important debates conducted by 
Marxist thinkers during the 1920s (Conio, 1975); typically, the work of the « Bachtin Circle » 
(Bachtin, Vološinov, Medvedev)  was fuelled by the productive controversies entertained by 
its members with the formalists ;  Lev Vygotskij sought direct inspiration from the latters’ 
theses; as to the proponents of the formal-philsophical school, Eichenbaum complained of 
them that «they do not quote our works, although they take their terms as well as everything 
else from us" (quoted after Tynjanov, 1977, p.515) 
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As Jakobson‟s emotionally-laden reaction in “The Generation That Squandered its 
Poets” plainly shows, he henceforth considered it all but impossible to revive the 
fortunes of the Russian formalists‟ scientific enterprise in the new, unpropitious 
conditions subsequent to Majakovskij‟s disappearance. In his essay, Jakobson made 
it clear that he saw only a bleak future for the formalists‟ endeavours in the absence 
of the fertile soil of the now vanishing or already vanished Russian modernist 
environment. He thereby imparted in half-veiled terms to his friends Šklovskij and 
Tynjanov that he would certainly not be returning to the Soviet Union (Depretto, op. 
cit., p.112).10 Coupled with an infamous and ambiguous repudiation of formalist ideas 
made by Šklovskij in “A Monument to a Scientific Error” (1930),11 Jakobson‟s final 
decision and the ensuing break between the Soviet formalists and their Prague 
colleagues unmistakably signalled the demise of Russian Formalism as a pioneering, 
innovative force – and with it, the premature end of the free development of the 
“modernist” human sciences in the USSR.12 
 
Just as any similarly contrived break in the “natural” evolution of a cultural or 
intellectual movement of note, the precipitated downfall of Soviet modernist culture 
and human sciences entailed by the Great Turn obviously gives rise to a number of 
serious exegetical problems. At a speculative level, for example, it inclines one to 
ponder the many paintings, sculptures, buildings, plays, poems or novels that might 
have seen the light of day, had the Russian modernist artists been allowed to pursue 
their work either completely unfettered or in a less aggressively hostile environment. 
Much more substantially, one is confronted with the question of the concrete 
repercussions of the double rupture epitomised by Majakovskij‟s suicide on the 
intellectual and cultural history of the XXth century. Considering in particular that the 
work of thinkers such as the Russian formalists, Jakobson, Bachtin or Vygotskij 
                                                 
10
 As Depretto also points out, it is in fact rather doubtful whether Jakobson ever seriously 
considered going back to the USSR (Depretto, 2005, p.112). 
11
 On the debatable matter of the extent of Šklovskij's "repudiation" of his formalist past and 
its impact on his subsequent work, see the Sheldon-Erlich controversy (Sheldon 1975 & 1976; 
Erlich 1976). 
12
 To be perfectly exact, quite a few Soviet thinkers – including the Russian formalists 
themselves – continued to produce interesting work well into the 1930s and beyond. From 
that date onwards, however, they were deprived of institutional support and constrained to the 
margins of cultural and intellectual life. The vital and lively debate between competing point 
of views (including Marxist and non-Marxist ones), which had been so productive during the 
early 1920s was definitively cut short. 
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subsequently enjoyed significant success and influence both in the West and in the 
Soviet Union, one cannot but surmise that the Great Turn left some sort of mark on 
the processes of the development, diffusion and interpretation of the important and 
complex legacy of the Soviet modernist context. 
Surprisingly enough in view of the undoubted and influential achievements of early 
Soviet culture and human sciences, it so happens that definitive assessments of the 
full extent of the repercussions of the Great Turn on the evolution and, especially, on 
the subsequent reception of the Soviet modernist context of the 1910s and 20s have 
proven rather elusive. Naturally, the Great Turn and the early years of the Soviet 
Union have received sustained attention and been both discussed and commented 
upon at great length. The fact is, however, that the interest for this period has been 
the almost exclusive preserve of Slavists, which it has to be said, remain a marginal 
scholarly group. This interest has also long remained both lopsided and biased: 
Soviet artists and thinkers were either put to instrumental use as handy props in 
mainstream Western theories or traditions (the specificity and vicissitudes of the 
evolution of their own work being thereby mostly disregarded),13 or considered in the 
light of their relations with Marxist ideology and Marxist science, rather than their 
specific originality.14 
A superficial reason for this lasting indifference or lack of critical concern for the 
impact of the Great Turn on the development of the Soviet modernist context is that 
the latter‟s originality and relevance have tended to be downplayed, especially 
outside Russia. Typically, the Russian modernists‟ achievements have been 
interpreted as an interesting but unessential facet of modernist culture, which neither 
held much sway over the main thrust of Modernism‟s evolution, nor brought 
fundamentally different or original orientations to it. In the words of the distinguished 
art critic John Berger, Russian Modernism was "remarkable but not unique" (quoted 
in Gibian, 1976, p.14). In the same vein, the extent to which the Soviet modernist 
culture and the human sciences it directly inspired did actually undergo a clear-cut 
                                                 
13
 One thinks for example of the reception of the Russian formalists or Bachtin in France, 
which were respectively subsumed to the discourse of structuralism and the critiques against 
it. (cf. Matonti 2009, Cavanagh 1993) 
14
 This is strikingly true again in relation to the exegesis of Russian Formalism, which has 
more often than not been considered through the prism of the “Formalism vs. Marxism” 
problem. Cf. Bennett (2003), Conio (1975), Frow (1986), Günther (1976), Morson (1979), 
Tihanov (2001), etc. 
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and unwarranted collapse around 1930 has been called into question. The events 
referred to as the "Great Turn", after all, amount to a long-drawn, complex socio-
cultural and political process stretching over many years, not to the abrupt and 
unqualified end of all valuable science or culture in the Soviet Union. In that spirit, it 
has even been argued that the triumph of a totalitarian culture and hegemonious 
Marxist science in the USSR was in many ways the logical result of the aesthetic 
practices, cultural aims and theoretical outlook of the Soviet avant-gardes and the 
related human sciences (cf. Groys, 1992), which suggests that it did not involve or 
constitute a noteworthy break at all. 
One ought here to point out that, more than a decisive, well-argued proof of either the 
limited originality of the Soviet modernist context itself or the limited scope of the 
repercussions of its troubled history, views such as the above constitute the reflection 
of a persistent vagueness and confusion surrounding both the precise situation of the 
Russian or Soviet modernist artists and thinkers in the intellectual and cultural 
landscape of the XXth century, and the consequences that their unhappy fates 
actually did entail. For instance, Russian Modernism's rather modest impact in the 
West has never been justified by a lucid and detailed assessment of its strengths and 
weaknesses. The reality is much rather that this process resulted automatically from 
the blur of undue neglect, unfortunate misunderstandings and cultural prejudice that 
accompanied the reception of the Russian modernists‟ work in the West.  
To wit, most of the Russian modernists were patchily received in Europe or America 
for predominantly ideological reasons15 and were unjustifiably but thoroughly ignored 
as a consequence until well into the 1970s (Gibian, 1976, p. 3). To say the truth, they 
remain relatively unknown and peripheral to this day, presumably because of their 
linguistic remoteness16 or the self-absorbed, autarkic streak that has often come to 
                                                 
15
 As a reavealing example of such ideological impediments, one can mention that the “white” 
Russian intelligencia (Aldanov, Bunin, Gippius, Chodasevič, G. Ivanov, Mereţkovskij, 
Nabokov, etc.), which emigrated to Berlin or Paris after the revolution and could have served 
as an efficient relay or for the art and theories of Russian modernism failed to help in that 
cultural transfer in great part because of their distrust and antipathy towards the “red” Soviet 
avant-gardes. Contacts with the Russian emigration was also of course discouraged by the 
Soviet regime itself (cf. Dmitriev, 2002, p.433) 
16
 This statement is particularly true of the Modernist poets (Majakovskij, Chlebnikov, 
Achmatova or Mandelstam), whose work is barely translatable, and therefore mostly hermetic 
to non-Russian speakers. 
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characterise Russian culture.17 Were it not for this mix of past or continuing issues of 
deliberate or fortuitous isolationism, differing ideology and cultural inaccessibility, 
though, one presumes that the Russo-Soviet artistic and literary output would long 
have gained a much more prominent place in our accounts of Modernism‟s greatest 
achievements, possibly on a par with the works of Picasso, Duchamp, Kafka or 
Joyce. Revealingly enough, considerably more attention has been afforded to the 
work of those Russian modernists (Kandinskij, Chagall, Diagilev, Stravinskij) who 
were least close to the political ideals of the Russian revolution or the ideology of the 
Soviet regime, whose artistic medium was not language-related and who assimilated 
most keenly in the West.18  
Similarly, although the effects of the Great Turn were in some ways ambivalent and 
indecisive, it remains controversial in the extreme to argue that it did not involve a 
momentous break or have significantly adverse consequences on the evolution of 
modernist Soviet human sciences and culture. If anything, such obviously 
provocative interpretations contribute to highlight the extent of the interpretative 
problems connected with these events, or rather, with the complicated process of 
accounting for their cultural and intellectual repercussions. It is certainly worth 
mentioning in this respect that the complex historical circumstances that followed the 
Great Turn also significantly contributed to preclude or delay objective and 
exhaustive assessments of that period (cf. Sériot-Friedrich, 2008, pp.1-4). 
In the Soviet Union, the nature of the historical obstacles to such objective 
assessments is obvious: until the 1960s it was simply forbidden to deal openly with 
the legacy of the post-revolutionary times.19 In the West, the reception and 
interpretative processing of early Soviet though was deferred, distorted and frustrated 
by the breakdown in Russo-Western exchanges that the Great Turn and the Second 
                                                 
17
 The Russian futurists, for example – as evidenced by their less than cordial welcome of 
Marrinetti during his visit to the Soviet Union (see Alfonsov 1999, p.16) – clearly sought to 
distantiate themselves from their Western counterparts and to promote a typically “Russian” 
form of futurism 
18
 Kandinskij was closely involved with the blaue Reiter expressionist group in Germany. 
Chagall mingled with the Montparnasse art community. Diaghilev made his name in Paris 
with the Russian ballet, whilst Stravinskij emigrated at a young age and often appears more as 
a cosmopolitan than a specifically Russian figure. 
19
  Sebastian Shaumyan (1965) in linguistics and Jurij Lotman (1964) in literary semiotics 
were the first to attempt a rehabilitation of the early Soviet legacy, by re-actualising the ideas 
of the Russian formalists. 
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World War unquestionably brought about,20 by the ideological tensions spun by the 
Cold War,21 as well as, once again, by the linguistic and intellectual barriers that still 
contribute to set Russian thought and culture clearly apart from the mainstream 
Western artistic and scientific traditions. Because of all these disruptions, it is only in 
more recent years – approximately since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union – that Russian scholars and international specialists in Slavic 
studies have been able to turn in earnest to reassessing the precise circumstances of 
the evolutions and revolutions of early Soviet thought and culture.22 Interestingly, the 
scientific interest for what had been heretofore neglected, distorted or overlooked 
aspects of the Soviet context of the 1910-30s and its original, modernist legacy has 
since then steadily increased, both in Russia and internationally, to the point that its 
popularity has possibly never been greater than today. This post-Cold War wave of 
reassessment, however, is an ongoing, incomplete process.23 
In short, what all the – highly unusual for scientific life in the XXth century (cf. 
Dmitriev, 2002, p.423) – delays and difficulties involved in the protracted process of 
assessing the scope of the Soviet modernist context seem to suggest is that its wider 
role and impact in the intellectual and cultural history of the XXth century remains 
liable, to this day, to possibly sweeping reinterpretations. The aspects of the Soviet 
modernist context which are most likely to disclose new and relevant perspectives, 
moreover, pertain in particular to its theoretical dimension and the problem of its 
original links with the Russian modernists. Notwithstanding the unjustly small amount 
of attention imparted to the Russian modernists‟ artistic and literary productions, it is 
                                                 
20
  Dmitriev, 2002, p.433 underlines in particular the effect of World War I on the crucial 
Russio-German cultural and academic ties, which went from being very intense (scholars 
such as Ţirmunskij or Špet were educated partly in Germany, the work of contemporary 
thinkers such as Husserl, Bühler, Wundt, etc. was almost immediately received and 
commented) to quasi non-existent. 
21
 These ideological tensions, it should be noted, contributed to perturb the assessment of 
Soviet thought in two complementary ways: on the one hand, they put Soviet theories 
squarely off limits for most Western scholars; on the other, they substantially biased the 
interpretations that were indeed carried out by disproportionately increasing the relevance of 
Marxist issues (cf. Sériot-Friedrich, 2008, p.2). 
22
 One reason for this being of course that a lot of archived material suddenly became much 
more readily available, especially to foreign researchers. 
23
 To convince oneself of the extent and actuality of this renewed interest, one needs but 
consider the mass of insightful critical reassessments of early Soviet thought to have appeared 
in very recent years: Avtonomova (2009), Dennes (2008), Depretto (2009), Kelih (2008) 
Romand-Tchougounnikov (2009), Sériot-Friedrich (2008), Tihanov (2009), Trautmann-
Waller (2006), Vauthier (2008), Zbinden (2006). 
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on the whole doubtless correct that their work is neither of absolutely unique 
importance, nor outstandingly different, at its very heart, from that of other Western 
modernist movements. As such, their untimely eclipse was a deeply regrettable 
incident, but one whose impact affected the narrower Russian cultural sphere and its 
history rather than the course of Modern art and literature as a whole. 
By contrast, the efforts of elucidation and generalisation of modernist ideas carried 
out by the likes of the Russian Formalists, Jakobson or Vygotskij had no real or 
significant equivalent outside of the Soviet Union. It is therefore almost inevitable that 
the perturbations to the exclusively Soviet process of theorising and systemising 
modernist artistic and literary insights had significant consequences, such as 
unwarrantedly obscuring the specificity and potential of some of the theoretical 
avenues suggested by Soviet thinkers. To cut frankly to the point, I wish to suggest 
here that amongst the “modernist” avenues to have been occulted in such a way, one 
finds the Russian formalists‟ theories on art and literature. To be quite precise, I 
believe that one has underestimated the implicit philosophical potency of their 
fundamental intuitions, which de facto involve a tantalising but neglected prospect as 
to the nature of aesthetic experience, and indeed, experience in general. 
 
The allegedly neglected philosophical scope of the Russian formalists‟ theories takes 
its source at the very core of the originality of Modernism, namely its account of art 
and literature themselves. To recall, be it in perilously over-generalising fashion, a 
significant aspect of the modernists‟ “project“ was to radically redefine the 
possibilities of art itself, most notably by exploring and pushing the limits of its 
semantic, epistemological and ontological functions. For instance, the modernists 
defied the age-old aristotelician idea that art must strive to depict reality mimetically 
or symbolically, suggesting instead that it focus more – sometimes exclusively – on 
the non-objective, non-figurative formal possibilities inherent to the specific medium 
of various art-forms (the phonic or graphic substrate of words in poetry, the pigment 
and texture of paint in painting, etc.). Instead of producing works of pleasing or 
harmonious beauty in a classical sense, the modernists also sought to use art to 
surprise and shock us into paying more attention to and confronting the often 
senseless reality offered by the ever more technical, rushed and confusing modern 
world. Most ambitiously, the modernists defended the idea that art could creatively or 
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performatively produce its own reality and, in that process, not only contribute to 
redefine our relations with the everyday world, but transfigure it into a sublimated, 
pervasively aesthetic kind of reality.24 
In keeping with the specific intellectual ambitions of the pre-war Russo-Soviet human 
sciences, the Russian formalists sought to capture and express these wild modernist 
aesthetic assumptions in more systematic and rigorous theoretical terms. To be more 
precise, one might want to say that the Russian formalists effectively made use of the 
concrete examples provided by Russian Modern art and literature as templates to 
formulate their own aesthetic theories. Be that as it may, the Russian formalists 
certainly succeeded in enunciating a seminal aesthetic idea – famously labelled by 
Šklovskij as the process or device of estrangement or defamiliarisation (“ostranenie” 
in the original Russian)25 – which has credibly been characterised as “the central 
aesthetic and philosophical principle of Modern Art and its theory” (Hansen-Löve, 
1978, p.22). In short, the principle of estrangement postulates that the essential 
function of art and literature is to redynamise and refresh our concrete perceptions or 
sensations of ordinary objects and everyday life by presenting them in formally 
unusual, unconventional or surprising ways. In Šklovskij‟s often repeated words: “art 
exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to 
make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they 
are perceived and not as they are known. The device of art is to make objects 
'unfamiliar,' to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception 
because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be 
prolonged” (Šklovskij, 1988 [1917], pp.20-21). 
This definition of both art and literature and of their perceptive power and function is 
of course not bereft of problems and questions marks. For instance, Šklovskij‟s 
principle of estrangement – as well as the whole formalist conception of art and 
aesthetics that it effectively underpins – simply generalises the major modernist 
themes enumerated above. Šklovskij obviously gives echo to the tenets of 
                                                 
24
 On the tenets of Russian Modernism in particular, cf. Hutchings (1997). On the core tenets 
of Modernist aesthetics, one can refer to a classic such as Hughes (1991) or the general 
introductions and anthologies by Armstrong (2005), Kolocotroni (1998), Lewis (2008) or 
Weston (2001).  
25
 Ostranenie is a Russian neologism (aledgedly resulting from a misspelling) formed on the 
root “strannyj” – which means “strange”.  
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(Russian)26 modernist aesthetics with his double concern for the importance of 
literary or artistic form as such, as well as the raw, sensual concreteness of empirical 
reality. The same goes for his attempt to characterise the everyday world as a 
legitimate source of aesthetic experience – whilst simultaneously emphasising the 
need to distort and transform it through the specific devices of art or literature in order 
to heighten and redynamise our perceptive awareness of it. Šklovskij‟s enthusiasm 
for the new, the surprising or the “unfamiliar” is also absolutely typical of modernism.  
Naturally, the pronounced slant of Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement towards the 
particular "dogma" and features of Modern art appears to give it a primarily 
descriptive value and to very strongly limit its conceptual scope, whether as a theory 
of aesthetics or as the bearer of general philosophical insights. One might even want 
to doubt its value as an adequate generalisation of the tenets of modernism itself: 
considering the incredible diversity and radicalism of Modern Art, such a feat seems 
methodologically very suspicious. In any case, its intimate links with Modern Art 
certainly mean that Šklovskij‟s definition of art was subjected to wide-ranging and 
stinging criticisms on the grounds that it lacks generality and only constitutes the 
somewhat out-dated theoretical formulation of a specific aesthetic – which has itself 
been ferociously attacked.27 
In synthesising the artistic principles of Russian Modernism as it does, however, 
Šklovskij's definition of art as estrangement also accomplishes something 
theoretically much more ambitious than simply providing a description of the 
particular aesthetic of Russian Cubo-futurism. For one, it offers an original twist to the 
venerable tradition of aesthetic formalism. Šklovskij‟s definition, indeed, obviously 
involves a bona fide formalist attempt to define art immanently, in terms of its own 
specific function and inherent formal properties. In addition, Šklovskij also eschews 
the classical criteria of beauty, taste or the “sublime”, canonised philosophically since 
the XVIIIth century by the works of Kant and the German Idealists as the typical 
markers of art‟s specific aesthetic value and functions. Instead, he elects to define 
the act of consciously experiencing the everyday world in its vivid, nuanced and 
concrete perceptual complexity and plasticity as the constitutive, immanent feature of 
                                                 
26
 Technically speaking, Šklovskij’s principle of estrangement was inspired most directly by 
the artistic practices of Russian Modernism (or Cubo-futurists). That inspiration, however, 
was not exclusive. 
27
 cf. Gablik 1984, or indeed the whole wave of post-modernist critiques of modernism 
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aesthetic experience. This unusual decision to closely associates the intrinsic 
aesthetic value of art with the process of sensual perception – rather than pegging it 
to a vague, transcendental concept of beauty –, leads in turn to a genuinely general 
prospect, "on behalf“ of Modern art and literature. This prospect is that the process of 
perception is itself intrinsically aesthetic or aesthetically valuable.28 
On its own, I willingly concede, Šklovskij‟s modernist “discovery” of the intrinsic 
aesthetic value of the perceptive process is neither particularly enlightening, 
interesting nor contentious in any significant way. That being said, Šklovskij‟s and his 
fellow formalists‟ conception of art and literature actually goes much further than a 
mere statement of perception‟s inherent aestheticity and aesthetic value: it provides a 
definite meaning and explanation to that assumption, through the idea that our 
perceptive acts possess a formal, intransitively “expressive” character. According to 
Šklovskij‟s programmatic declarations, perception derives its aesthetic value from the 
fact that it is not a purely mediatory cognitive act geared towards conveying 
information or knowledge about the empirical world but, on the contrary, that it 
amounts to an intransitive, conscious awareness of reality in its intricate phenomenal 
complexity and structure. Put somewhat differently, Šklovskij assumes that 
perceiving a given object or fact fully and properly does not imply simply identifying it 
and its properties cognitively or categorically as a definite whole or definite 
"something" (to know what it is), but to experience and be wholly aware of (to feel, to 
sense, to see) the details and intricacies of its specific structural, formal features or 
“make” (faktura).29 As is the case in non-objective, non-figurative modern art, the act 
of aesthetic perception involves experiencing the detailed structure or formal 
attributes of an object, rather than the object itself. As Šklovskij puts it, “art is a way 
of experiencing how an object is made: the object itself is not important"(Šklovskij, 
1988 [1917], p.21 – my italics, adapted translation).30  
                                                 
28
 To be clear, the generality of Šklovskij’s claim concerns only the nature of perception 
itself, not the modernist assumption that art must involve sensual impressions of reality. It is 
indeed certainly not true that all art forms or aesthetic traditions are focused on sensual 
perception as their aesthetic end. Still, it is possible to admit that perception can sometimes 
constitute such an aesthetic end, and that it therefore does carry intrinsic aesthetic potential – 
whether it is actualized in a given work or not. 
29
 Jakobson repeats the same argument at the level of language itself: he defines poetry as an 
“expression with a set on expression”, i.e. as a use of language where the pure linguistic 
substrate is valued as such, rather than for its deictic, communicatve or conative functions. 
30
 The exact meaning of this key statement is unclear, so that translations differ considerably 
Lemon’s unmodified version reads: “Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: 
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Again, one might want to question whether Šklovskij‟s way of correlating aesthetic 
value with the perception or perceptibility of form as such is all that original. One can 
trace similar definitions of aesthetic perception as an essentially formal and 
intransitive act as far back as Kant‟s critical philosophy and aesthetics – a model 
from which I just suggested Šklovskij was distancing himself. In that sense, one could 
argue that Šklovskij‟s “formalist” interpretation and systematisation of the modernists‟ 
original artistic practices does not result in or imply any significant new aesthetic 
insights after all. An only slightly closer look at Šklovskij‟s and the Russian formalists‟ 
aesthetic conjectures, however, reveals that they do bring significant nuances to the 
role of form in aesthetic perception, which demarcate them very strongly from 
Kantian schematism and aesthetics. To be more precise, Šklovskij‟s "strange" 
version of formalism diverges in two absolutely decisive ways both from Kant‟s 
aesthetics itself and from the other classical statements of formalism in art, music or 
literature propounded by the likes of Clive Bell, Clement Greenberg, Eduard 
Hanslick, Oskar Walzel or Heinrich Wölfflin.31 
Firstly, one recalls that the formal dimension of perception in Kant‟s philosophical 
system is linked to the synthetic, critical faculties of Pure Reason, and is therefore of 
a purely intellectual, abstract order. This abstractness is even more evident in regard 
to Kant‟s conception of aesthetic form. In Kant‟s aesthetics, “the concern is not with 
the inherent nature of [the] object, not even considered as phenomenon, but rather 
with the object qua represented, that is, apprehended in mere reflection and its 
aesthetic, and therefore non-cognitive and non-practical, relation to the subject” 
(Allison, 2001, p.119). Clive Bell offers a similarly detached vision of the work of art 
and the aesthetic experience it involves: "To appreciate a work of art we need bring 
with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its 
emotions" (Bell, 1913, p.27). In short, this type of formalism is essentially disengaged 
and contemplative. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the object is not important.” Scholes (1975) suggests “In art, it is our experience of the 
process of construction that counts, not the finished product”. See also Sher (1991): “Art is a 
means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artefact itself is quite unimportant” The 
original Russian is: “iskusstvo est’ sposob pereţit’ delan’e vešči, a sdelannoe v iskusstve ne 
vaţno”. There is of course more at issue here than a simple problem of translation: the 
different meanings given to this statement reflect possible interpretations of Šklovskij’s 
(problematic) view of the relation between the work of art and the object of perception. (see 
also Chapter 3) 
31
 For the classical accounts of their respective positions, see Bell (1914), Greenberg (1961), 
Hanslick (1854), Walzel (1923), Wölfflin (1915) 
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For Šklovskij, in flagrant contrast to these traditional positions, aesthetic form is 
anything but the property of an abstract, reflected or represented object. We just saw 
that he explicitly rejects the view that aesthetic perception is an abstract, cognitive 
act of knowledge – or a disinterested act of reflexive contemplation in the Kantian 
sense –, asserting rather that it corresponds to our concrete, “lived” sensual 
impressions of the material structure of a given “thing” (vešč), “fact” (fakt) or a “word 
as such” (slovo kak takovoe). Despite its formal nature, aesthetic experience involves 
the perception of something concrete, of the material “fabric” (faktura) or “texture” of 
an empirical reality. In other words, because of this combination of artistic form and 
concrete perception in aesthetic experience, it would seem that Šklovskij‟s particular 
conception of formalism involves a rejection of the traditional dualistic distinction 
instituted by most Western (Platonician, Cartesian, Kantian) metaphysics – and by 
aesthetics itself as a philosophical discipline32 – between form and content, or 
between the ideal and sensual layers of perception. Instead, he seems to suggest 
that aesthetic perception effectively “bridges the gap“(Holquist-Kliger, 2005) between 
the two and congregates them into a “homogeneous, monistic and autotelic act” 
(Hansen-Löve, 1978, p. 225).  
Secondly, Šklovskij‟s idiosyncratic brand of formalism distinguishes itself by 
postulating that the forms we perceive in aesthetic perception are not defined by their 
particular "significance" (Bell), “beauty”, “harmony”, “purposiveness” (Kant) or any 
particular quality. On the contrary, aesthetic experience corresponds to the pure 
perceptibility or perceptiveness of any given form. As we saw, Šklovskij deems that 
the simple act of perceiving be it as common and ordinary an object as a stone in its 
complex, sensual phenomenality constitutes in itself a properly aesthetic experience. 
In that sense, according to Šklovskij, the play of striking arrangements of lines, 
colours, shapes, volumes, vectors and space that characterises painting, or the 
subtle uses of rhythm, rhyme, alliteration and metaphor in poetry are not intended to 
produce immanently beautiful, outstanding or special forms as such – nor are they to 
be evaluated and judged in such terms. Rather, the formal elements of painting or 
poetry are geared towards being purely “expressive”, which means that they are 
                                                 
32
 If one believes Eagleton, that separation was essential to the birth of aesthetics: “The vital 
distinction that the term signifies for its inventor, Alexander Baumgarten, is not between art 
and life but between the material and immaterial: between things and thoughts, sensations and 
ideas, what is bound up with our creaturely life of perception as opposed to what belongs to 
the mind. (Eagleton, 1988, p.327).  
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either to be palpable or perceptible themselves, or capable of shaping our ordinary 
acts of perception in such a way as to reinforce and sharpen our awareness of their 
intentional content and structure. 
When considered in the light of these two specific features then, Šklovskij‟s brand of 
aesthetic formalism thus does appear to make a highly original suggestion, namely  
that art and literature have the power to summon, produce or "perform" aesthetic 
experiences of the world as a series of structurally articulated, expressive but 
nonetheless concrete and decidedly empirical forms. Much more, it seems to imply 
that not only can we perceive reality as a series of concretely articulated and 
expressive forms in the particular modality of aesthetic perception, but that the 
empirical world is in fact always given or experienced in that way. In effect, since 
Šklovskij posits that the aesthetic value or "aestheticity" of a given object 
corresponds to nothing more than its pure, concrete perceptibility as a distinct, 
expressive something and, moreover, that this perceptibility itself implies nothing 
more than a conscious, alert perception of the object‟s form or detailed structure, one 
must conclude that the normal process of perception itself involves perceiving reality 
and its objects as expressive, concrete forms. In other words, from the typically 
modernist and not uncommon assumption that perception can be an intrinsically 
aesthetic and “valuable” act in itself, Šklovskij‟s and the Russian formalists‟ theory of 
estrangement leads up to the ambitious and general thesis that perception functions 
as a kind of aisthesis, “an opening onto the world, a primal contact with it” (Barbaras, 
1998, p.16), which happens as the intransitive, onto-morphogenetic crystallisation of 
reality in a series of concrete, “materially” expressive forms or structures 
 
Regrettably, Šklovskij‟s unusual aesthetic formalism and the as yet unclear 
philosophical perspectives it seems to imply with regard to the conjointly concrete 
and formal, material and expressive nature of our empirical experience of reality have 
never been thoroughly explored and assessed. That is so because along with many 
other Soviet modernist ideas of the time, Šklovskij‟s theory of art as estrangement 
was dismissed out of hand and deemed unacceptable as a plausible, philosophical 
and systematic model. On top of the above-mentioned reservations formulated 
against estrangement, critics (Erlich, Hansen-Löve, Steiner, Striedter, etc.) have 
agreed almost unanimously that Šklovskij‟s loose theorising on perception too 
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obviously lacks the conceptual foundations and ambition to be credible as a coherent 
philosophical model. The aesthetic principle of estrangement itself has in time been 
rejected as a relevant and useful concept of literary theory, which was originally its 
central purpose. Šklovskij‟s notion of form, similarly, was attacked early on for being 
too simplistic, reductive and, crucially, for lacking a truly semantic dimension 
(Medvedev, 1973 [1934], Engelhardt, 1927). As mentioned, the final nail in the coffin 
of Šklovskij‟s aesthetics is that, despite its pretension to generality, it seems to be too 
closely bound with the idiosyncratic artistic experimentations and philosophical 
background of Russian Modernism to be universally applicable and to adequately 
characterise all forms and types of artistic practices and traditions.  
To say the truth, such circumspection is not wholly unjustified. In many ways, 
Šklovskij's modernistic ambition to present aesthetic perception as a concretely 
expressive, formal act constitutes but another attempt in a long, serially unsuccessful 
tradition – again dating back to Kant – to establish the importance of art as a 
synthetic and therefore more complete and adequate way of understanding and 
experiencing the world (Berman, 1994, pp. VIII-IX). In the same vein, the Russian 
Formalists are not alone in their implicit ambition to transcend the age-old problems 
of metaphysical dualism, nor do they seem best qualified to offer new solutions to the 
classical oppositions between intelligible and sensible, form and matter, idea and 
impression, etc. The inherent vagueness of terms such as that of “expression” or 
even "form" itself, as well as the patchiness of the philosophical concepts and the 
indefinite terminology used so far to describe Šklovskij‟s principle of estrangement or 
the Russian formalists' aesthetic assumptions constitute rather evident hints as to 
their conceptual limitations and imprecisions. In any case, my short exposition of 
Šklovskij's aesthetics has without question contrived to simplify his views on the idea 
of the concrete perceptibility of form and its connection with aesthetic experience, to 
over-interpret the philosophical scope and intention of his theory, and to paper over 
the many obvious gaps of his piece-meal argumentation, as well as the more general 
faults and omissions of his definition of art and literature. 
Despite all their limitations and the undeniable pertinence of the above-mentioned 
objections, however, it must be said that the philosophical perspectives hastily 
outlined above are but potentially, rather than actually present in Šklovskij's work. 
They constitute imperfect but promising sketches that other formalists such as 
Tynjanov or Jakobson, constantly sought – and to a large extent succeeded – to 
- 26 - 
 
ameliorate and systemise. Jakobson‟s work in particular, provides a much more 
precise and legitimate meaning to the idea of concrete and expressive perceptual 
form suggested by earlier formalists. As I have been at pains to emphasise in this 
introduction, both Šklovskij‟s and the other formalists‟ efforts were interrupted before 
Russian Formalism had time to fully run its course and were prevented from 
receiving an adequate and objective assessments – including in the Western 
intellectual traditions they contributed to strongly influence – by subsequent historical 
circumstances. As I will try to show in the following pages, despite their initial 
conceptual frailties and origins in a particular, historically defined and therefore 
contingent aesthetic or artistic practice, the correlated ideas of the concrete 
perceptibility of form and the intrinsically aesthetic, structural and expressive nature 
of perception suggested both by Modern art or literature and the Russian formalists' 
literary and linguistic theories can be articulated and systemised in a consistent and 
relevant philosophical model. 






Russian Formalism’s Structuralist Legacy 
 
To be perfectly honest, my introductory remarks on the difficulties incurred by the 
wider Soviet modernist context in its development and reception are not nearly 
sufficient to justify my subsequent assertion that contingent historical circumstances 
have perturbed and obscured the Russian formalists‟ work to the point that it has 
remained insufficiently acknowledged and explored as the source and vector of 
philosophically profound and consistent insights into the nature of art, literature or 
aesthetic experience, let alone experience in general. The first, preliminary but 
nonetheless pressing task that needs to be undertaken at the outset of this study is 
therefore to face up to, and then answer a number of general objections against the 
plausibility of my assertion and the prospects it opens. 
Amongst the most obvious problems facing my suggestion that the aesthetic 
assumptions of Russian Formalism are ripe for a comprehensive and fruitful 
reinterpretation, one finds the inconvenient fact that, unlike the work of some of the 
other pre-war Soviet thinkers, the Russian Formalists actually enjoyed a wide and 
often enthusiastic reception. Their ideas were introduced first in the Anglo-Saxon 
sphere in the 1950s (amongst other by René Wellek‟s and Austin Warren‟s influential 
Theory of Literature), at a time when they opportunely came into resonance with New 
Criticism (cf. Thompson, 1971). Their work was also met with strong interest in 
Germany, most notably by Hans-Robert Jauss‟s and Wolfgang Iser‟s “Poetics und 
Hermeneutics” group in Constance.33 Most significantly of all, the theories of the 
Russian Formalists had a decisive impact on French Structuralism, first through the 
proxy of Jakobson‟s personal influence on Claude Lévi-Strauss,34 and then again 
                                                 
33
 Jurij Striedter, one of the core members of the “Poetics und Hermeneutics” group in 
Konstanz, translated the first anthology of Formalist texts into German. (Striedter, 1969). 
34
 Lévi-Strauss meeting with Jakobson at the French Institute for Advanced Studies at 
Columbia in New York in the 1940s is considered as the seminal moment of the former’s 
career, and of French Structuralism as a whole. 
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when they were rediscovered and reactualised by the French structuralists at the 
height of their popularity, thanks in particular to Tzvetan Todorov‟s translation of the 
fundamental texts of Šklovskij, Tynjanov and Eichenbaum (Todorov, 1966).35 In other 
words, all the most significant schools of literary theory of the post-war era were 
acutely aware of the existence of Russian Formalism.  
Much more, the Russian Formalists are unconditionally credited with having laid the 
foundations of modern literary theory (or poetics) and their work is a recognised and 
valued part of the canon of that discipline (cf. anthologies and introductions such as 
Culler 1997; Ducrot 1999; Pechlivanos 1995; Ruwet 1996, W. Schmid 2010; Selden 
1995; Weber 1998; Wellek-Warren 1949). Over the years, many insightful 
monographies, one by as prominent a thinker as Frederic Jameson (The Prison-
House of Language, 1972), have contributed to a thorough scholarly assessment of 
their ideas and influence. In short, the Russian formalists' work has been widely 
acknowledged, ably reviewed, productively plundered for its wealth and extensively 
criticised. Despite the reservations I voiced as to the standard interpretations of early 
Soviet thought in general, Russian Formalism does not appear to constitute a 
particularly obscure or contentious part of that legacy, and thus to possess obvious 
potential for rehabilitation. After all, even their apparently so original attempt to bind 
form and content together has received widespread and sustained critical attention 
(cf. Engelhardt, 1927; Hansen-Löve, 1978; Holquist-Kliger 2005). In such conditions, 
if one is to cast a new light on Russian formalism‟s allegedly misunderstood 
philosophical value, one needs here to volunteer much more specific arguments as 
to the precise scope and origin of that misunderstanding and its consequences – and 
to discuss in some more detail the historical context and evolution of Russian 
Formalism, as well as the circumstances of its reception. 
 
Before proceeding to such a discussion, I also need to defend the very legitimacy of 
my ambition to interpret Russian Formalism as the source of philosophical, 
systematic aesthetic principles – as this seems in many ways to flout the very spirit of 
the formalists‟ project. By all accounts, notwithstanding the general, aesthetic 
overtones of crucial ideas such as estrangement, the focus of the formalists was 
solely to formulate a theory of literature. They were intent on "specifying" the 
                                                 
35
 Cf. also Matonti (2009) on the reception of Russian formalism in France 
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problems of literary analysis and criticism, not on producing a full-blown aesthetic 
theory, let alone a methodologically grounded philosophical system (Erlich, 1955, 
p.145). Boris Eichenbaum, for instance, made this perfectly clear: “What 
characterises us is neither “Formalism” as an aesthetic theory, nor “methodology” as 
a closed scientific system, but only the striving to establish, on the basis of specific 
properties of the literary material, an independent literary science” (Eichenbaum, 
1927, p.117). Tellingly, the non-literary, philosophical dimension of the aesthetic 
principles expounded by Šklovskij was quickly restricted by the formalists to playing a 
secondary, discreet role in the background of their investigations. Despite its seminal 
influence, Šklovskij‟s vision of art as estrangement only functioned in Russian 
Formalism‟s earliest days as a broad template or conceptual stepping-stone, 
warranting but an ever diminishing portion of the formalists‟ attention in comparison 
to specific issues of narratology, verse analysis, literary evolution, etc. As a matter of 
fact, the Russian formalists carefully and purposefully avoided confronting the wider, 
non-literary implications of their initial aesthetic premises: in their eyes, to use the 
notion of estrangement as a foundation to justify a systematic, unified theory of 
aesthetics would threaten to reduce the manifold manifestations of art and literature 
to a single, reductive explanatory principle. 
To my mind, neither the formalists‟ indifference to the broader aesthetic aspects of 
their ideas nor their outright hostility to closed systems and axiomatic principles must 
automatically disqualify all attempts to make philosophical sense of their work. This is 
especially true if such attempts are directed (as mine is) more towards exploiting 
Russian Formalism‟s inherent potential than providing a descriptively faithful and 
exact account of its basic tenets. In any case, the Russian Formalists were never 
totally successful in distancing themselves from the philosophical field of aesthetics, 
with which they “worked, not infrequently, in tactical collaboration” (Tihanov, 2004, 
p.62). What is more, there is definitely evidence of “alien” philosophical or 
psychological influences in the formalists' literary theories. To drive home this point, 
one can mention that no less an authority than Vygotskij suggested that "actually, the 
Formalists are compelled to be psychologists and to speak in sometimes confused, 
but absolutely psychological prose" (Vygotskij, 1986 [1922], p.74).  
As such, the philosophical and psychological innuendos to be found in the formalists‟ 
nominally literary theories constitute enough justification for shining some light on 
these more ambiguous parts of their work, as was done critically in the 1920s already 
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(cf. Engelhard, 1927; Ţinkin, 1927), or later on by Holenstein (1976), Hansen-Löve, 
(1978), Paramonov (1996), Gretchko (2003), Svetlikova (2005), or Romand & 
Tchougounnikov (2009). It is also quite clear though that if it is to go further than 
simply identifying their main theoretical sources (in psychology, philosophy, 
linguistics, etc.) and descriptively highlighting the non-literary aspects of some of their 
essential ideas, the interpretative act of systemising the formalists‟ aesthetic of 
estrangement into a consistent philosophical framework cannot be carried out as a 
straightforward hermeneutical reassessment of their work itself. Rather, a 
philosophical, systematic approach to Russian Formalism must proceed by 
ascertaining its worth through the prism of another, related model that is both more 
consistent and philosophically more ambitious.  
The necessity of reinterpreting the conceptual potential of the Russian formalists‟ 
legacy indirectly is made all the more evident when one considers that, despite its 
undeniable and foundational role in the development of literary theory (and despite 
the recurring bursts of interest generated by some of its specific concepts, in 
particular estrangement), Russian Formalism in itself certainly does appear to be 
both outdated and deeply flawed. The bulk of the formalists' ideas were consciously 
provocative, even excessive in their intent (cf. Erlich, 1973, p.638) and, as such, they 
display conspicuous weaknesses. As we saw, the Russian formalists have been 
abundantly and rightly criticised for these weaknesses and, for that same reason, 
have also long been assessed as a spent force. That Russian Formalism 
nonetheless exerted a durable influence and still commands historical interest comes 
down, arguably, to the fact that it was able to quickly mature into and was eventually 
supplanted by a stronger theoretical paradigm, that of structuralism.  
In effect, Russian Formalism's most valuable insights were reinterpreted and 
recycled in clear structuralist terms by some of the formalists themselves (Jakobson, 
Trubeckoj), in the context of the Prague School. Erlich, for instance, has thus 
volunteered the opinion that Prague structuralism was ultimately a restatement of the 
"basic tenets of Russian Formalism in more judicious and rigorous terms" (Erlich, 
1974, p.727). Additionally, one can point out that it is through the mediation of the 
Prague school and Jakobson that the formalist ideas first enjoyed significant 
international recognition; it is in the context of French Structuralism that they made 
the greatest impact; and it is as the “John the Baptists” of structuralism (Steiner, 
1984, p.20) that they are best known and most respected. 
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At worse, the obvious and long-acknowledged conceptual limitations and polemical 
weaknesses of Russian Formalism‟s key ideas – along with their resulting adjustment 
or adaptation into a structuralist framework – would seem to imply that it has in fact 
been correctly assessed as a transitional, now refuted theory with no further 
significant coherent insights to yield as a systematic model. As Peter Steiner has 
suggested, it is probably most appropriate to see Russian Formalism “not as a school 
in the ordinary sense of the word, but […] a peculiar developmental stage in the 
history of Slavic literary theory” (Steiner, 1984, p.9), which means also that it never 
actually achieved the coherence of a systematic model in its own right. At best, 
Russian Formalism‟s shortcomings mean that prising a coherent theory from its yet 
embryonic and contradictory ideas must involve questioning its ties with structuralism 
and, ultimately, lead to a reassessment of structuralism itself. 
 
That the only reasonable prospect of rehabilitating or defending the relevance of the 
formalists‟ aesthetic ideas in a philosophical perspective is to do so indirectly, by 
shining a new light on their significance and potential vis-à-vis structuralism, gives 
rise to a couple more methodological objections against such an endeavour. To start 
with, the one really substantial reason to suspect Russian Formalism of hiding 
unexploited conceptual possibilities with regard to structuralism is the above-
mentioned probability that the repression of cultural life and scientific activity that 
intervened in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s seriously perturbed or diminished the 
legacy it was able to bequeath structuralism. But, as far as the structuralist aspects of 
the formalists‟ work are concerned, the reverse seems to be true.  
Although Russian Formalism‟s precipitated demise did happen in the difficult, hostile 
context of the Great Turn, it is often argued that it succumbed not as a result of the 
enforced interruption of its development by exterior and contingent socio-political 
factors, but primarily because of its own conceptual implosion under the weight of its 
polemical excesses, contradictions and vagueness (cf. Erlich, 1955; Aucouturier, 
1994). By all accounts, the formalists‟ ideas and theories would have had to be 
adapted and consolidated in a sturdier paradigm anyway, irrespective of the historical 
circumstances. Since the formalists‟ essential insights were effectively salvaged by 
formalists themselves in the friendly context of the Prague School, and were 
eventually received and further developed in a structuralist framework both in the 
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Soviet Union by the Tartu School of semiotics and in the West by the French 
structuralists, this has quite logically been taken to mean that Russian Formalism‟s 
downfall had little negative impact on its contribution to structuralism, and that its 
transition was highly successful.36  
One must also consider against the likelihood of a productive reassessment of the 
ideas of the Russian formalists through the prism of structuralism that the latter was 
one of the defining intellectual movements of the XXth century. In that quality, its 
scope and limitations have been even more thoroughly discussed and debated than 
Russian Formalism's ever were. Moreover, structuralism is itself generally seen 
nowadays as a rather tired and, in many ways, discredited paradigm, so that even if 
Russian Formalism did still have anything relevant to reveal in connection with it, 
these perspectives themselves would more likely than not be obsolete and subject to 
the criticisms generally directed at structuralist ideas (cf. Culler 2000). If that were not 
enough, the pre-war Slavic contributions to structuralism – which include the work of 
the Russian formalists, the Prague school, as well as that of Špet – have been 
assigned a distinctly peripheral position both in the genealogy and in the wider 
conceptual horizon of structural thought.  
To recall, in its classical accounts, structuralism is often presented as having 
emerged almost exclusively from the pioneering work of Ferdinand de Saussure in 
general linguistics (cf. Dosse, 1991; Eco, 1988). From that single seminal source, it 
spread to the whole field of linguistics, burgeoning into a number of structural models 
such as Hjelmslev‟s glossematics or Benvéniste‟s theory of enunciation. 
Structuralism‟s period of greatest relevance came in France after the war, where the 
template of Saussurean linguistics was applied to disciplines such as anthropology, 
literary theory, psychoanalysis, sociology and philosophy. This diversification gave 
rise to the French intellectual movement of the 1960s, which in due course has 
become synonymous with structuralism itself. In this conventional picture of the 
genealogy of structuralism, the Prague School fits in as an important pre-war model, 
but only as one of several representative examples of the Saussurean tradition of 
linguistics. Špet‟s work does not register at all as a significant contribution, whereas 
the Russian Formalists, as we just saw, are noted only as “inter-paradigmatic” 
(Steiner, 1984, p.10) forbearers to structuralism proper. Slavic contributions to 
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 Jameson (1976), for example, speaks of “Czech formalists”, underlining the continuity he 
sees between the Russian formalism and Prague structuralism 
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structuralism, including both those of its most prominent figure, Roman Jakobson, 
thus appear to be both conceptually beholden to Saussure and historically 
subordinated to the more mature accomplishments of the French thinkers of the 60s 
(Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Lacan, Althusser, etc.). In comparison to these towering 
figures of XXth century thought, it is hard to envisage how a reassessment of 
Russian Formalism might seriously challenge structuralism‟s fundamental orientation 
or offer the prospect of ground-breaking new insights. 
 
Unquestionably, it would be unrealistic to seek to face down all these very substantial 
and solid objections by simply arguing that Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement and 
the Russian formalists' other core aesthetic assumptions were consciously intended 
as fully fledged philosophical statements, that they have not been widely received 
and discussed, and that they do not display fundamental inconsistencies and 
limitations. It is equally undisputable that most of the Russian formalists‟ ideas and 
theories were recycled and adapted in the context of structuralism, a much more 
potent paradigm which has been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate and 
whose halcyon days are now also long gone. As such, there seems very little room 
left to defend the hypothesis that Šklovskij‟s and the formalists‟ modernist vision of 
art and literature as estrangement still has the potential to be shaped into (or at least 
to inspire) a consistent and appealing vision of aesthetics, be it in a structuralist or 
any other kind of framework. 
Despite these strong arguments against my hypothesis, however, I believe one can 
nonetheless find compelling reasons to defend its plausibility. To start with, the 
uncertainties surrounding the Great Turn and its consequences imply that, 
notwithstanding the widespread and enthusiastic reception of Russian Formalism, 
the modalities of its transition to Prague structuralism in the turbulent Soviet context 
of the 1920s are still not as clear as they could be. At the very least, they have 
prevented a definitive judgement on the successful, adequate nature of that 
transition. True, Russian Formalism itself was conceptually drained and wearing itself 
out by 1930. Just as true, structuralism was the obvious solution to redynamise it, 
and in many ways effectively did so. But the constrained circumstances and manner 
of the mutation from the one to the other do raise strong suspicions that this process 
did not proceed as unimpeded and seamlessly as it could have. In fact, one can even 
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find a few, usually Russian voices to argue that structuralism did not constitute such 
an improvement or successful adaptation of Russian Formalism at all, and perverted 
the essential originality of the latter's ideas (Novikov, 1994).37 Whilst such views are 
both rare and constitute something of an exaggeration, they do underscore that the 
details of formalism‟s transition to structuralism remain an unsettled matter. 
The second and perhaps even more significant argument in favour of a reappraisal of 
the philosophical potential and relevance of Russian Formalism's aesthetics in a 
structuralist perspective concerns the reception and impact of Prague structuralism 
itself. In effect, even if one accepts that Russian Formalism's legacy was faithfully 
and adequately recycled in the context of Prague structuralism (which I happen to 
believe was patently not the case, cf. also Steiner, 1984, p.5), this does not mean 
either that the full extent of its conceptual links with Russian Formalism were 
correctly assessed, or indeed, that Prague structuralism itself was received in 
adequate fashion in the West. True, the key roles played by Jakobson both as a 
transmitter of ideas and as the "midwife" of French Structuralism, along with the 
generally high regard in which his and Trubeckoj's work in phonology are held might 
seem to indicate that the Prague School and its formalist heritage were well received 
and integrated in the genealogy of structuralism. But there are just as many reasons 
– for example the almost complete neglect of such interesting figures as Jan 
Mukařovský or Felix Vodička (Winner, 2002; H. Schmid, 2004, p.18) or the absence 
of an overarching assessment of the specific importance and place of Jakobson's in 
the structuralist constellation38 – to believe that Prague structuralism has not been 
afforded the attention it deserves (cf. also Sériot 1999).  
In short, despite the otherwise bleak prospects for a productive reassessment of the 
Russian formalists‟ aesthetics, a serious opportunity to do just that does seem to 
exist. In effect, it seems perfectly reasonable to argue that the mutation of Russian 
Formalism into Prague structuralism was impeded and rendered problematic by 
historical circumstances. That consideration in itself gives us grounds to assume that 
genuine opportunities for the development of the formalists‟ fundamental aesthetic 
insights went begging in this unsatisfactory process. Since it is quite possible, 
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 Šklovskij himself, the quintessential figure of Russian Formalism, never really warmed to 
structuralism (cf. Šklovskij, Theory of Prose (1985)). 
38
 There are of course a reasonable number of critical accounts of his work (Bradford 1995, 
Delas 1993, Holenstein 1975, Sangster 1982) None of these, however, offer to situate his role 
and position in the ark of mainstream structuralism.  
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moreover, that neither the true extent of Prague structuralism's debt to the formalists' 
aesthetic insights nor its own originality and potential have been adequately 
evaluated, this would then imply that Russian formalism‟s philosophical scope and 
signification – in a specifically structuralist framework – could indeed have been at 
least partially overlooked. With this in mind, the two obvious steps to follow in order to 
defend the idea that the formalists‟ modernist vision of aesthetics still carries 
unexplored and unexploited potential is, firstly, to take a closer look at the modalities 
of Russian Formalism‟s transformation and reception in Prague structuralism and, 
secondly, at the potentially overlooked specificity and residual potential of the Prague 
School in the wider constellation of structuralist theories and the standard, Western 
accounts of structuralism‟s genealogy. 
 
Regarding the matter of Russian Formalism‟s transition into Prague structuralism, it 
is beyond doubt that the former was recycled neither in its entirety nor in its 
complexity in the latter. Russian Formalism was at heart a very diverse phenomenon, 
involving a number of very different trends and epistemological perspectives (Steiner, 
1984, p.16). Although the formalists shared a common and apparently clearly defined 
objective, their methods towards achieving that goal varied enormously. Šklovskij, for 
instance, gave a wilfully intuitive, impressionistic and increasingly existential turn to 
his investigations in poetics. By contrast, Jakobson and Tynjanov defended a more 
rigorous, systematic and linguistic angle, whilst Eichenbaum chose to emphasise the 
role of literature's social dimension. Similarly, despite their professed aspiration to 
concentrate on the purely literary aspects of literature – or as Jakobson put it, on 
“literariness” (literaturnost‟, Jakobson, 1979 [1921], p.299) – their arguments included 
a wide interdisciplinary variety of linguistic, critical, psychological and philosophical 
elements. All these various trends and disciplinary approaches were quite distinct 
from one another, but most represented justifiable and interesting contributions to the 
core aim of Russian Formalism to establish an autonomous "science" of literature. 
They also continually influenced each other, consolidating or correcting Russian 
Formalism‟s general theoretical course and expanding its horizon further than the 
pure and totally independent literary theory it was aiming for.39  
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 Defining the limits of literary theory, of course, has been a constant problem of the 
discipline since its inception (Tihanov, 2004, p.62-63), and many would argue that such a 
delimitation has ultimately failed (ibid., 61; Culler, 2010) 
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After Jakobson‟s definitive break with his colleagues and friends in the Soviet Union, 
however, this vital and fruitful collaborative mechanism was terminally disrupted and 
only the structurally-oriented model which he (and a few others) defended could be 
developed further.40 Even more importantly, the diverse disciplinary breadth and 
implications of the formalists‟ ideas and theories were dramatically reduced. For 
some time after 1930, they were further developed only in the framework of structural 
linguistics provided to them by the Prague school (Fontaine, 1974, p.15). 
Significantly, the philosophical, psychological or general aesthetic perspectives that 
had played an important, if ambiguous role in the early stages of the formalists‟ work 
were decisively sidelined, and the contact with the more philosophically inclined 
figures at the periphery of the formalist movement, such as Špet, Ţinkin or even 
Engelhardt, was either lost for good or reduced to insignificance. 
This drastic reduction, within the Prague School, of the theoretical or methodological 
range of formalist theories and ideas, along with the abandonment of whole avenues 
of inquiry, was certainly not without its own logic and justification. As we saw, 
Russian Formalism was faced with fundamental methodological issues long before 
its downfall: the vagueness of some of its claims and the uneven quality of its various 
theoretical trends made a pruning necessary in order for it to achieve a sufficient 
level of clarity and coherence. What‟s more, this trimming process had begun and 
was largely carried out in the context of Russian Formalism itself, as a consequence 
of growing disagreements amongst the formalists over the excessive eclecticism of 
their science of literature and its dependence on the concepts of non-literary 
disciplines. Their initially constructive and mutually enriching disputes deteriorated 
over time into something resembling more a sterile confrontation of increasingly 
irreconcilable ideas.41 Instead of the undifferentiated intermingling and cross-
fertilisation between contrasting methodological approaches, some positions, such as 
the ones explored by Eichenbaum (or the “quasi-formalists” Ţirmunskij, Vinogradov, 
etc.) were steadily marginalised and rejected as unsatisfying by a smaller group 
made up of Šklovskij, Tynjanov and Jakobson (and possibly Polivanov and 
Tomaševskij, cf. Depretto, 2009).  
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 The formalists who stayed in the USSR had to reorientate their research : Tynjanov turned 
to writing novels, Šklovskij, after a prolonged silence, produced more classical criticism  
41
 This deterioration also applies to the Formalists exchanges with their Marxists opponents, 
with whom they had originally led a constructive dialogue. (cf. Conio, 1975, Depretto, 2009) 
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The most promising and conceptually solid work of that reduced group, moreover, 
was produced by Tynjanov and Jakobson in an ever more distinctly structuralist and 
(in Jakobson‟s case) linguistically-oriented perspective. The linguistic, structuralist 
option, as Steiner and many others have convincingly argued (Erlich, 1955; Hansen-
Löve, 1978; Ehlers, 1992), thus profiled itself as the expression of Russian 
Formalism‟s maturation and as the exclusively viable template for its further 
development long before the former‟s eventual downfall. In that sense, the leaner 
framework of the Prague school can quite reasonably be seen, as is usually the 
case, as having simply sanctioned and further optimised the necessary 
rationalisation and on-going transformation of formalist ideas into their structuralist, 
language-oriented mould.   
Having said that, even the ascendancy of Jakobson‟s and Tynjanov‟s model as the 
"natural" and most potent development for Russian Formalism does not warrant 
either that the latter's transposition in the context of the Prague school was 
straightforward and inconsequential, nor that the reduction of its conceptual breadth 
to the lone discipline of linguistics was wholly justified or even intentional. Tellingly, 
many of the non-linguistic aspects of the formalists‟ work and ideas were reactualised 
at a later stage either by the Czech structuralists (Mukařovský, Vodička, etc.) or by 
the formalists‟ other structuralist “heirs” (Soviet and French). Also, the growing 
involvement of Russian Formalism with structuralism confers paradoxically more, not 
less significance to the enforced separation between the Soviet Formalists and their 
Prague colleagues after 1930. That situation, indeed, clearly entailed the risk that not 
all the formalist insights that possessed value and potential in a narrower structuralist 
framework would in fact be adequately recycled by the Prague school. That risk was 
all the greater since, as I said, exchanges between some of the Soviet formalists 
(Šklovskij and Tynjanov especially) and their Prague colleagues were still going 
strong in the late 1920s.  
The formalists themselves certainly felt that their work was being seriously hampered 
by the course of events and the resulting impediments to their efforts to collaborate 
and exchange ideas with one another. In a letter to Šklovskij, Tynjanov mused that: 
“Had it not been for History and geography, you, me and him [Jakobson], we could 
have achieved much more together” (Tynjanov, 1984 [1929]). Be that as it may, it is 
quite clear that the abrupt and constrained nature of the separation between the 
Soviet Formalists and their Prague colleagues led to a certain arbitrariness in the 
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selection of the aspects of the formalists‟ work which were effectively recycled and 
further developed in Prague. One certainly finds no trace that this selection process 
was accompanied by a thoughtful analysis and comprehensive refutation of the 
formalist concepts and theoretical perspectives that were to be rejected and 
abandoned. Much rather, it resulted directly from the contingent historical fact that 
only some of the “formalist” proponents of the structural model, namely the linguists 
Jakobson and Trubeckoj and the folklorist Bogatyrev, emigrated and were able to 
pursue their work free of any political fetters. 
 
The problematic impact of the enforced separation between the Prague School‟s 
Russian members and their colleagues in the USSR on the transition of the formalist 
ideas and theories to a structuralist framework can be further corroborated by 
highlighting the circumstances that attended to (and sped up) that transformation 
process, namely the fading away of Russian Modernism and the special scientific 
and intellectual context that accompanied it. As mentioned, the Russian modernist 
poets and artists initially exerted a decisive influence on the formalists and were 
without doubt the single most important source of the latters‟ radical and ambitious 
aesthetical assumptions. Naturally, the immediate relevance of the Russian 
modernists and their idiosyncratic aesthetic concerns was strongly reduced in Prague 
after their premature downfall and the discontinuation of exchanges with the Soviet 
Union. In line with Russian Formalism's perceived progress towards a structuralist 
paradigm and the limited conceptual credit generally afforded to modernist ideas, 
though, the dwindling of the Russian modernists‟ role in Prague has traditionally been 
interpreted either as a marginally significant event, or even as a helpful step in the 
evolution of formalist ideas towards maturity.42 It is seen as fully coherent with the 
formalists‟ suspicions of the more philosophical, non-literary aspect of their work, with 
their efforts to harness the excesses of their early ideas in a leaner methodological 
framework, and with the need to emancipate themselves from the specific aesthetic 
principles and preoccupations of the Russian modernist poets and artists, which as 
Erlich puts it, “proved a mixed blessing” (Erlich, 1973, p.638). 
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 Interestingly, it is Šklovskij’s « Monument to a Scientific Error » that is considered as the 
watermark of Russian Formalism, rather than Jakobson’s « Generation that Squandered its 
Poet », underlining the limited importance of the demise of Modernism in connection with 
Formalism’s downfall. 
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Jakobson‟s reaction in “The Generation That Squandered its Poets” to the downfall of 
Russian Modernism, however, casts a quite different light on the significance of this 
decisive chapter in the evolution of Russian formalism. In his pessimistic essay, 
written specifically in reaction to his friend Majakovskij‟s death, Jakobson all but 
identifies with the fortune of the modernist poets, and laments the dire loss that the 
ebbing of their singular voice will entail for his generation and for himself: "As to the 
future, it doesn't belong to us either. […] When singers have been killed and their 
song has been dragged into a museum and pinned to the wall of the past, the 
generation they represent is even more desolate, orphaned, and lost - impoverished 
in the most real sense of the word" (Jakobson,  1987, p.300). Clearly, the key actor of 
Russian Formalism‟s transition to structuralism and linguistics identified the receding 
of the Russian modernists‟ influence not as a liberation or as a move towards 
conceptual maturity, but as an irretrievable loss.  
That Jakobson would believe this is of course above all a reflection of the intensity of 
his own involvement with the Russian modernist poets, both on a personal and a 
theoretical level. He famously penned avant-garde verses in his youth under the 
pseudonym Aljagrov, and befriended the futurist poets (Majakovskij, Chlebnikov, 
Kručenych). He fervently championed their aesthetic cause, providing the avant-
garde with one of its most powerful theoretical voice.43 As happened to his poet-
friends, his fate was darkened by the upheavals of the time: Jakobson escaped likely 
persecutions and humiliations only by going into exile. All in all, it could therefore 
seem credible to interpret Jakobson's anxiety at the avant-garde‟s eclipse as a 
moment of personal empathy or a private sense of uncertainty triggered by the need 
to readjust his methodological approach. Such views, however, do not hold up very 
well to scrutiny. At the time of writing his essay, Jakobson had already found a new 
home in the independent, welcoming scientific and cultural context of the young 
Czechoslovak Republic (cf. Toman, 1995) and was enjoying ever greater 
international success thanks to his achievements in phonology.44 He had also 
already resolutely switched to the structuralist paradigm that defined his mature and 
most significant work in phonology, so that no immediate adjustments were called for 
by his loss of contact with the Russian modernists. In fact, no such adjustments ever 
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 Many of Jakobson’s early texts are dedicated to the Cubo-futurists poets (Novejšaja 
russkaja poezija, K pozdnej lirike Majakovskogo, Futurizm, O chudoţesvtennom realizme...) 
44
 One can mention here the Congress of Linguistics in The Hague (1928), where Jakobson 
and Trubeckoj presented their theses to great acclaim. 
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occurred: there was no fundamental incompatibility between Jakobson structural 
linguistics and the original modernist inspiration of his work, to which he actually 
stayed true all his life (cf. Jakobson, 1980). It is thus hard to see why he would want 
to associate himself and his own work so closely with the fall of the modernist poets 
("the future, it doesn't belong to us" – my italics). 
In fact, it seems much more accurate to interpret the sense of gloom exuding from 
“The Generation That Squandered its Poets” as reflecting the apprehension of its 
author in connection to the negative effect of the premature demise of Russian 
Modernism on the whole Soviet scientific context of the 1910-20s and its broader 
legacy. The fear spelled out by Jakobson in his essay is that, although he might 
himself be able to keep alive and develop the modernist intuitions of his own, 
specifically linguistic research, he would have to do so in isolation, in an intellectual 
environment that would not reproduce the unusually close interaction with modernist 
artists and writers that had initially helped to foster his ideas.45 Worse, he realised 
that the disappearance of the Russian modernist poets and artists would actually 
prevent his "generation" from fulfilling all the promises of its early endeavours, and 
that a large part of its original ideas would probably remain in an embryonic state and 
be misunderstood or forgotten. This pessimism applies in particular to the work of the 
Russian formalists, which Jakobson saw as only just beginning.46 By despondently 
turning his back onto Russian Formalism at the vital juncture of Russian Modernism‟s 
collapse, Jakobson acknowledged his inability to sustain and develop the whole of 
the formalists‟ modernist-inspired legacy on his own. Much more, he also 
passionately deplored that nobody else would take on that necessary task, whether 
in the alien and indifferent Western context in which the troubled historical 
circumstances at hand were forcing Russo-Soviet modernist ideas to develop, or in 
the clearly hostile intellectual and cultural environment that was quickly taking shape 
in the Soviet Union. 
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 Jakobson was very close to the Czech modernists (f.e. Karel Teige), and there also existed a 
close collaboration between the CLP and the « devetsil ». Czech modernism, however, was of 
a very different ilk than its Russian equivalent, and looked more to France and the French 
Symbolist and Surrealist traditions. See also Linhartova (1977) 
46
 As he wrote to Tynjanov in another dispirited letter: "En vérité, le travail des formalistes ne 
fait que commencer, pas dans le sens d'une étude de détail, avec une centaine d'exemples, pas 
dans le sens où il serait temps pour nous de faire des manuels synthétiques mais dans le sens 
du travail tout simplement - avant, nous travaillions à l'aveuglette, pour nous tous, ce furent 
des années d'apprentissage et maintenant alors que les problèmes sont terriblement clairs, c'est 
la débandade." (quoted by Depretto, 2005, p.xx) 
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In my opinion, Jakobson's dejection at the sad prospect of the opportunities lost as a 
result of the Russian modernists‟ premature eclipse shows clearly enough that, when 
adapting the formalists‟ aesthetic theories to the paradigm of structuralism, neither he 
nor his Prague school colleagues sought to reduce or limit them to the field of 
linguistics on deliberate and reasoned methodological grounds. In fact, Jakobson and 
the Prague School knowingly circumvented many of the issues brought up by early 
formalism and its modernist aesthetic insights – whilst providing clues and 
entertaining hopes as to their potential for further developments in a structuralist 
perspective.47 That such developments did not happen is due primarily to the 
absence – in a rapidly and radically changing scientific context and an increasingly 
uncomfortable political situation –, of thinkers ready to recognise and tackle the wider 
implications and possibilities of the formalists‟ aesthetic ideas. Admittedly, it is 
eminently doubtful whether either the Russian formalists or the Russians of the 
Prague School would have had the resources and interest to fully account for all the 
psychological and philosophical implications and problems of their modernist-inspired 
assumptions on art and literature, even if they had not been restricted to a narrower 
linguistic approach in less troubled historical circumstances. As noted, they did not 
consider it their task to account for the philosophical aspects of their ideas. But the 
crucial point here remains that possible avenues for the development and 
systematisation of the formalists' aesthetic insights in a structuralist perspective were 
almost certainly foregone on what were predominantly contingent grounds by the 
Russians of the Prague School. 
 
Turning now to the question of the subsequent reception and interpretations of 
Russian formalism‟s structuralist legacy, I wish to add to the foregoing observations 
that, crucially, the formalist aesthetic and philosophical avenues that were not 
developed by Jakobson or the other Russians in Prague were never adequately 
investigated, let alone fully exploited in the subsequent evolution of structuralism, 
whether in the Soviet Union or in the West. True, I did mention that Czech 
structuralists such as Jan Mukařovský and Felix Vodička actually endeavoured to 
explore the specifically aesthetic dimension of the formalists‟ work and produced very 
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 This dismissal of philosophical concerns is repeated by Jakobson in his considerations on 
the ontological nature of the phoneme in his essay “Zur Struktur des Phonems” (Jakobson, 
1971, pp.282-283) 
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interesting and thought-provoking theories in that respect (cf. Mukařovský 1936, 
1941, 1947 and 1966, and Vodička 1942, 1948 and 1969).48 As I also mentioned, 
however, these pre-eminent scholars have been sadly overlooked outside of the 
Czech Republic, and are mostly an irrelevance in traditional accounts of 
structuralism. In that sense, it is not credible to argue that they served as an effective 
relay for the formalists‟ ideas, or that they succeeded in anchoring them in the 
mainstream of structuralist thought. If anything, their work serves as further proof of 
the widespread neglect incurred by the structuralist perspectives suggested by the 
Russian formalists‟ aesthetic theories.  
Alternatively, one might want to point out that the Russian formalists‟ ideas were also 
considered in a broader disciplinary framework by the likes of Jurij Lotman, Roland 
Barthes or Tzvetan Todorov – i.e. thinkers who cannot be considered as being 
outside of the structuralist mainstream. The problem here is that Lotman, Barthes 
and Todorov all conducted their interpretations of Russian formalism after a thirty-
year long hiatus, in the radically different post-war context and with both a very 
different mind-set and different priorities. As a result, their accounts subjected the 
Russian formalists‟ work to important distortions. A clear example of such distortions 
is the case of Propp‟s “Morphology of the Folktale”, which was of peripheral 
importance to Russian formalism itself but quickly became one of the most, if not the 
most important formalist text for the French structuralists.49 Tellingly, it has also been 
noted, for example by Jaccard, that the rediscovery of formalist texts in the 1960s 
occurred independently of interest for the Russian avant-gardes and the context of 
Modernism in the Soviet union (cf. Jaccard, 2005, p.11). This fact serves as yet 
another reminder that the modernist logic and pathos which informed the Russian 
formalists‟ aesthetic ideas was at the very least partially overlooked and 
underestimated – and further compounds Jakobson's fears as to the dire 
consequences of the downfall of Russian Modernism and the vulnerability of the 
particular intellectual climate it had fostered. 
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 With regard to its importance in the perspective explored in this study, the work of 
Mukarovsky should have figured more prominently than it does – and has only been 
neglected because of a lack of research on my part. Sadly enough, I thus unfortunetaly repeat 
a now habitual exclusion 
49
 Propp’s “Morpholoy” is the only work of the Formalists to have recieved a full and widely 
circulated edition (point), and was translated before (in 1958) the seminal texts of Šklovskij, 
Tynjanov or Eichenbaum (1966, by Todorov). 
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On top of the specific problems of the reception of Russian formalism and its 
interrupted legacy, it is also crucial to note that even some of the modernistic 
aesthetic ideas and perspectives that were indeed explored and further developed 
and systemised by Jakobson and his colleagues in Prague and are clearly in 
evidence in their linguistic theories have been brushed aside and given less attention 
than they deserve. As I suggested earlier on, the impact and interpretations of the 
Prague School itself in the genealogy of structuralism also constitutes an exegetical 
issue that can further accredit the thesis of the existence of a residual structuralist 
potential connected with the aesthetic of the Russian formalists. 
Lest one forget, problems and delays of reception concerned the whole of the Slavic 
pre-war output. Propp, for example, was discovered and translated only in the 1950s, 
Vygotskij in the 1960s, Bachtin in the 1970s and Špet even later, in the 1980s. Even 
Jakobson, with the exception of his work on phonology, only started to receive 
sustained attention after his emigration to the United States (i.e. after a second break 
in his scientific trajectory). Just as the theories of the Russian formalists, the ground-
breaking theories sketched out by the likes of Bachtin, Vygotskij or Jakobson did not 
integrate mainstream Western discourse on their own terms, as full-blown and 
independent paradigms conveying with them their own conceptual horizons. Quite to 
the contrary, they were received retrospectively, against distinctly alien 
epistemological backgrounds, to which they were subsumed uncritically for the most 
part. This critical naivety, it can be added, was further facilitated by the apparently 
obvious, but in effect treacherous similarities between the Russian context and the 
Western one (cf. Sériot 1995).  
Recent research has highlighted the serious repercussions of these delays and the 
uncritical subsumption of typically Russian traditions to Western models. In effect, 
over the last couple of decades or so, specialists in Russian culture have made 
convincing attempts towards providing a finer comparative assessment of early 
Soviet thought, and have come up with a very different account of its evolution and 
historical impact. The extent of the reinterpretations thus achieved is evidenced by 
the case of as prominent a figure as Bachtin, whose work has been liberated from 
numerous inconsistencies generated by its French, American and even Soviet 
receptions in the 1970s.50 One-sided interpretations have been nuanced and 
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 Cf. Beasley-Murray (2007), Vauthier (2008), Zbinden (2006) 
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contrasted to produce a diversified picture of the many aspects of Bachtin‟s versatile 
work and, paradoxically perhaps, a much more sober estimation of the originality of 
this otherwise enormously popular thinker. For instance, whereas the authorship of 
important works written by Vološinov and Medvedev (both members of the so-called 
“Bachtin Circle”) were for some time attributed to Bachtin himself, these scholars and 
their ideas have now again found a distinctive and independent identity. Similarly, 
Bachtin‟s influential theory of dialogue and dialogism has been critically reconsidered 
and made to reveal the extent of its roots in the work of the likes of Jakubinskij, 
Polivanov, Lev Ščerba (all linguists closely linked with Russian Formalism), as well 
as its connections with that of Nikolaj Marr or Vygotskij. Next to the plentiful attention 
lavished on Bachtin, one has thus also rediscovered the richness and the relevance 
of the original theories of all the scholars cited here on the relations between 
language, thought and society, as well as their pioneering role in fields such as the 
philosophy of language, pragmatics, socio-linguistics, psycho-linguistics or the 
psychology of consciousness. 
Of greater interest to us, the heightened attention afforded to pre-war Soviet thought 
has also brought in sharper focus the complexity and importance of its role in the 
evolution of structuralism. The widespread view, we saw, was and still mostly is that 
the Soviet and Czech structuralists operated squarely within the Saussurean tradition 
(cf. Sériot, 1999, p.3). Upon closer inspection, however, many Soviet structuralist or 
proto-structuralist models have revealed themselves not to be indebted in such a 
clear way to Saussure's work, if at all in some cases. Key ideas, such as Tynjanov‟s 
conception of verse as a hierarchical system of constructive factors (cf. Ehlers, 
1992), Špet‟s phenomenological and hermeneutical theory of language and 
expression (cf. Dennes, 1998), as well as the organically structural notion of geo-
linguistic areas formulated by Jakobson and Trubeckoj in the context of their 
research on Eurasianism (cf. Sériot, 1999) have all been shown to hail from a 
conceptual background that does not coincide with the central claims of Saussurean 
structuralism. These different models also exerted a reciprocal influence on each 
other – including on Trubeckoj‟s and Jakobson‟s successful and influential structural 
phonology.51. To a large extent, structuralism thus unfolded as an idiosyncratic 
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 For instance, Tynjanov and Jakobson penned an important article together ("Problems of 
language etc.", 1928), Špet is widely acknowledged as an important influence on Jakobson 
(Dennes 1999; Holenstein, 1975), and the relevance of Eurasianism to Jakobson and 
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"Slavic" tradition in the Soviet Union and later in Czechoslovakia (Bojtar 1985), the 
specific typology of which, it is almost needless to say, was mostly passed over in the 
mainstream interpretations of structuralism. 
 
Having now defined a plausible historical basis for a fruitful reassessment of the 
Russian formalists‟ aesthetic theories in a structuralist perspective, the last remaining 
task facing me in this chapter is of course to make explicit in more detail what their 
residual structuralist originality might be, and to justify the idea that the specificity of 
the Slavic tradition they represent can lead to a new understanding, or at least to new 
perspectives on structuralism and its theoretical potential. 
The originality or specificity of the Slavic structuralist tradition as a whole is not 
difficult to pinpoint as it has already been identified by a number of different 
researchers as its inclusive, “ontological” or “substantive” nature (see Sériot, 1999; 
Tchougounnikov 2003; also Bojtar 1985). Sériot, for example, has convincingly 
highlighted this integrative dimension in Slavic structuralism‟s most important model, 
namely Jakobson‟s and Trubeckoj‟s phonology. According to him, they did not derive 
their idea of phonological structure from the abstract Saussurean conception of 
language as a system of differences without positive terms, but from a reworking and 
refining of organicist metaphors of totality (inherited from the German Romantics and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt)52 and from considerations on the “real” structure of concrete, 
geographical entities fuelled by their endeavours to define and justify their “Eurasian” 
theories (Sériot, 1999). As a result, although the international success of their work 
elicited its progressive adjustment towards the prevalent Saussurean model, 
Jakobson and Trubeckoj tended to not separate the problems of ideal meaning and 
linguistic signification from the question of the concrete “substance” and material 
articulation of language and linguistic signs. Even from a very different angle, 
Fontaine comes to a similar conclusion, suggesting that Jakobson proceed to 
“delogicise” the idea of system and return to empiricism (Fontaine, 1974, p.63) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Trubeckoj goes without . saying, since both must be counted amongst the main exponents of 
that theory (cf. Sériot, 1999). Also, it important not note here that these scholars were also 
specifically aware and proud of the fact that they were developing a “national” science, a 
specifically “Russian science” (ibid., p.1) 
52
 The importance of the German Romantics as a source for early Soviet thought (and the 
neglect of that source in its assessments) is also noted by Tchougounnikov (2003), or in 
Trautmann-Waller (2006) and Romand-Tchougounnikov (2008). 
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An even clearer tendency to apprehend semiotic and linguistic problems in an 
integral, monistic and substantialist perspective is obvious in the work of Špet, where 
they are set in the broader context of a phenomenological and hermeneutical 
investigation on language, signification and knowledge. On the whole, the relevance 
of Špet‟s work to structuralism might of course be questioned, as his work seems 
closer to phenomenology and hermeneutics and shows very little affinities or 
connections with the Saussurean ideas of system, sign, structure, etc.53 More 
specifically though, it has convincingly been shown by Maryse Dennes, Špet‟s 
definitions of the word (slovo) and the structure of expression do represent an 
important and forgotten source of structuralism in Russia – most notably because of 
their importance to Jakobson. Both these definitions strongly emphasise the unity of 
the formal (or intelligible) and empirical (or sensible) layers of language and 
signification (Dennes, 1999 & 2006).  
In my own opinion, the specific, integral orientation of Slavic structuralism also 
concerns the fundamental aesthetic assumptions of the Russian formalists. In effect, 
one way (and probably the only way) to justify and make sense of the simultaneously 
formal and concrete dimension of perception suggested by Šklovskij‟s theory of 
estrangement is to explain it as implying that the content of our (aesthetic) perceptual 
acts are in fact hierarchically articulated as a differential, signifying system: objects 
and their qualities are perceived not as pre-defined, discrete, individual entities, but 
as expressive, concrete signs, similar in their hierarchically organised and differential 
structure or form to those of language (albeit not coextensive with them). To be quite 
clear, when assimilating perceived objects to signs, I do not mean that the perceived 
object functions or stands in as a sign « for » or a symbol « of » itself, as an 
Augustinian aliquid stat pro aliquo, but only that the object and its properties are 
values in a differentially structured, hierarchical perceptual system (rather than 
atomic or discreet units), just as, according to Saussure, linguistic signs are values 
determined by the total system of a given language. In other words, it seems to me 
that Šklovskij's conception of art as estrangement implies a vision of structuralism 
that goes beyond the bounds of language or pure linguistic signification, to 
encompass the concrete realms of the perceptual and the empirical: it both suggests 
and calls for an expressive, structural theory of perception. 
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 The “structuralist” ancestry in his case is more Humboldt than Saussure. See for example 
Špet’s The Internal Form of the Word, which is subtitled “variation on a humboldtian theme”  
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Of course, there is a significant step from merely mentioning the “ontological“, 
“substantive” or “perceptual” dimension of Jakobson‟s, Špet‟s or even Šklovskij‟s 
ideas to suggesting that their work still bears unearthed potential and the prospect of 
a radical renewal of our understanding of structuralism‟s possibilities. Superficially, 
the ontological, empirical or monistic originality of Slavic structuralism might seem 
obvious, as traditional Saussurean structuralism has often been characterised as an 
idealist, abstract model. Starting with Saussure‟s famous dichotomies (langue-parole, 
synchrony-diachrony, signifier-signified, paradigmatic-syntagmatic), structuralism is 
seen to evacuate pragmatic and empirical questions from structuralism‟s horizon, 
and to lock language away from reality (cf. Bertocchi, 2001, p.121). Roland Barthes, 
for one, explicitly rejected the above-mentioned idea of a non-linguistic, meaningful 
structure of perception: "percevoir ce qu'une substance signifie, c'est fatalement 
recourir au découpage de la langue: il n'y a de sens que nommé, et le monde des 
signifiés n'est autre que celui du langage." (Barthes, 1964, p.2). More generally, 
structuralism has tended to be criticised and rejected for its allegedly rigid “idealism” 
and, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, for being a “Kantism without a transcendental 
subject” (Ricoeur, 1963, p.33).  
The fact of the matter, however, is that the accusations of “insubstantiality”, rigid 
dualism and ontological/empirical shallowness directed at Saussurean structuralism 
are not especially convincing. In his important study on Jakobson, Elmar Holenstein, 
for example, makes the convincing point that the pre-war structuralist tradition as a 
whole did not display dichotomic anti-substantialist, idealist features (Holenstein, 
1976, p.15). Sériot comes to a similar conclusion when underlining the crucial fact 
that structuralism‟s epistemological framework and central concepts – including that 
of structure itself – were not instated suddenly and definitively in the shape of a 
formal semiotics by Saussure‟s Cours de Linguistique Générale, but were the result 
of a slow paradigm shift, which happened in a very particular context, namely the 
crisis of positivism, and took its roots in much older traditions (Humboldt, the German 
Romantics) and concepts (those of organism and totality).54 Generally speaking, 
structuralism emerged in a context which saw the birth of Einstein's theory of 
relativity, Freud's psychoanalysis and Husserl's phenomenology, all theories which 
fundamentally challenged and engaged with our sense of reality itself and the ways 
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 That observation itself, as Sériot points out, has older roots and was made already by 
Koerner and Cassirer (cf. Sériot, 1999, p. 3) 
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of imposing meaning onto our experience of the world. Far from having been cast 
and conceived at the outset as an ontologically neutral or even sceptical theory, 
structuralism emerged as one of many revolutionary ways of theorising not only 
possible conditions of knowledge, but as an answer the increasingly acute problem of 
our concrete relation with the world. 
Even amongst the mainstream Saussurean versions of structuralism, one finds much 
evidence of an important ontological-empirical streak or interrogation. According to 
Jean-Claude Milner (2003, p.37), for example, Saussure himself was conscious of 
the ontological dimension of his theory. If one believes Jean Piaget, the problem of 
the ontological status of the « structure » was one of the initial problems raised by 
that « great doctrine ».55 Many Saussurean linguists (for example Benveniste, 
Buyssens) certainly sought to bypass the strict interpretation of the binary 
oppositions propounded by Saussure's students and interpret the dichotomies in a 
non-exclusive, non-binary way. The ambition of Lévi-Strauss‟s structural 
anthropology was to "reconcile the sensuous and the intelligible, […] and allow a 
glimpse of the natural order as a vast semantic field" (Lévi-Strauss, 1971, p.614). 
Similarly, Gestalt psychology, the constructivist models of Piaget, or more recently, 
the radical constructivism of a J.W. Schmid, to which one can add Algirdas Greimas‟s 
ideas on the question of presence all offer examples of the application of structuralist 
principles to problems of perception. 
On the one hand, it would seem that Western structuralism is just as obsessed or 
concerned with the ontological, empirical status of structures than its Slavic cousin, 
which contradicts the idea that the latter might bring fresh perspectives to the former.  
Indeed, structuralist theories of perception already exist. On top of this, an even 
worse problem if one wishes to argue in favour of the potential of Slavic structuralism 
to renew the ontological aspect of structuralism is that these more inclusive and 
ambitious structuralist positions have in fact been criticised and rejected in the West. 
In effect, the “idealist” sceptical phase of structuralism was ushered in at the end of 
the 1960s, through the anti-realist, anti-substantialist stance of Michel Foucault‟s 
sceptical epistemology (in Les mots et les choses, 1966), and with the criticism of the 
“metaphysics of presence” formulated by Jacques Derrida (2002, 2003 and 2009) 
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 « Le problème initial que soulève cette grande doctrine est, une fois admise l’existence des 
structures, de comprendre en quoi consiste cette existence » (Piaget, quoted in Berttochi, 
1998, p.122) 
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and the post-structuralist movement. In other words, it would seem that the 
ontological ambitions of structuralism belong rather to its early, failed phase, and that 
the Slavic sources, far from providing new potential, were probably only discarded on 
the same grounds as other ontologically ambitious models. 
To be honest, this study will bring no definite answer to the question of the actuality 
and continued relevance of Slavic structuralism in general or the structuralist 
perspectives opened by the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic of estrangement, for the 
simple reason that this would require too broad a comparative review of Western 
structuralist models, both past and present. Before attempting a comparative 
assessment of Slavic structuralism‟s allegedly extra ontological potential – in 
comparison especially to such actual models as the radical constructivism of S.J. 
Schmid –, one requires a coherent, internal exposition of its own development and 
potentialities. Only then, I believe, when the internal originality and specificity of the 
less-known Slavic structural models has been made empirically apparent, can one 
statute and speculate on their superiority or subordination to other structuralist 
models. Only then can one decide, whether they fall under the usual criticisms 
directed at structuralist models and theoretical discourses (see Culler 2000), or if 
they can offer something genuinely new. 
Despite the uncertainties as to the real extent of the remaining relevance and 
potentialities of Slavic structuralism and therefore of the Russian formalist aesthetic 
theories, three important points can be mention here at the outset, which all bode 
well for the idea of an original contribution of Russian formalism and are certainly in 
the favour of a reappraisal of Slavic structuralism and its position in the structuralist 
constellation. Firstly, considering the partial neglect and zones d’ombre which 
surround it, one can squarely affirm that it is certainly promising and historically 
impotent to seek to reconstruct and retrace the development of the Russian 
formalists‟ aesthetic ideas in a structuralist perspective. Even if one might find them 
to fall under the usual objections directed at structuralism, my investigation will have 
cast some more light on the variations of structuralism‟s ontological scope and 
imperialism. If nothing else, one can thus obtain a much more detailed and precise 
picture of the genealogy of structuralism, of its failures and successes. In a similarly 
minimalist perspective, one will at least obtain a much fairer, more precise and 
detailed account of the inherent limitations of their account of aesthetic. 
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Secondly, the historical usefulness of this account is reinforced by the fact that Slavic 
structuralism arises from sources very different to those of its Western counterparts, 
and as such, brings a very different conceptual baggage with it. As I have argued, 
one of its most direct inspirations was Russian Modernism and its radical theurgic 
and transfigurational aspirations to transcend and sublimate the everyday world or 
“byt”. Other important sources include the monistic, neo-platonician tradition of 
Orthodox theology and philosophy – as expressed in Vladimir Solovev's theory of all-
unity or "vseedintsvo" (see Hutchings, 1997), or in the work of Pavel Florenskij, and 
anti-positivist currents such as German Romanticism or the intuitive philosophy of 
Henri Bergson (see Fink, 1999; Curtis 1976). These outlandish sources, moreover, 
do not indicate that it is wholly incompatible with the Western, saussurean tradition: 
in time, they moved towards Western models, and developed in an original 
constellation of thinkers. Holenstein, for one, has clearly shown that the Prague 
structuralists interacted closely with such important theories as the phenomenology 
of Edmund Husserl, the logical positivism of Rudolf Carnap, the philosophies of 
language of Karl Bühler and Anton Marty, and the budding Gestalt psychology of 
Christian von Ehrenfels. 
Thirdly, and most promising of all, one should note that structuralism has in fact 
indeed undergone re-assessments in recent years, with the criticisms of the post-
structuralists having been called partially into question. Such tendencies are to be 
observed both in Russia (cf. Avtonomova 2009, Dennes 2008,) and internationally 
(Bronkhard 2010, Chabot, 1998; Costantini, 2003). In such a context, renewed 
attention to Russian formalism and the obscure aspects of the Slavic genealogy of 
structuralism might indeed bring useful insights to a more positive and ambitious 
assessment of structuralism‟s ontological possibilities. Without saying more on the 
topic for now, it can already be mentioned that my analysis will indeed contest some 
of the most powerful and mainstream objections made by the likes of Foucault and 
Derrida in the 1960s and 70s, by suggesting in particular a thoroughly different 
relation between structuralism and phenomenology. 




The Strange Aesthetics of Viktor Šklovskij 
 
My prospective suggestion in the preceding chapter was that the original 
philosophical potential of Šklovskij‟s aesthetics of estrangement can be fruitfully 
harnessed and systematically expressed in the terms of a structural theory of 
perception. This suggestion obviously constituted but a programmatic declaration, 
which, at this stage, is rather premature and over-ambitious. By all accounts, my 
argument up to now has contributed only to point towards the general plausibility and 
relevance – from a historical point of view – of my proposed attempt to reassess the 
Russian formalists‟ aesthetic ideas‟ potential in a structuralist conceptual framework. 
It has offered precious little indications, however, as to the specifics of such an 
interpretation. Much worse, my remarks on the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic of 
estrangement are in fact still marked by imprecisions and simplifications, which 
threaten the very validity of my overall assumptions as to its true originality. In order 
to dispel these lingering approximations and before trying to demonstrate precisely 
how the Russian formalists' aesthetic intuitions might be explained and justified in the 
terms of a structural theory of perception, it is therefore essential to corroborate and 
refine my preliminary arguments by further specifying the scope and implications of 
the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic theory itself. Logically enough, I will turn to this task 
in the present chapter by describing the formalists‟ core aesthetic tenets in somewhat 
more detail. 
To be quite exact, I will confine myself in the first place to outlining and interpreting 
the aesthetically and philosophically significant aspects of the earliest version of the 
formalists‟ theories, such as they are presented specifically by Šklovskij in his two 
earliest, seminal essays, "The Resurrection of the Word" (Vosskrešenie slova, 1914) 
and, most significantly, "Art as Device"56 (Iskusstvo kak priem, 1917). One reason for 
restricting my description and commentary of the formalists‟ key tenets in this way is 
that, as we saw, Russian Formalism is on the whole perfectly well documented. 
Amongst the best, authoritative accounts of its achievements (which I have already 
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repeatedly mentioned and quoted), one finds Victor Erlich's Russian Formalism: 
History – Doctrine (1955), the first full-length monograph written about Russian 
Formalism in any language, which also played a decisive role in popularising their 
ideas in the Anglo-Saxon sphere; Peter Steiner's Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics 
(1982), which provides an astute and clear outline of Russian Formalism's complex 
diachronic evolution; and in German, Aage Hansen-Löve's massive Der russische 
Formalismus: methodologische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip 
der Verfremdung (1975), a hand-book of sorts that contains probably the most 
ambitious assessment of Russian Formalism‟s significance to aesthetics.57 
Surprisingly perhaps, since even the most recent of these three monographs dates 
back a good thirty years, they remain very much up-to-date and provide together an 
accurate and nuanced picture of the formalists‟ core literary and linguistic tenets.58 In 
this context, I do not deem it necessary either to repeat or dispute all their 
conclusions by means of an extensive discussion of the formalists‟ theories: it amply 
suffices to outline those aspects of the formalists' work that are relevant in the 
methodologically limited perspective of this study and to which I wish to give new 
interpretations. 
It should also be noted as a further justification of my choice to concentrate on 
Šklovskij„s early texts that much of the formalists‟ output is in fact not directly relevant 
to the argument I wish to explore in the following pages. In effect, Šklovskij‟s two 
aforementioned essays are the only ones either to deal directly with the aesthetic, 
philosophical principles that underlie the formalists‟ literary theories, or to provide a 
really explicit formulation of them. For a number of reasons – which I already briefly 
went over and which have to do with the nature of the formalists‟ scientific aims and 
interests, as well as their specialisation as linguists and literary critics –, Šklovskij and 
his colleagues dedicated their theoretical endeavours to problems of literature or 
poetic language leaving aside more general questions of aesthetics.  
Naturally, most of the original discussions and insights to be found in the formalists‟ 
works are thus of a linguistic or literary theoretical nature, rather than an aesthetic or 
philosophical one. That is not to say, of course, that Šklovskij‟s aesthetic 
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 For further topical monographies see Depretto (2009), Ehlers (1992), Jameson (1976), 
Kujundţić (1997), Speck (1997), Striedter (1968), Svetlikova (2005), Toman (1995). 
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 Typically, a much shorter, introductory text written somewhat more recently by Michel 
Aucouturier for a French audience, Le Formalisme Russe (1994), brings no significant 
corrections to the preceding accounts. 
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pronouncements in "The Resurrection of the Word" and "Art as Device" with regard 
to the functional relation between art (or literature), perception and reality played no 
role outside these early texts, or that they were later repudiated and fundamentally 
called into question, whether by him or his fellow formalists (cf. Lanne, 2005, p.55).59 
Quite the reverse, his aesthetic ideas continued to exert a decisive influence at the 
very heart of the formalist theoretical edifice, which they informed and effectively 
underpinned (Hansen-Löve, 1978; Meyer 1998). As such, other formalist theories 
than Šklovskij‟s also contain interesting insights pertaining to questions of aesthetics. 
Except in Šklovskij's earliest writings, however, the predominance of technical literary 
and linguistic matters at the centre of the Russian formalists' attention has tended to 
mask the significance and, inevitably, to modify the philosophical inflections and 
meaning of their work. In other words, if one is to uncover the full, unadulterated 
originality of the aesthetic positions at the root of Russian Formalism, there can be no 
doubt that one ought to turn to Šklovskij‟s early texts. 
 
To recall, my suggestion in the introduction was that the core of Russian Formalism's 
philosophical originality is expressed in condensed form in Šklovskij‟s assertion that 
the essential function of art and literature consists to refresh or revive our perceptions 
of ordinary objects and everyday situations by representing (or presenting) them in 
formally unusual ways – the process he designates in short as that of estrangement. 
For clarity‟s sake, I quote Šklovskij‟s crucial pronouncement again here: “art exists 
that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make 
the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are 
perceived and not as they are known. The device of art is that of “estrangement”, it is 
to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the 
process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (Šklovskij, 
1988 [1917], pp.20-21). I went on to claim that this definition of art and literature 
implies that, in essence, perception itself is structured as a concretely expressive 
form. In order now to gain a more detailed perspective both as to the accuracy of this 
claim and as to the exact philosophical sense and implications of Šklovskij‟s 
obviously innovative but rather sketchy and imprecise definition of the aesthetic 
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[The Resurrection of the Word] is 70 years old. But it seems it has not aged. Even now, it is 
younger than I am." (Šklovskij, 1990, p.63). 
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function of art and literature, it is useful to begin by pointing out that it relies upon a 
number of more specific arguments put forward by Šklovskij to justify it. To be quite 
precise, it seems to me that his definition of art as estrangement results from the 
conflation of two vital and in many ways conflicting assumptions. 
The first of these assumptions concerns what Šklovskij refers to as “the general laws 
of perception” (ibid., p.20). According to him, perceiving a given fact or object is not a 
stable act whose properties recur constantly and without variations, even in 
analogous circumstances. On the contrary, perceptual acts are subjected through 
repetition and habit to a process of progressive automatisation, as a result of which 
the perceptual qualities of objects undergo significant changes: “as perception 
becomes habitual, it becomes automatic” (ibid., p.20). Šklovskij does not back up this 
claim with much detail reasoning, but simply argues for the self-evidence of these 
transformations in our impressions of facts and objects over time: “If one remembers 
the sensations of holding a pen or of speaking in a foreign language for the first time 
and compares that with his feeling at performing the action for the ten thousandth 
time, one will agree with us.” (ibid., p.20) He does specify, though, that the 
automatisation of perception implies that objects lose their clarity, distinctness and 
consistence, and fail to emerge in their full detail to consciousness. Šklovskij likens 
automatisation to a kind of perceptual algebra, where an abbreviated, cognitive 
symbol is substituted to the intricate and variable content of the empirical object. 
Thus, in automatised, everyday perception, "either objects are assigned only one 
proper feature - a number, for example - or else they function as though by formula 
and do not even appear in cognition" (ibid., p.20) 
Šklovskij further comments that the propensity of common, everyday perceptions to 
become automatised or “algebraised” through repetition and habit has the 
considerable upshot of allowing a great economy of perceptual effort and energy.60 
The protracted and potentially infinitely complex sensory processes of feeling 
(oščuščenie) and seeing (videnie) are progressively replaced by the seamless 
efficiency and constancy of symbolic representation and categorial cognition, thanks 
to which objects are schematically sorted out and immediately recognized 
(uznavanie). Such a substitution, Šklovskij admits, provides “a relief for thought, and 
may appear as an indispensable condition for the existence of science” (Šklovskij, 
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1914, in Bann, 1973, p.43). The “automatic”, formulaic nature of habitual everyday 
perception, its tendency to rigidify and sublimate into something much simpler, 
schematic and abstract enables it to function as an effective and stable form of 
conceptual (or symbolic) knowledge of reality. This in turn also allows the perceiving 
subject to achieve a more effective and generalised knowledge of the world. 
On the downside, the automatisation and "algebraisation" process of perception also 
leads to the unfortunate consequence that our vivid, immediate contact with or 
experiences of empirical reality are gradually compromised. Objects often escape our 
attention altogether because of our familiarity with them and of the shear efficiency 
with which we process them cognitively: “We do not see the walls of our bedrooms. If 
we have such trouble spotting a mistake in our proofs, especially when the text is 
printed in a language we know well, it is because we cannot force ourselves to see, 
to read a familiar word and not to “recognise” it” (ibid., p.42). Much worse, the 
ultimate implication of automatisation is that reality completely fades into an 
unconscious, abstract, indistinct, unreal haze, and our everyday lives lose their 
individual, vital substance. In Art as Device, Šklovskij illustrates this process of 
alienation from the everyday world by quoting Tolstoj‟s Diary: “I was cleaning a room 
and, meandering about, approached the divan and couldn't remember whether or not 
I had dusted it. Since these movements are habitual and unconscious, I could not 
remember and felt that it was impossible to remember - so that if I had dusted it and 
forgot - that is, had acted unconsciously, then it was the same as if I had not. If some 
conscious person had been watching, then the fact could be established. If, however, 
no one was looking, or looking on unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of many 
people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been. [Leo 
Tolstoy's Diary, 1897]”. Šklovskij adds emphatically: “And so life is reduced to 
nothing. Habitualisation devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of 
war” (Šklovskij, 1988, p.20). 
To offset the negative effects of everyday perceptions' tendency to dissolve into 
automatised, almost unconscious and unreal acts of abstract cognition or recognition, 
Šklovskij postulates the existence of a counter-mechanism, triggered by art. As he 
sees it, art is able – and functionally intended – to affect the modalities of perception 
itself and give rise to a distinct type of experience, which Šklovskij defines as being  
aesthetic. In this aesthetic type of experience, he claims, our attention is shifted back 
to our sensual impressions of the empirical world, and these are restored to their 
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originary clarity and freshness (“art exists so that one may recover the sensation of 
life”). In other words, the existential deficiencies of standard cognition and the 
abstractness of everyday experience bring Šklovskij to reassert the value of the 
concrete, vital and sensual process of perception as such. He underlines the fact 
that, counter to the insubstantial, ethereal and almost ghostly quality of automatised, 
abstract or idealised cognition, the vitality and vividness of sensual perception 
provides existential substance to our lives.61  
As one can see, Šklovskij thus turns on its head the traditional hierarchy of 
Platonician metaphysics (which postulates both the epistemological superiority and 
ontological primacy of the ideal and intelligible over the "shadowy", fleeting world of 
the senses) and insists that it is in fact the alert, sensual process of perception that 
constitute the primary source of our existential experience of reality in its full vibrant 
phenomenality. For Šklovskij, our most fundamental and fulfilling mode of interaction 
or contact with reality is not what we can figuratively, abstractly or conceptually know 
about it, but first and foremost what we see, feel and experience. Instead of being 
downgraded to a functional and derivative source of information or idealised 
knowledge, the process of perception is defined as “an aesthetic end in itself” 
(Šklovskij, ibid., p.20).  
Šklovskij, of course, does not make his point in philosophical terms, nor does he 
address it against Platonician metaphysics directly: as I have pointed out, he is not 
particularly concerned with the philosophical dimension of his argument. His anti-
Platonician bent is nonetheless clearly visible in “Art as Device” because of his 
explicit critique of the (neo-Platonician) theory of art of the Russian Symbolists 
(Erlich, 1955, pp.33 etc.).62 One of Šklovskij‟s main concerns or argumentative 
strategies, in effect, is to attack the Symbolist idea that “art is a way of thinking in 
images”, of “revealing the unknown through the known” or in other words, that it 
functions as an intuitive, almost mystic symbol that leads to a deeper, hidden (and it 
platonic and symbolist terms, “more real”) intellectual world (cf. Šklovskij, 1988., 
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 In that sense, it has often been convincingly argued, that he was much influenced by the 
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p.16). By contrast, Šklovskij‟s own “Futurist” argument is to highlight that art actually 
functions as an impediment to such intuitively symbolic, abstract or intellectual 
knowledge, that it seeks paradoxically to make the known unknown (or at least 
strikingly unusual and difficult to recognise) and thus shift all our attention onto the 
concrete, material process of sensual perception. In fact, it is to explain and justify 
this anti-Platonician property of art that Šklovskij introduces his comments on the 
“general laws of perception”. 
In short, the first pillar of Šklovskij‟s original conception of art and literature as 
estrangement is the importance given to sensual perception as an aesthetic end in 
itself. That aesthetic role rests upon the crucial distinction (as well as the cyclical 
alternation) Šklovskij postulates between two contrasted modes of perceiving and 
experiencing the world. The first mode corresponds to our common, everyday 
experience, and is marked by habit and repetition. It involves an essentially cognitive, 
categorial and schematic relation with reality. In everyday experience, objects are 
perceived only through a reduced, or rather abstract and generalised prism of 
conventions, concepts and automatisms.  
As such, Šklovskij reckons that the everyday should be seen, to some extent, as a 
depleted, degraded and almost dehumanised type of experience – known in Russian 
culture as “byt” –, in which reality appears only in a “dead”, “petrified” and 
“sedimented” guise.63 To this automatised and impoverished everyday perception, 
Šklovskij then opposes what he calls “artistic” or aesthetic perception. In this 
aesthetic type of experience, the sensual, perceptual process is redynamised and 
refreshed: the world is given again in its full, lively and dynamic presence. Through 
the redeeming effect of art and literature, the veils of everyday automatisation, 
generalisation and abstraction can be torn apart and a sense of the world‟s vital, 
individual concreteness and phenomenality revived and enjoyed anew. As such, 
aesthetic experience is de facto assigned a clear existential superiority over everyday 
experience, not so much for possessing value in itself as a special or higher kind of 
experience, but because only it actually affords us a full, conscious and vibrant 
impression of reality.  
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In conjunction with the autotelic, intransitive value assigned to the process of sensual 
perception in the alternating cycle of everyday and aesthetic experiences (or 
automatised and de-automatised perceptions), the second crucial element at the 
heart of Šklovskij‟s definition of art and literature as estrangement is the absolutely 
pivotal role and function he imparts to the notion of form. Indeed, we saw in the 
above quote from “Art as Device” that, according to Šklovskij, “the device of art is […] 
to make forms difficult”. The following pronouncement, taken from “The Resurrection 
of the Word”, is even more explicit as to the central importance of form in an 
aesthetic context – even though it only refers to the particular case of literature and 
what Šklovskij rather vaguely describes as “literary perception”: “„literary perception is 
that perception in which we experience form (and maybe something more than form, 
but certainly form)” (Šklovskij, 1914, in Bann 1973, p.45)  
Before commenting further on the question of form, one must quickly acknowledge at 
this point that it does not simply embody a philosophically interesting and innovative 
aspect of Šklovskij‟s aesthetic speculations: the question of form also constitutes one 
of the defining features of Russian formalism as a whole, and is therefore also one of 
its most complex, multifaceted aspects. In addition, the paramount role which the 
formalists sought to attribute to form in art and literature was met with immediate 
controversy and had to be vehemently defended in the face of vociferous opposition. 
Because the formalists themselves were fully convinced of the novelty and 
provocative force of their position, the shrill reception given to their conception of 
artistic (or literary) form led them to be even more forceful and uncompromising in its 
defence (Erlich, 1955, pp.57 etc.). 
Taken in combination, the pivotal importance of the notion of form and the often 
overtly polemical manner in which the formalists defended its role thus make this an 
issue fraught with ambiguities and paradoxes. Revealingly, Šklovskij alone is prone 
to use the term in a number of very distinct ways, referring in turn to “the experience 
of form”, the “external and internal form of words”, as well as to “artistic forms”. True, 
these confused references to form – whose diversity and meanings are multiplied 
when one takes the work of other formalists such as Tynjanov and Jakobson into 
consideration – are not mutually exclusive or contradictory as such. But they certainly 
reveal a degree of vagueness as to the extension and definition of the concept, which 
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contrasts starkly with the generally uncritical enthusiasm with which the formalists 
used it – not to mention the fierceness with which formalism‟s detractors attacked it. 
Šklovskij‟s aforementioned assertion that “„literary‟ perception is that perception in 
which we experience form” is a perfect illustration of this ambiguity. Although its 
“formalist” orientation might seem to be clear-cut and unequivocal on the surface, 
even such a straightforward statement of his programme must be understood as 
possessing at least two quite different, if related meanings.64 
First of all, Šklovskij often employs the term "form" to designate explicitly the 
structural and relational qualities, as well as the constituent parts of artistic and 
literary works. In one of his more radical description of the nature of art and literature, 
for example, Šklovskij states that "a literary work is pure form. It is neither thing nor 
material, but a relationship of materials. And, like every relationship, this one too has 
little to do with length or width or any other dimension. It's the arithmetic significance 
of its numerator and denominator (.i.e. their relationship) that is important." (Šklovskij, 
1990, [1925], p.189). Here, obviously, form takes on a very abstract meaning, 
relating only to the work of art or literature itself. 
This first "abstract" meaning given to the notion of form by Šklovskij derives directly 
from – and is best understood with regard to – his and the formalists' key theoretical 
ambition, which was to ground literary studies as an autonomous discipline capable 
of producing analyses of literature qua literature. The central motivation of the 
Russian formalists, indeed, was “to bring to an end the methodological confusion 
prevailing in traditional literary studies” (Erlich, op.cit, p.145). Literary studies, they 
argued, had up to that point tended to concentrate not on the literary work itself, but 
on a multitude of external factors, including the circumstances of its psychological or 
social production, its wider impact on society and culture, or its philosophical, 
ideological, religious and spiritual significance. By implicitly locating the source of 
aesthetic value outside of the literary work itself, “traditional literary studies” – by 
which the formalists meant primarily the XIXth century Russian “Civic” tradition of 
Belinskij and Černyševskij, as well as Potebnja‟s more recent Symbolist school of 
thought – thus made it a priori impossible "to delimit the area [of literary studies] and 
define unequivocally its subject of inquiry" (ibid., p.171).  
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In practice, the formalists‟ scientific aim therefore required them to oppose these 
traditions and to characterise the literary work in reference not to external or extrinsic 
criteria such as its capacity to represent or imitate reality, its moral meaning, 
emotional power, social and political significance or even symbolic richness (its 
“imagery” – obraznost‟), but purely through its immanent properties or its 
“literariness”. As is well-known, Šklovskij and all the other formalists after him 
achieved this objective by defining the literary work through its inherent formal 
structure and the particular relations instituted between its internal constituent parts. 
Famously, Šklovskij thus stated that a literary work is in fact nothing else than “the 
sum of its devices." (Šklovskij, op.cit., p.190). The devices themselves, in Šklovskij‟s 
definition, correspond to the formal, “technical” aspect of a literary text: depending on 
the genre (poetry, short story, novel, etc.) and the textual or verbal levels on which 
they operate (stylistic, discursive, narrative, etc.), they include rhythm, alliteration, 
repetition, metaphor, metonymy, parallelism, syntax, narrative voice, plot, etc. By 
defining the literary work in this fashion, the formalists could proceed to analyse only 
its constitutive formal elements, the devices, and assess its aesthetic value on that 
exclusive basis. In that sense, it is unsurprising to hear Jakobson declare: "If literary 
history wants to become a science, it must recognise the artistic device as its only 
concern" (Jakobson, 1921, p.11). 
 
Šklovskij‟s definition of the literary work as a pure form or a "sum of devices" – along 
with the variations on this seminal theme put forward by other formalists – happens 
to be the aspect of Russian Formalism which has received the widest echo and for 
which it is best known. It is certainly on that basis that a better defined and less 
eclectic “science” of literature could be successfully developed. More than anything 
else, it was the formalists‟ assumption that a literary work can be analytically reduced 
to the specific arrangement, patterning or composition of its structural devices, 
segments and elements that interested French Structuralists such as Lévi-Strauss or 
Barthes.65 This rigorously formal definition of art and literature is also what drew the 
starkest criticisms from the formalists‟ opponents. It was attacked in particular by 
Marxist critics, who decried the formalists for wilfully and categorically excluding the 
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diverse representational, emotional, social or ideological – in short the meaningful, 
semantic – dimensions of art, in favour of a pure, abstractly formal definition, a 
criticism that ultimately gave rise to the use of the disparagingly-intended term 
“Formalism” to describe their theories. For the same reason, as Erlich judiciously 
remarks, the aesthetics of Russian Formalism “has often been represented as merely 
a refurbished version of the late nineteenth-century “art for art‟s sake” doctrine.” 
(Erlich, 1955, p.145).  
Both the positive reception of Russian Formalism as a theory capable of isolating the 
intrinsic aesthetic properties of literary works, and its dismissal by critics as an 
idealist, abstract, art pour l’art doctrine are in great part justified and perfectly 
understandable. There is no doubt that the tendency to isolate literature and art as 
special, self-contained, blindly “technical” kind of phenomena was a strong feature of 
the formalists‟ theory, especially in its early, polemical days. Typically, Šklovskij 
states that art has a “sense of being shut up within itself” and a “freedom from 
external coercion” (Šklovskij, 1991, p.189), which is a stance very close indeed to the 
principles of l’art pour l’art. That being said, such a perception of Russian Formalism 
as a radically theory of meaningless and abstract form is also both profoundly 
misleading and incomplete.  
For one, as Erlich further points out, when dissociating literature from its external 
contexts or objective meanings and reducing it to its formal features, the formalists 
were above all making a point of analytical method, rather than formulating a strong 
aesthetic principle. The formalists did not see their alleged “formalism” as a 
statement about the essential nature of art and literature, but only as a way to 
“specify” the problems of literary studies and the methodological perspective required 
to investigate literature properly (cf. Erlich, 1955, p.145). Eichenbaum thus wrote: 
“Our method is usually referred to as “Formalist”. I would prefer to call it 
morphological to differentiate it from other approaches such as psychological, 
sociological and the like, where the object of inquiry is not the work itself, but that 
which, in the scholar‟s opinion, is reflected in the work.” (Eichenbaum, 1922, quoted 
from Erlich, 1955, p. 171).  
More to the point, this clear-cut conception of art and literature as pure form – as well 
as the notion of pure, abstract and meaningless literary form itself – is hard to 
reconcile with some of Šklovskij‟s other aesthetics pronouncements and 
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assumptions. By all accounts, his emphasis on the exclusive aesthetic importance of 
a text's stylistic devices seems to sit very uncomfortably with the presumptive power 
to summon vivid, concrete and meaningful experiences of the empirical world that we 
saw Šklovskij assign to art and literature as their essential function. In spite of its 
clear and repeated emphasis on the autonomous status of art and the supreme 
importance of its immanent, formal properties, Šklovskij's aesthetics involves a 
clearly empirical, worldly component.  
Trevor Pateman cleverly highlights this concrete, empirical dimension of Šklovskij‟s 
nominally formalist aesthetic by contrasting it to a really uncompromising, almost 
mathematical formalism such as that of the Bloomsbury art critic Clive Bell.66 After 
quoting Šklovskij's definition of art as estrangement (“And art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life etc.), Pateman comments: "If this is formalism, it doesn't 
sound at all like Clive Bell's. If the job of art is to resist the automatism of perception, 
its encapsulated imperceptiveness, in order to restore the world and ourselves to life, 
then it is humane in a way which Bell's aestheticism cannot accommodate. Whereas 
Clive Bell's aesthetic emotion is disconnected from the world represented in an art 
work and does not lead us back to it, for Shklovsky art is working well when it 
enables us to experience epiphanies about the real world - illuminations which may 
be major (about the human condition) or small (in which we feel the stoniness of the 
stone)." (Pateman, 1991, p.43). 
In other words, as paradoxical as it may sound in view of their absolute formal 
autonomy and immanence, art and literature – or to be more precise, the aesthetic 
experience they give rise to – are nonetheless tightly bound and involved with the 
empirical world and our concrete, sensual impressions of it.67 As such, the notion of 
form, or rather the “formal” nature of art and literature take not a narrowly idealistic, 
abstract meaning, but a specific and unusual one in the texts of the Russian 
formalists, as is well reflected in comments such as the following by Tomaševskij: 
“The word “form” has many meanings which, as always, cause a lot of confusion. It 
should be clear that we use this word in a particular sense – not as some correlative 
to the notion of “content” (such a correlation is, by the way, false, for the notion of 
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“content” is, in fact, the correlative of the notion “volume” and not at all of “form”) as 
something essential for the artistic phenomenon, as its organising principle” 
(Tomaševskij, 1928. p.34). 
 
These considerations on the "peculiar sense" of Šklovskij's notion of form and the 
formal dimension of art and literature bring me logically to the second, more unusual 
meaning which they take on in Šklovskij's (and the other formalists‟) texts. That 
meaning must be understood in closer relation to the conceptual horizon mapped out 
in “The Resurrection of the Word” and “Art as Device” with regard to perception – 
rather than to the formalists' goal of establishing an independent science of literature. 
In effect, it is obvious from my own and Pateman's remarks that Šklovskij's concept 
of form is no less closely connected with the idea of de-automatisation of perception 
than with the imperative of isolating the specific features of art and literature. 
Šklovskij himself introduces the notion of form (and its centrality to art and literature) 
in immediate and explicit connection with the process of automatisation.  
The process of automatisation, we saw, involves a progressive blunting and dulling of 
the grain, texture or fabric of perceived objects. To take one of Šklovskij‟s example, 
when we perceive a stone in the mode of everyday experience, we “know” it is a 
stone and recognise it as such. However, we do not register and have no impression 
of the smoothness or roughness of its surface, its particular shape and size, its 
shades of colour, its asperities and protuberances: we are blind to all the concrete 
sensual qualities which make up the phenomenal appearance of a given stone. 
Crucially, Šklovskij likens this dullness or blindness of automatised, everyday 
perception to a “loss of form” (Šklovskij, 1913). As he puts it, because of 
automatisation, “we apprehend [objects] only as shapes with imprecise extensions; 
we do not see them in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main 
characteristics. We see the object as though it were enveloped in a sack. We know 
what it is by its configuration, but we see only its silhouette.”(Šklovskij, 1917). In other 
words, it is not so much our impressions of the object as such that becomes 
automatised and transparent in everyday experience, but that of its intricate, complex 
sensual features and contours. Conversely, it is our impressions of the object‟s same 
intricate, complex sensual features and contours that must be restored, reactualised 
and redynamised in aesthetic perception.  
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When considered in this perspective, it now seems that Šklovskij equates form with 
the phenomenal, perceptual structure of reality itself, or rather, that he uses the term 
to refer to the empirical, perceptual form of concrete objects, as they are given in 
aesthetic experience. In such a reading (which is the one I implicitly emphasised in 
my introduction), the form that is revealed, dynamised and “made difficult” by art or 
literature and thus experienced aesthetically is that of the empirical object itself, or to 
be absolutely precise, of the object as it is concretely perceived. This also seems to 
mean that our sensual impressions of the object are in fact not distinct from its formal 
or intelligible structure, in an aesthetic mode at least. Rather, the empirical object can 
be said to be “expressed” or given monistically in the act of perception 
simultaneously and indistinctly as a sensual, concrete and meaningful form. As 
Hansen-Löve puts it: "Der spezifisch ästhetische Erkenntnisprozess vollzieht sich aus 
formalistischer Sicht nicht auf zwei voneinander unabhängigen 
Kommunikationsebenen (einer intellektuell abstrahierbaren "Botschaft" und den 
sensuell wahrnehmbaren "Reizen"), sondern in einem homogenen methodischen 
Schaffens- und Rezeptionsakt der "Bedeutungsproduktion" […]"(Hansen-Löve, 1978, 
p.225).68 
 
In summary, Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement reveals itself as being informed by an 
obvious tension between two contrasting, almost incompatible elements. The first of 
these two elements is the value afforded to the concrete act of perception as the 
intransitive, autotelic purveyor of our conscious, full experience of life and the 
empirical world. The second element is the immanent, formal nature of art and 
literature as an independent (and independently analysable) phenomenon. Crucially, 
we also discovered that Šklovskij does not deem these apparently conflicting formal 
and perceptual elements to be fundamentally contradictory, nor indeed does he 
seem to consider that they constitute two distinct, separate facets of his theory. On 
the contrary, he presents them as being tightly interconnected: even the immanent 
“pure forms” of art necessarily involve sensual perception, whilst even mere sensual 
impressions are linked in aesthetic experience with the perception of form. In effect, 
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his whole idea of art as estrangement only makes sense thanks to the functional 
combination or confusion of immanent artistic or literary form and empirical, sensual 
perception in aesthetic experience. 
On the one hand, the unusual interaction between artistic or literary form and sensual 
perception posited by Šklovskij seems to lead directly to (indeed, to rely upon) an 
original and innovative position with respect to the nature of perception. Indeed, we 
caught a brief glimpse of the possible implications of his theory of estrangement in 
that regard, for example through the hypothetical idea repeated by Hansen-Löve, that 
the acts of aesthetic perception induced by art and literature correspond to an 
experience of the empirical world in its concretely expressive, simultaneously 
intelligible and sensible phenomenality. For my part, I firmly believe that 
interpretations such as Hansen-Löve's as to the homogeneous, conjointly meaningful 
and sensual nature of aesthetic experience are absolutely correct. At the very least, 
something very similar to that idea is confusedly but persistently hovering at the back 
of Šklovskij‟s mind and in the background of his texts, and in my opinion, is 
necessary to make sense of his theory. The thought that reality and its objects are 
perceived as concrete, complex and meaningful forms in aesthetic experience 
certainly flickers through many of Šklovskij‟s statements. One can recall, for example, 
his affirmations that objects have “shapes with imprecise extensions” (Šklovskij, 
1988, p.20) or that “art is a way of experiencing how an object is made: the object is 
not important.” (ibid., p.21).69 
On the other hand, one must admit at this point that it would constitute a gross over-
simplification (which Hansen-Löve does not commit) of Šklovskij‟s theory of 
estrangement to state that it straightforwardly and explicitly implies that artistic or 
literary form and concrete, objective perception simply and purely congregate in 
aesthetic experience.70 It is a similarly unwarranted short-cut to state that Šklovskij 
really conceives aesthetic experience as an act in which the world is not only 
encountered in vivid, conscious sensual fashion, but is also meaningfully articulated, 
structured and expressed thanks to the direct effect of  works of art and literature. For 
one, although it is definitely present in his theory, Šklovskij never explicitly describes 
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or defends what the concrete expressive form of perceived objects really might be or 
what such a notion implies: beyond his programmatic declarations on the 
automatisation and de-automatisation of given perceptions or his comments on the 
“disappearing shapes” of objects and the “stoniness of the stone”, one finds little 
indications as to how Šklovskij envisions perception, or what kind of systematic 
theory he has in mind to justify that vision. As it is, the question of perception never 
takes on a clear role in Šklovskij‟s aesthetics, but is integrated to it in an ambiguous, 
derivative way, as if it were either an obvious presupposition or an after-thought, the 
inevitable consequence of other more important arguments.  
Even more importantly, just as it was misleading to reduce Šklovskij‟s concept of 
form to its abstract, artificial dimension, it would be wrong-headed to completely 
forget that particular emphasis of Šklovskij‟s conception of art as estrangement. Next 
to the undoubted importance afforded to the act of consciously feeling and 
experiencing life and the concrete, empirical world, indeed, Šklovskij never repeals 
his fundamental observation that art and literature are essentially immanent, formal 
phenomena, which as such remain distinct from the empirical world itself – and 
therefore from the aesthetic perceptions one can have of it. True, because he states 
that “aesthetic perception is the perception of form” and because the ideas of artistic 
form and aesthetic perception are so closely linked to one another, the distinct formal 
nature of art and literature as Šklovskij sees them might not appear to interfere with 
the radical idea that aesthetic experience corresponds in fact to a donation of reality 
itself as a concrete perceptual form. One can presume a sort of overlap or correlation 
between artistic or literary form, and the perceptual forms to which they give rise to. A 
closer look at Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement, however, reveals that, although it is 
beyond doubt that he posits a strong link between empirical perception and form in 
the aesthetic process, Šklovskij does not suggest that artistic form and perceptive, 
empirical content really congregate in such a way in aesthetic experience. In fact, 
Šklovskij‟s conception of their interrelation is much more complicated and subtle. As 
mentioned, it has a rich and complex background in the Russian aesthetic traditions, 
in particular that of Symbolism.71 
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It should be emphasised here that the complexity or subtlety of Šklovskij‟s theory of 
estrangement with regard to the questions of artistic form, perception (or perceptual 
form) and their interrelated aesthetic roles should not necessarily be seen as a 
weakness. If anything, they reflect positively upon the capacity of his theory to 
integrate problems such as the mediatory role of art or literature in the aesthetic 
process. After all, it would seem rather far-fetched and naïve to imagine – as my 
exposition of Šklovskij's conception of aesthetic experience so far might be said to 
have suggested – that a work of art or, especially, of literature can induce direct and 
immediate perceptions of empirical reality (as concrete forms or in any other guise) 
through its formal properties.72 No one in his right mind, I believe, would want to 
suggest that the act of reading, for example, leads one to literally "see" or "feel" the 
objects or situations described as if in a concrete act of perception (cf. Iser, 1976). 
This is particularly obvious in the case of the non-objective modernist art and 
literature that effectively inspired Šklovskij‟s theory, as they do not even pretend to 
imitate or reproduce real objects and situations as they are perceived, but either 
wilfully exaggerate and distort their most basic features, or renounce altogether to 
represent anything objectively defined.  
 
Since it is obviously absurd to postulate that art and literature can induce pure and 
immediate “formal” perceptions of the empirical world thanks to their own formal 
properties, and since, despite some of his pronouncements tending towards such an 
affirmation, Šklovskij is certainly not so naïve as to suggest such a thing, this begs 
the question of how artistic or literary form actually do affect and interact with 
perception in his theory of estrangement. As it happens, Šklovskij does offer a 
specific, detailed solution to the problematic question of the relation between form 
and perception, the mention whereof will conveniently allow me to complete my 
outline of his theory of estrangement. 
In effect, Šklovskij reconciles and explains the interaction of the distinctly formal and 
empirical aspects of his conception of aesthetic experience indirectly, with the help of 
a further, key concept, that of the artistic or literary “devices” (priemy). On the one 
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hand, we already saw that Šklovskij defines the devices as the basic units or 
components of the literary or artistic work. As such, they are very clearly connected 
with its purely formal structure, or rather, they effectively represent and constitute that 
formal structure itself (“the literary work is the sum of its stylistic devices."). But, on 
the other hand, Šklovskij also links the artistic devices unambiguously to sensual 
perception: according to him, devices are meant to provoke estrangement, to 
“defamiliarise” and induce thereby the fresh awareness of the empirical world and the 
feeling for life that characterise aesthetic experience according to Šklovskij. In other 
words, the devices serve as crucial functional intermediaries between the levels of 
pure artistic or literary form and sensual, empirical perception. 
To be more precise, the defining function of the artistic or literary devices is in fact to 
artificially distort the standard modes of description or representation of everyday 
objects, facts or situations. Devices are used to describe or represent the world in an 
unusual or surprising way and thus to "make it strange" and “unfamiliar”. Beyond this 
generic characterisation, Šklovskij does not provide a single definition of the 
"estranging" function of the artistic or literary devices, choosing instead to illustrate it 
through a number of significant examples, many of which he draws from the novels 
and short stories of Lev Tolstoj: "Tolstoj makes the familiar seem strange by not 
naming the familiar object. He describes an object as if he were seeing it for the first 
time, an event as if it were happening for the first time. In describing something he 
avoids the accepted names of its parts and instead names corresponding parts of 
other objects. For example, in "Shame" Tolstoy 'defamiliarises' the idea of flogging in 
this way: "to strip people who have broken the law, to hurl them to the floor, and to 
rap on their bottoms with switches," and, after a few lines, "to lash about on the 
naked buttocks.""(Šklovskij, 1988, p.21). In a similar spirit, Šklovskij also mentions 
Tolstoj's recourse to unusual narrative perspectives: after quoting a short extract of 
Tolstoj's novella "Kholstomer," he points out that "The narrator of "Kholstomer," for 
example, is a horse, and it is the horse's point of view (rather than a person's) that 
makes the content of the story seem unfamiliar." (ibid., p.21) 
Obviously, one could do here with some more details on the exact workings of the 
artistic devices and the varied ways through which they actually produce 
estrangement and aesthetic perceptions of reality. In fact, it is to such an explanation 
and differentiation of the distinct types of devices that Šklovskij devoted most of his 
work subsequently to “Art as Device” (where his idea of the device is only very 
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broadly sketched out). Having said that, the fundamental mechanism of Šklovskij‟s 
aesthetics and, in particular, of the relation it establishes between artistic or literary 
form and empirical perception can be correctly inferred from the few above 
examples, without having to go any further into the technical subtleties of the device 
as a concept of literary theory. Indeed, Šklovskij decides to confer absolute generality 
to the “estranging” function of literary devices such as the ones highlighted in 
Tolstoj‟s works. After simply quoting a couple more relevant tolstojan examples, 
Šklovskij declares in a typically unworried, sweeping statement: “having explained 
the nature of this device [i.e. estrangement], let us try to determine the approximate 
limits of its application. I personally feel that estrangement is found almost 
everywhere form is found.” (ibid., p.25) In short, notwithstanding the particular 
variations of specific types of devices, they all involve the same fundamental 
“estranging” interaction between artistic or literary form and perception.  
On the basis of these considerations, one can sum up the basic tenets of Šklovskij‟s 
“strange” aesthetic as follows: Artistic or literary works are constituted by the specific 
organisation (sloţenie) or construction (postroenie) of a sum of individual devices. As 
such, they are “pure forms”. This artistic of literary form is structured and organised in 
such a way as to distort or displace (sdvig) the habitual and conventional modes of 
descriptions or representations of facts and objects. In other words, objects, facts or 
situations are represented not against their usual background (fon), but are detached 
or separated (vydelennyj) from it and thus made to look strange, unusual, unfamiliar. 
Through this wilfully artificial and formally unusual depiction, representation or 
presentation of common objects and facts, the work of art or literature and its devices 
are thus able to functionally trigger an aesthetic effect, which is defined by Šklovskij 
as an impression of strangeness, or to be more precise, a sense or impression of 
difference (differencial'noe oščuščenie, differencial'noe vpečatlenie).73 In turn, the 
“differential impression” that arises from the discrepancy between the incongruous, 
formally modified literary object and its normal, "real-life" equivalent is sufficient to 
interrupt the habitual automatised cognitive process of perceiving the given objects 
and facts. According to Šklovskij, it leads to a "slowing-doing" (tarmoţenie, literally 
“breaking”) or "making difficult" (zatrudyvanie) of the perceptive process, which in 
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turn brings with it a renewed, heightened or redynamised – and therefore aesthetic – 
awareness of the specific properties of given objects, facts, situations, events, etc. In 
short, the strangeness of the pure artistic or literary form functionally brings us to cast 
a de-automised, fresh look at the world, and therefore to experience and perceive it 
more consciously and fully in its sensual complexity. 




Devices, Material and the Concrete Form of “Poetic Language” 
 
From the viewpoint of the Russian formalists‟ own theoretical aims and modernist 
convictions, the general meaning taken on by Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement in 
light of his characterisation of the literary work as a sum of de-automatising devices 
is doubly satisfactory. As it is, this differential, mechanical model allows him and the 
other formalists to cement their so-called “morphological” analytical approach to 
literature by successfully reducing the literary text to its strictly immanent, formal 
features and defining its aesthetic value independently of any external factor. In 
effect, the literary function and properties of the devices – which, as we saw, 
constitute the sole aesthetically relevant components of the literary text – are related 
neither to their plastic appeal, their emotional force, descriptive vividness, ideological, 
political, moral, religious and spiritual significance, nor to the richness of their 
figurative imagery. Only the “strange” contrasts and salient distortions imposed by 
the devices on our habitual representations of reality are deemed by Šklovskij to be 
aesthetically relevant. The literary text and its aesthetic value can thus be defined 
and analysed on the whole as a set of exclusively formal, work-immanent problems 
such as the particular technical uses made of given devices in view of generating 
distortions and differential effects, or the setting and arrangement of these same 
devices into plots and narrative structures – which are themselves also designed to 
produce contrastive, estranging effects.74 
On top of this, Šklovskij‟s definition of the literary device and its “estranging” function 
opportunely accommodates his modernist inclinations for the concrete, vital 
dimension of art or literature – and saves him and his fellow formalists from being 
truthfully portrayed as austere or idealist “art for art‟s sake” dogmatists. Indeed, the 
idea of estrangement not only preserves a strong connection between the immanent, 
formal dimension of literature and the wider, everyday world, but relies on it 
necessarily: if the differential, contrastive or distortive properties of a device do not 
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end up inducing fresh, concrete impressions, it cannot be said to fulfil an estranging 
function at all and, consequently, to possess aesthetic value or even really be a 
device in Šklovskij‟s sense. Despite their nominal status as purely formal constituents 
of literary texts, the devices thus clearly contribute to anchor literature and its 
aesthetic qualities into real life and the empirical world. In line with Eichenbaum‟s 
above-mentioned pronouncements (cf. Chapter 1, p.21), the formalists can 
reasonably claim that whilst their theory methodologically reduces literature to its 
formal, immanent properties, it does not preclude literature from practically entailing 
an aesthetic experience that is resolutely concrete and worldly. 75 
As far as my own claims pertaining to the philosophical originality and potential of 
Šklovskij‟s aesthetics are concerned, by contrast, one can only be disappointed by 
the functional theory outlined in the preceding chapter – and that without even 
considering any of the other weaknesses or faults to be found with Šklovskij‟s theory 
of estrangement. In effect, the intermediary role attributed to the literary devices 
obviously brings serious caveats to Šklovskij‟s apparently so unusual, pioneering 
conception of the interaction of form and perception in aesthetic experience. It 
certainly calls into question the notion that aesthetic experience corresponds to the 
act of perceiving the empirical world itself in its simultaneously formal and concrete 
phenomenality. In truth, the outlook now is that it might not be possible at all to 
justifiably or adequately make use of the idea evoked earlier on that objects appear 
as concrete expressive forms in perception. As a result, one might also have to 
abandon altogether any claim as to the compelling philosophical innovations it 
seemed both to promise and to rely upon with regard to the structural, expressive 
nature of aesthetic experience and perception in general. 
In effect, Šklovskij‟s conception of the literary devices and their crucial mediating role 
between artistic form and sensual perception certainly leaves no doubt that although 
aesthetic experience does involve concrete impressions of reality at some point, 
these are induced secondarily or derivatively by the literary text and occure only as a 
functional after-effect of its formal properties. Worse, it would seem that only our 
perceptual “intentions” or "set" (ustanovka), rather than our concrete acts of 
perception are affected by the literary text: when considered carefully, Šklovskij‟s 
model intimates that literature does not so much produce immediate sensual 
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impressions, as recondition our perceptive disposition towards the empirical world 
through a mediatory, differential play on our formal representations thereof.76 As 
such, the renewal or freshening of our concrete perceptions that is supposed to 
happen in aesthetic experience results but indirectly from the literary text and its 
formal, estranging features. 
This does not mean that perception plays a lesser role than expected in Šklovskij‟s 
aesthetics: by all means, the production of fresh impression remains the ultimate 
function of art and literature. It does mean, however, that the formal, structural 
dimension of aesthetic experience concerns only the devices and the artistic, 
“artificial”77 level of literature, rather than the one of empirical perception. All literature 
actually does is to renew its own significations and artificial structures, not those of 
the world itself. Contrary to what I suggested in the preceding chapters with regard to 
its monistic, integrative dimension, Šklovskij's aesthetics thus seems to preserve a 
traditional dualistic structure and to keep the categories of artistic, literary form and 
the objective, perceptual world well separated from one another after all. Far from 
having the general property of revealing reality in a meaningful, expressive form, 
aesthetic perception appears only as a limited kind of experience, possessing no 
other end than itself, and no other consequences than a momentarily heightened, 
acute sense of reality. In that sense also, aesthetic experience constitutes only a 
special, artificially produced and transient way of experiencing the world and is 
therefore essentially distinct from and irrelevant to the normal process of perception. 
To be sure, Šklovskij insists on clearly distinguishing the aesthetic from the everyday 
as two essentially different modes of experience, despite their interrelation in the 
cycle of automatisation and de-automatisation.78 
Šklovskij‟s conception of the literary devices also proves disappointing because of 
the specific, technical way in which they function – namely by occasioning a very 
basic “sense of difference” between common, everyday reality and its formally 
unusual representation in literature. This, indeed, means that literature produces its 
aesthetic formal effects simply by impeding or interrupting the normal process of 
perception, rather than transforming or rearticulating perceptual contents. This has 
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 As mentioned in chapter.2, the act of reading must been seen at least as involving a 
mediation of perception through language 
77
 One can note the existene of a word play in Russian with the word “iskusstvennyj”, which 
means both “artistic” and “artificial” 
78
 In that sense again, accusation of « abstract formalism » might again seemed warranted. 
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led Hansen-Löve, for example, to characterise Šklovskij‟s method as being 
essentially “apophatic”: it proceeds only through the negation of positive concepts 
(Hansen-Löve, 1978, pp.71 etc).79 
Be that as it may it is certainly true that according to Šklovskij, the aesthetic 
experience that results from the impediment or interruption of perception occasioned 
by literature is not intrinsically meaningful; it does not entail essential modifications to 
the structure or “form” of our impressions of reality. According to Šklovskij‟s 
description of the process of estrangement, all that happens as a result of the sense 
of difference functionally induced by the literary devices is that our impressions of the 
empirical world alternate between two psychological states of awareness, or two 
modes of attention: automatised, schematic and diffuse in everyday perception, 
conscious, vivid and focussed in aesthetic perception. On top of this, there is a 
second and very serious drawback to this conception of the literary device as the 
catalyst of a blind impression of difference. In effect, such a characterisation of the 
process of estrangement makes it impossible to conceive the notion of form as being 
in any way meaningful or possessing a positive, constructive semantic dimension. In 
other words, it would seem that Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement does not imply 
that aesthetic perception displays formal, structural features (these are the exclusive 
property of art and literature) and that even if it did, this formal dimension cannot be 
said to express or carry any objective meaning. In the face of these two inconvenient 
facts, it is thus very hard to argue that Šklovskij‟s aesthetics suggests, – let alone can 
contribute relevant insights to – a theory that presents perception as a concrete but 
intelligibly articulated form or structure. 
In fairness, I pointed out even whilst outlining these theoretical prospects that they 
constituted both a simplification and an over-interpretation of Šklovskij's aesthetics. 
What is more, I do believe that neither Šklovskij‟s differential, mechanistic notion of 
the literary device, nor his insistence on clearly separating the aesthetic from the 
everyday finally put pay to the original perspective of a monistic, structural theory of 
perception raised by his theory of art as estrangement. The main reason for this 
unchastened optimism is, simply put, that the concept of the literary device as I have 
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 In that sense, and despite repeated assertions to the contrary, Šklovskij’s idea of difference 
cannot be linked to that of Saussure. Instead of instating a system of meaningful oppositions 
and contrasts as in Saussure, difference operates in Šklovskij’s theory only as a blind, one-off 
contrastive effect. As pointed out by Hansen-Löve, Šklovskij’s idea of difference derives 
from Christiansen’s Theory of Art 
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described it so far on the basis of Art as Device  – along with the blind, negative and 
non-semantic conception of form, as well as the apparently neat dualistic separation 
between artistic form and objective perception that it helps to preserve – does not 
represent Šklovskij‟s last word on the questions of form and perception, or their 
interaction in literature and aesthetic experience. In fact, what we have seen so far is 
but a very general template of Šklovskij's aesthetics, to which he soon brought 
precisions and refinements.  
As I will now try to demonstrate, these precisions and refinements provide renewed 
reason to believe in the potential originality of his theory as regards both the 
perceptual dimension of literary form and the formal, expressive structure of concrete 
perception itself. Discussing these issues, it should be mentioned, will draw me 
somewhat deeper into the literary theoretical aspect of Šklovskij‟s work. 
Unsurprisingly, indeed, it is on the level of literary analysis that he chose to refine his 
insights on the nature of literature and literary form. Much of this chapter will thus be 
dedicated to some of Šklovskij‟s most important literary theoretical concepts. I must 
again stress, however, that it does not purport to offer an extensive account or 
criticisms of these concepts, but simply highlights the developments they bring to 
Šklovskij‟s conception of literary form and its interaction with sensual perception, as 
well as the perspective they open with regard to the systematic, philosophical 
potential of his original insights.80 
 
One issue that Šklovskij had to address in particular with regard to his idea of the 
literary device was the question of the relation between the form and the objective 
content (or meaning) of the literary text. We saw, of course, that his conception of the 
device tended to obliterate the semantic dimension of the literary text. Because of 
Šklovskij‟s blunt and repeated assertions that literary works of art are “pure forms” 
and bare “sums of devices”, one could be excused for thinking that he does assume 
that they never possess objective content, are bereft of any social, emotional, or 
descriptive meaning and, in the most radical of modernist fashion, are completely 
and essentially non-representational and abstract. Such a view, however, is largely 
inexact and would be plainly absurd in any case since there is plenty of great 
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 For a full account of the evolution of Russian formalism, one can consult Hansen-Löve’s 
very rich description (Hansen-Löve, 1978, pp.227-456), or Steiner’s convincing “metapoetic” 
account (Steiner, 1984). 
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realistic, representational or objective literature, even in Modernism. In fact, despite 
the undeniably radical formulation he chooses to use, Šklovskij‟s intention is not to 
naïvely exclude the idea that literary works of art may possess any objective, 
meaningful content or that they may sometimes (or even usually) imitate, represent 
or be connected to the world in some descriptive, referential or “ideological” way. 
Rather, his concern is to redefine the relation between a literary text‟s form and its 
meaningful, objective content in such a way as to underline the exclusive aesthetic 
prerogative and relevance of the former. 
As such, Šklovskij does not present or conceive the literary text as a pure 
aggregation of literary devices and techniques totally free of meaning or descriptive 
references to the extra-literary, physical world. Rather, he describes it as the specific 
organisation or structuration of an underlying, raw content, by means of formal 
literary devices functionally intended to “defamiliarise” that content and its 
significations. Instead of accepting the usual opposition between the artistic form of a 
literary work and its objective content, meaning or “message”, Šklovskij postulates a 
distinction between the literary devices on the one hand, and what he calls the extra-
literary “material” (material) on the other. This extra-literary “material” corresponds 
according to Šklovskij to the real life or imaginary situations, events, facts, objects or 
ideas that can be taken as themes or “motives” and represented or described in a 
work of literature. It constitutes so to say the pre-aesthetic stage of the creative 
process, the unformed, objective substrate of the literary text. Although it is an 
important component of the literary work, though, the material as such has no 
aesthetic function: it serves only as a fundament or template which supports the 
devices‟ aesthetic, estranging function.  
Incidentally, this crucial distinction between device and material is reflected and 
further illustrated in another famous opposition postulated by Šklovskij between what 
he calls the “plot” (confusingly called “sjuţet” in the original Russian) and the 
“subject-matter” (fabula) of the literary text, that is, respectively, between “how” a 
story or novel is constructed, and “what” it is about.81 These two concepts apply more 
specifically to the level of narrative structure but involve precisely the same 
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 Šklovskij’s provides the following example:"In this way, the plot of Eugene Onegin is not 
the love between Eugene and Tatiana but the appropriation of that story line in the form of 
digressions that interrupt the text." (Šklovskij, 1991, p.170) 
The sjuzet-fabula distinction, by the way, figures among the conceptual innovations of the 
Russian formalists that achieved greatest success. 
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distinction as the device/material couple between the functional, form-giving and 
structuring principle of a work of literature, and the secondary objective, meaningful 
substrate used as “pretext” for the literary play and formal invention that ultimately 
give rise to the aesthetically relevant estranging effects. 
As one can see, Šklovskij‟s distinction between device and material (as well as 
between plot and subject-matter) constitutes his answer of sorts to the question of 
form and content in the literary work of art. Unsurprisingly, that answer strongly 
emphasises the importance of form over meaning and confirms the predominant 
aesthetic role of the devices. Although Šklovskij tolerates the idea that extra-literary 
material (or objective content) is without doubt a component of the literary work, he 
very clearly subordinates its role to the latter‟s formal, differential and estrangement-
inducing properties. In fact, the structuring, aesthetic power of the devices is so 
strong and dominant that the material is all but completely neutralised as an 
independent element. Typically, Šklovskij thus maintains that the material or 
objective content that is used in a literary work is disrupted and transformed to such a 
point by the literary devices that it acquires a wholly different value and quality, which 
severs it from its original meaning and properties. As he evocatively puts it in of his 
autobiographical works: “artistic form carries out its own unique rape of the Sabine 
women. The material ceases to recognize its former lord and master. Once 
processed by the law of art, it can be perceived apart from its place of origin” 
(Šklovskij, 1983, p.243)  
In another savoury quote, Šklovskij suggests in similar fashion that "in order to 
transform an object into a fact of art, it is necessary first to withdraw it from the 
domain of life. To do this, we must first and foremost "shake up the object", as Ivan 
the Terrible sorted out his henchmen. We must extricate a thing from the cluster of 
associations in which it is bound. It is necessary to turn over the object as one would 
turn a log over the fire" (Šklovskij, 1990 [1925], p.61). In other words, although a 
literary work of art can possess objective content and can in fact meaningfully 
represent or describe objects and situations from the extra-literary, empirical world, a 
clear rift is instated between the formally and artificially structured content described 
by a literary text and the reality which served as model or motive for its formal and 
aesthetically potent literary description. Once they are artistically integrated to a 
literary work as “material”, objects and facts (or the description thereof) lose their 
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original properties or significations, and find themselves completely subsumed to the 
formal principles and aesthetic function that govern literature.82 
At first glance, the device-material economy of the literary work of art seems to 
confirm the dualism of Šklovskij‟s aesthetics and the clear separation it implements 
between the formal, structured and artificial aspects of literature on the one hand, 
concrete reality and objective meaning on the other. By reducing the semantic 
dimension and the objective content of a literary work to the status of a secondary, 
dispensable substrate - which furthermore undergoes a complete, essential change 
of value and function when transposed in a literary context, and often functions as a 
device itself  –, Šklovskij further validates the idea that literature and its artificial, 
formal qualities constitute a phenomenon essentially distinct and independent not 
only from “real life” itself but also from the objective descriptions of the world and its 
objects in literature. In effect, Šklovskij seems to suggest that form is not an attribute 
of the empirical world, or even of its artistically-neutral objective representations and 
descriptions. As he understands it, when formal, literary elements are applied to 
objective descriptions of the world, they transform or transfigure it into something 
distinct, into a series of artificially motivated facts or “artefacts”, which are then 
essentially determined by their literary context and function, not their concrete, real 
life features and meanings. 
Beyond its apparent confirmation of the dualistic structure of Šklovskij‟s theory, 
however, the device/material opposition also reveals his profound ambivalence as to 
the scope of the notion of form. In effect, simply by putting forward such ideas as the 
device and the material Šklovskij demonstrates an obvious willingness to rethink both 
the concept of form itself and the precise modalities of its opposition to objective 
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 In that sense, the content of a literary text is indeed essentially “formal”: the text’s objective 
meaning fulfils no mimetic, descriptive functions, but contributes only to the effectiveness of 
the devices. Even when a given work does apparently follows the structure of a given 
material, and is organised in a verysimilar, descriptive fashion, this is only a device of its 
own, called the “motivation”, which serves to reinforce the aesthetic, defamiliarising 
effectivity of a given literary text. What this means, essentially, is that when a texts actually 
describes or refers to something extra-literary (for example a political event), the relevance of 
that objective description is not so much  what is being described, but how that description is 
used to create an aesthetic, defamiliarising effect. Šklovskij favorit example is the description 
of war in Tolstoj’s “War and Peace”. Acorrding to Šklovskij, the description of war in 
Tolstoj’s novel should not be interpreted as a moral or political commentary, but as a way of 
forcing us to “see” war in a new light (Šklovskij, 1963): all the objective, moral and political 
descriptions of war of subsumed to that aesthetic goal and must be first understood in the 
narrative, aesthetic logic of the novel. 
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content or meaning. It is certainly clear from the way he elects to define the relation 
of the literary devices to the extra-literary material that Šklovskij was unhappy with 
the traditional, dichotomic opposition of form and content, in which form is usually 
presented as a neutral, passive concept, an “empty receptacle” to be filled with 
meaningful content. In comparison to this traditional definition, Šklovskij‟s notion of 
the device appears to be much more active and dynamic: as the formal element of 
the literary work it has the potency to intervene directly on the material and to 
dynamically shape and organise it. In that sense, of course, the device/material 
opposition clearly presupposes a measure of interaction between the formal 
elements and the objective content or meaning of the literary text that goes much 
further than their mediated, functional connection through the differential effects of 
estrangement. In effect, the power of the devices to transform the material within the 
literary work (as well as the property of the material itself to be adapted into a formal 
device) involves a genuine encroachment of the one on the other. 83  
This encroachment, it has to said, is conceived by Šklovskij first and foremost as an 
expansion of the concept of form, not as a negation of the opposition between literary 
form and non-literary content. As such, he deems that the encroachment between 
the two functions only in one direction, namely through the structuring, shape-giving 
action of form on a docile material, which is then transformed in its essence, and 
“sublimated” into something essentially artificial and formal. In his early texts at least, 
Šklovskij does not seriously envisage the reverse prospect, namely that artistic form 
might be conditioned by the properties of the material. To him, literary devices and 
form can transfigure and sublimate a neutral material into something aesthetically 
potent; in some cases, a given material can be used as a specific device (that of 
motivation). The non-aesthetic material itself, however, can not incorporate or be 
influenced by formal elements without being immediately subsumed to the artificial 
logic of these elements. In Šklovskij‟s scheme, literature and literary form figure as a 
dynamic, potent element which remains clearly distinct from the static, passive and 
amorphous nature of the objective content or meanings on which it operates. Despite 
the significant encroachment of the devices and artistic form on the material and 
objective content of the literary text, the intrinsic irreversibility between the two 
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 Hansen-Löve’s analysis also underline this encroachment, by revealing that Šklovskij’s 
conception implies several interacting levels of devices and materials : material I and II, 
device I and II, etc, which involve an evolution from a static opposition between the two 
concepts, to a dynamic interaction (cf. Hansen-Löve, 1978, pp.188 and following) 
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guarantees that the former can still be distinguished from the latter and maintains a 
distinct status. 
The strictly one way relation between form and content – or between devices and 
material, literature and non-literary world – is of course extremely useful to Šklovskij. 
Crucially, it enables him to achieve the double aim of expanding the potency and 
scope of the notion of literary form as an aesthetically relevant organising principle, 
whilst maintaining its autonomy as a distinctly phenomenon that can be analysed 
independently. The (rather obvious) problem with his argument, however, is that it is 
conceptually unsustainable. As Šklovskij himself soon experienced, once the idea of 
a mingling of form and content is admitted, defining the two notions separately from 
one another – let alone establishing the exclusive influence of the one over the other 
– quickly becomes an endless source of problems and paradoxes. As it happens, 
Šklovskij distinction between device and material thus masks a much more 
integrated conception of form and objective content than suggested by the dichotomy 
of his distinction between devices and material and the generally dualistic structure 
given to his aesthetics of estrangement by the mediatory function of the literary 
devices themselves. 
 
There is no shortage of examples to illustrate the complex and evolving nature of the 
roles assumed by the devices and material, or more generally, of literary form and 
objective content in Šklovskij‟s work. One of these is provided by the case of the 
evolution and eventual crisis undergone by his theory of prose. By Šklovskij‟s theory 
of prose, I mean more specifically the collection of articles or essays written during 
the period 1917-1922 and gathered in his anthology On the Theory of Prose (O teorii 
prozy), published for the first time in 1925. These texts, it should be noted, were not 
explicitly or purposefully composed by Šklovskij as the complementary parts of a 
single, unified theoretical edifice: in reality, they represent nothing more than 
successive stages and diverse aspects of his thematic reflexions on the problem of 
literary prose. Nonetheless, they do display a clear conceptual unity and, thanks to 
the diachronic rather than systematic relation between them, they provide a revealing 
trace of the logical progression and crisis of Šklovskij‟s thought on prose. Without 
going into the details of his reflections on the subject, I thus wish to briefly outline that 
progression and eventual crisis. 
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Šklovskij‟s theory of prose takes root in the general, seminal concepts we have 
encountered, namely the ideas of estrangement and of the literary device, as well as 
the distinctions between device/material and plot/subject-matter. As it happens, 
Šklovskij first exposes these ideas in the opening three texts of On the Theory of 
Prose (“Art as Device”, "The Relationship between Devices of Plot Construction and 
General Devices of Style" and "The Structure of Fiction"), which thus constitutes its 
general framework.84 In the remaining articles of his volume, Šklovskij then seeks to 
explore these core concepts and detail their precise mechanisms and concrete 
applications in literary prose. Put summarily, the fundamental insight to emerge from 
Šklovskij' deliberations and demonstrations is the following: because the material or 
subject-matter of a literary text is completely secondary and always remains 
aesthetically neutral, the only way for literary prose to develop and conquer new 
territories is not by producing new meanings, or changing its content, but to evolve 
towards an ever increasing degree of formal complexification, artifice, innovation and 
reflexivity.85 
This inner logic of the development of literary prose and its devices towards ever 
greater formal abstraction and complexity is itself best demonstrated by Šklovskij's 
conception of the evolution and complexification of plot – a theme which effectively 
serves as the main thread of On the Theory of Prose. According to Šklovskij, the 
earliest examples of prose literature, such as Cervantes' Don Quixotte, display a very 
basic, summary type of plot, consisting only of the consecutive "stringing" together 
(nanizyvanie) of unrelated episodes and motives (cf. Šklovskij, 1990 [1925], pp.72-
100). By contrast, later forms of prose literature, such as the detective mystery story 
(the paradigmatic type of which Šklovskij sees in the work of Conan Doyle (ibid., 
pp.101-116)) and the detective novel (ditto Dickens (ibid., pp.117-146)) already 
possess more complex narrative structures. Their themes and motives are arranged 
in so-called "framed structures" (obramlenie) and "gradations" (stupenčatost'), which 
imply a specific, hierarchical ordering of the text's narrative structure. The difference 
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 In contrast to most of his formalist fellows, who concentrated mainly on verse and poetry, 
Šklovskij turned most of his interest to prose and “narratology” (what Hansen-Löve calls his 
“subjekt-theory”). His own "theory of literature" is thus a "theory of prose", which explains 
why his seminal concepts figure at the head of a work on prose. 
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 This need for formal innovation is also a result of the process of automatisation: devices 
themselves, indeed, are subjected to automatisation, and must be revitalise, a process only 
possible through formal innovation. This by the way, shows that Šklovskij's theory is only 
possible as a theory of literary evolution. 
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between the mystery story, the detective novel and later, more mature genres is the 
increasing scale and degree of their structural complexity and formal abstraction, 
which develops into an ever more baroque nexus of parallelisms, repetitions, 
flashbacks, anticipations, progressions, gradations, delays, etc.  
In its early stage at least, the evolution and renewal of literary plot appears as a 
straightforward process of complexification of the arrangement and composition of its 
various elements. At some point, however, even the increased complexification of 
intricate, interwoven narrative structures attains its limits and exhausts its potential 
for renewal and “estranging”, norm-breaking innovation. Well aware, of that problem, 
Šklovskij thus gradually turned towards another line of plot development, which 
relays that of the simple complexification of narrative structure. This new type of plot 
involves not only an ever cleverer but unreflexive arranging of devices and motives, 
but the self-conscious "laying bare" (obnaţenie) of the plot and its devices through 
the use of parody. In a parodic novel or story, according to Šklovskij, not only may 
the plot be complexified to the extreme but, more importantly, the very tricks used to 
construct and complicate its structure are taken as theme. Instead of relying on an 
underlying “story” (fabula), the parodic novel relies on a kind of ironical, ultra-formal 
meta-narrative plot: it “comments” reflexively on its own devices instead of simply 
structuring and organising them. Šklovskij beloved example of such a parodic novel 
is Lawrence Sterne's Tristram Shandy, which he famously deemed to be "the most 
typical novel in world literature" (ibid., p.170) 
Leaving aside the broad range of criticisms to which one could submit Šklovskij‟s 
sketch of plot (as a unsatisfactory account of plot and its functions, as a cursory, 
inadequate assessment of the individual novels it analyses, as an unsystematic 
theory of literary evolution, etc.), I wish to emphasise the point here that Šklovskij‟s 
hereunto perfectly logical scheme of ever more complex and self-reflexive formal 
innovation seems to reach its limits with the ideas of the parodic novel and the laying 
bare of the devices. Even if one takes Šklovskij‟s proclamation that Tristram Shandy 
constitutes the pinnacle of novelistic plot cum grane salis, it the parodic novel still 
appears to mark the outer-bounds of the novel‟s formal possibilities: it is simply not 
feasible to add to its formal complexity and self-consciousness.86 
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 In a literary historical perspective, and from a strictly formal point of view, one could argue 
that the ironical, « post-modern» novel (be it Borges, Robbe-Grillet, Pynchon, etc.) exhibits 
precisely the features of extreme narrative complexity, and playful use of form 
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This does not mean that no other types of novels are conceivable, that the parodic 
novel exhausted all the possibilities of the novel as a genre or that it excluded any 
further developments and innovations. Even Šklovskij did not consider Tristram 
Shandy to constitute the end of the road for the novel, and On the Theory of Prose 
clearly indicates that novel as parody does not figure as the ultimate possible 
development of plot (whether in a historical, or a conceptual perspective). Indeed, 
after his analysis of the parodic novel, Šklovskij pushes his exposition a step further 
in the two final articles (“Ornamental Prose” and “Literature without Plot”), outlining 
yet another type of plot. The fact of the matter, however, is that the new type of plot  
he suggest does not rely on a pure play with formal elements and therefore marks a 
clear break with the foregoing developments of Šklovskij‟s thought on plot. 
Revealing, the way Šklovskij presents it also differs markedly from his argumentation 
in the rest of On the Theory of Prose. Instead of highlighting the positive formal 
progress and innovations achieved by plot in the work of the authors he is 
commenting (i.e. Andrej Bely and Vasily Rozanov), Šklovskij proceeds rather by 
showing their failure to do away with form in their attempts to create new literary 
works that rejuvenate and go beyond the limits even of the “purest”, most typical of 
plot structure, namely the parodic novel. 
The work of Rozanov is especially interesting for Šklovskij as, on the one hand, it 
represents "an extraordinary act of betrayal" (Šklovskij, 1991, p.191). The "betrayal" 
involved by Rozanov's work is that it is constructed without obvious recourse to form 
or plot, whether as organising or parodic principles. As Šklovskij points out, Rozanov 
novels includes "ready-made", non-literary material directly, without transforming or 
structuring it through the artificial devices of plot, nor even using them as a 
“motivation”. Rozanov novels thus appear as an amorphous collection of "fragments: 
"Social and topical essays, presented as autonomous fragments, contradict each 
other at every point. A biography of Rozanov and scenes from his life as well as 
photographs, etc. have also been included." (Šklovskij, 1991, p.193)  In other words, 
we have here what seems to be the absolute paradox in Šklovskij's theory of prose, a 
"literature without plot", without form or devices, but only pure, non-literary material.  
Šklovskij counters this apparently paradoxical genre by saying that even such a 
literature as Rozanov's, which seeks to go beyond plot and formal structure, is not 
free of literary form. Indeed, Šklovskij argues that the introduction and use of pure 
non-literary material constitutes an extra-proof of the need of literary form to renew 
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itself by all possible means. Although Rozanov's works are apparently amorphous, 
anti-literary, the result of the “collage” of non-literary elements (documents, photos, 
diaries), Šklovskij concurs that this actually constitutes a new form, beyond plot (vne 
sjuţeta). He even likens it to a new genre that resembles the parodic novel thereby 
obviously presenting it as the logical continuation of the evolution of plot. Every 
attempt to evoke a non-literary justification, within a literary work, inevitably produces 
a new device; for example, bibliographical facts become stylistic facts. In an 
apparently paradoxical pirouette, Šklovskij thus states that Rozanov's work 
represents "a heroic attempt to go beyond the confines of literature, "to speak without 
words, without form," and the work has turned out splendidly, because it has given 
birth to a new literature, a new form" (ibid., p.193) 
On the face of it, Šklovskij's interpretation of Rozanov's work and his paradoxical use 
of non-literary material as a new literary form is perfectly acceptable: the use of 
"ready-mades" and non-narrative collage techniques of conspicuously non-literary is 
after all by now a well established literary device. Similarly, in Šklovskij‟s own logic of 
estrangement and norm-breaking, the recourse to non-artificiality, non-formal 
elements as a reaction, and estranging gesture against an overtly artificial, complex 
and self-reflexive type of plot, makes perfect sense. Once the limits of pure formal 
innovation have been reached, one must have recourse to other elements if one is to 
renew a genre. 
In light of his dichotomic characterisation of the device and the material, however, 
Šklovskij's explanation raises a number of significant questions. As we saw, 
Šklovskij's argument rested on the assumption that the material was something raw, 
unformed, which necessarily required structuration through the devices to acquire an 
aesthetic, formal character. Even more importantly, he insisted on the irreversibility of 
the interaction between form and material, refusing any aesthetic quality to the 
material as such. In that perspective, how is one to understand that material, as in 
Rozanov‟s work, can indeed be directly and successfully integrated to a work of art, 
without further recourse to plot and other formal structures (not even as a 
straightforward “motivation” device), without being submitted to the distortive effects 
of devices, and then be considered as aesthetically potent or even as the vector of a 
new literary form? Does it not necessarily mean that the raw material, – which can 
thus indeed be integrated as such to the work of art – have formal qualities itself? In 
the last texts of On the Theory of Prose  Šklovskij certainly seems to have nuanced 
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his claims as to the aesthetic neutrality of the material. He thus starts to talk of a 
"cross-over" (skrešenie), between device and material (Tchougounnikov, 2005, 
p.131) and suggests that the material can become literary, whilst the device can 
loose its literary edge. 
In other words, against Šklovskij‟s obvious wish to maintain a clear analytical 
separation between them, the ideas of the device and the material are interlinked in 
such a tight interplay that it becomes impossible to distinguish clearly between what 
constitutes artificial, literary form, and what is objective, descriptive content. 
Revealingly, as Hansen-Löve points out, this interplay between objective content and 
literary form is not only confined to Šklovskij's theory, but extends to his literary 
productions. As one can see in A Sentimental Journey and the short epistolary novel 
Zoo, or letters not about love, which Šklovskij wrote during his exile in Berlin in the 
early 1920s, his literary work took on an existential turn even as he embraced ever 
more formally complicated and abstract literary forms (cf. Hansen-Löve, 1978, 
pp.571-575).  
One can take Zoo as the clearest example of this process. On the surface, it is a 
baroque succession of literary devices and narrative convolutions with no real 
subject-matter, a pure, ironic and self-conscious exercise in style and technique. The 
author of the letters has been forbidden to write about love by the woman he is 
sending them to. But as this spurned love is his only purpose for writing, he employs 
all the tricks in his repertoire to write about it without seeming to do so. This literary 
game culminates in one of the letters being crossed out, as a sign of its purely 
formal, meaningless nature. At the same time, however, the author of the letters fully 
realises that, despite his attempts to circumvent his feelings and emotions through 
literary stratagems, he cannot mask them at all and his only achievement is to give 
them another more convoluted and literary form. He thus exclaims: "I have been 
entirely mistaken, Alja!... Love also has its methods… I have forgotten where is love, 
and where is the book. The game goes on […]" (quoted in Hansen-Löve, 1978, 
p.579). Despite his best efforts to take refuge in pure form, the author finds that his 
letters still express his concrete, real feelings. As he discovers, they cannot be clearly 
distinguished from their literary form – even from an extreme, almost empty form – 
because form and reality essentially encroach on each other. If anything, the formal 
innovations of Zoo serve precisely to give expression to the sentimental, over-
intellectualised kind of love the narrator seems to be experiencing: his crossed-out 
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letter, far from being only a purely formal, stylistic act, appears as the most vivid and 
truest expression to his frustration, and the very concrete interdiction to speak under 
which he finds himself. 
This permeability of plot and the literary devices with the structures of objective 
representations and descriptions of reality itself, or rather, the ability of plot and 
devices to express concrete, real situations and feelings despite their clearly formal 
and artificial nature constitutes a first convincing hint back towards the inherently 
epistemic, existential potential of Šklovskij‟s conception of literature and the idea of 
the concrete form of perception. Despite its nominally dualistic, functional framework, 
indeed, his theory does seem to involve the idea, firstly, that our objective 
representations of reality – and possibly, our sensual perceptions thereof – are 
pervaded by articulated, structured form, or rather, are concretely informed with 
meaning and sense. Secondly, it also implies that their concrete structure can be 
transformed and expressed through the action of literature and its artificial devices. 
Even the extra-literary material, as we saw, possesses potentially formal features 
that can be actualised in given literary works. 
 
On top of the very general and indecisive perspectives involved by his theory of 
prose and his concepts of device, plot and material, Šklovskij‟s work also offers 
another, thematically more limited and therefore much more precise and convincing 
set of insights into the simultaneously concrete and formal dimension of literary form 
(or conversely, the formal dimension of concrete perception). Indeed, his theory of 
estrangement deals in an original way not only with the question of the relation 
between literary form and objective content, but also with the question of the 
perception of literary form itself. In Šklovskij‟s aesthetics, not only are the literary text 
and its devices geared towards differentially producing fresh sensual impressions 
and redynamising our objective representations of the world through their devices, 
but they take on a concrete, perceptual role and importance of their own. Typically, 
although Šklovskij does define the scope of estrangement very widely (as we saw, it 
can be made to “redeem” and refresh the “form” of almost anything, from the simple 
stone to the fear of war, etc.), most of the time estrangement is applied not to 
empirical reality and its objects, but to the language, the “verbal material” and words 
of the literary text itself. 
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Šklovskij‟s argument regarding the properties and literary functions of language is 
that, just as perception in general, it does not always function as a mediatory, 
transitive conveyor of meaning and knowledge. In essence, Šklovskij sees language 
as an autonomous phenomenon that possesses its own structure, as well as its own 
aesthetic value. In fact, one of his central assumptions is that language and words 
themselves are concrete, objects or things (“vešči”) in their own right, whose 
properties call to be properly perceived.87 Just as is the case with general objects, 
however, the complex forms and immanent features of words are eventually blended 
out of consciousness through repetitive, ordinary usage. All that remains when a 
word is thus automatised are its transitive properties (typically, its indexical, semantic 
and communicative functions). Instead of being perceived and considered as a 
singular object worthy of interest, with all the depth of its metaphorical and 
etymological meanings, the word begins to function only as a secondary, unimportant 
and schematic medium for thought or communication.88 When used in such a way, 
as a means of communication or a vector of thought, language can be said to be 
purely “prosaic”. 
In contrast to this purely “prosaic language”, Šklovskij highlights the existence of a 
distinct “poetic language”, whose function is to impede transitive, utilitarian uses of 
language and trigger a renewed sense of words as specific, concrete objects with 
their own pure aesthetic qualities. The defining trait of poetic language, according to 
Šklovskij, is its “difficulty” and strangeness: "According to Aristotle, poetic language 
must appear strange and wonderful; and, in fact, it is often called foreign: the 
Sumerian used by the Assyrians, the Latin of Europe during the Middle Ages, the 
Arabisms of the Persians, the Old Bulgarian of Russian literature, or the elevated, 
almost literary language of folk songs. The common archaisms of poetic language, 
the intricacy of the sweet new style, the obscure style of the language of Arnaut 
Daniel with the "roughened" forms which make pronunciation difficult – these are 
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 In keeping with the tradition of the Russian Cubo-Futurists, whose poetry emphasised the 
importance and unique status of language as such, Šklovskij thus speaks of the “samovitoe”, 
“samocel’noe” and “samocennoe” slovo, the “self-wrought”, “autotelic” and “self-sufficient” 
word. 
88
 For example, the original meaning and internal form of the French word “enfant” (child) is 
“who does not speak”. But no modern French speaker will take notice of this (or of any other 
of the specific features of the word “enfant”), and will use the word to refer directly to a child. 
Similarly, the external, phonetic form of most words is neither spoken nor heard fully in 
normal conversation, but is reduced to the minimum needed for effective communication 
(Šklovskij, 1914, in Bann, 1973, pp.63-64).  
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used in much the same way. […] The language of poetry is, then, a difficult, 
roughened, impeded language." (Sklovskij, 1988, p.28). As was the case with 
estrangement in general, language obtains its aesthetic qualities by being unusual, 
surprising, and by challenging the habitual, often simplified and utilitarian meanings 
and significations to which it is usually subsumed.89 
On the one hand, Šklovskij's conception of poetic language involves nothing more 
than a creative play with the normal structures of language: linguistic form, so to say, 
is made slightly more complicated, its contours are exaggerated and embellished. 
For instance, what Šklovskij calls the external form of words, i.e. their phonetic or 
graphic substrate, can be underlined and redynamised by the use of straightforward 
techniques such as alliteration or rhyme. As to the "internal form" of words, their 
etymological roots and core significations, it can be reactivated through the creative 
use of redundant epithets.90 In turn, the use of such epithets will also become 
automatised and lose its aesthetic or poetic force. New, striking and more 
complicated epithets must therefore be successively created so as to constantly 
renew our awareness of a word‟s internal form and endow language with poetic 
value. The following lyrical example from Keats comes to mind: "I want a brighter 
word than bright, a fairer word than fair" (Letter to Fanny Brawne, August 16). This 
process of formal, linguistic renewal, according to Šklovskij, is essential to poetry. In 
that spirit, he approvingly quotes Aleksandr Veselovskij – the founder of historical 
poetics in Russia and one of Šklovskij‟s main influence: “The history of the epithet is 
the history of poetic style in an abridged edition.”  (Veselovskij, quoted by Šklovskij, 
1991, p.66). 
On the other hand, Šklovskij conception of poetic language and its possibilities to be 
redynamised also includes a much more radical dimension, in which the play with 
language is carried so far that, rather than being simply redynamised and 
reactivated, the contextual meanings and linguistic functions of words are 
fundamentally undercut and put out of play. In these extreme cases of poetry, words 
are made to appear as pure expressive objects, free of traditional meaning, but still 
aesthetically or poetically significant. Poetic language then appears, very explicitly, 
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 Here again, he is in opposition to Potebnja: poetic language does not facilitate thought but 
impedes it. 
90
 For instance, although the word “sun” intrinsically implies the notion of brightness, one can 
use the formula “bright sun” to focus attention back on that particular dimension of the word 
“sun” (Šklovskij, 1914, in Bann, 1973, p.65) 
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as an example of a "concrete form", which is essentially both materially perceptual 
and expressively structured.  
To illustrate the meaning of this more radical idea of poetic language as a pure but 
concrete expressive form – and indeed, to underline its source – one can turn to the 
Russian Futurists. One of the central aesthetic aims of the Russian Futurists was to 
produce a pure poetry centred on what Kručenych calls the "word itself" (slovo kak 
takovoe, cf. Kručenych, 1913). In essence, this means that they focussed on the raw 
expressive possibilities of language as a concrete, “material” phenomenon. In that 
spirit, they meant their poetry to explore the diversity and richness of linguistic form 
itself. This is very obviously reflected in their poetical practice, which goes beyond 
conventional uses of language and involves many neologisms or “word creation” 
(slovotvorčestvo), free innovative uses of syntax and morphology, and a general 
disregard for conventional meaning. A classic (and often cited) example of such 
Futurist poetry is Chlebnikov‟s poem “Incantation by Laughter” (1914):  
 
O laugh it out, you laughsters! 
O laugh it up, you laughsters! 
So they laugh with laughters, so they laugherize delaughly. 
O laugh it up belaughably! 
O the laughingstock of the laughed upon–the laugh of 
Belaughed laughsters! 




Laughify, laughicate, laugholets, laugholets, 
Laughikins, laughikins, 
O laugh it out, you laughsters! 
O laugh it up, you laughsters!  
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 In the transliterated original: 
O, rassmejtes’, smechači! 
O, zasmejtes’, smechači! 
Čto smejutsja smechami, čto smejanstvujut smejal’no, 
O, zasmejtes’ usmejal’no! 
O rassmešišč nadsmejal’nych – smech usmejnych smechačej! 
O issmejsja rassmejal’no smech nadsmejnych smejačej! 
Smejevo, Smejevo, 
Usmej, osmej, smešiki, smešiki, 
Smejunčiki, smejunčiki. 
O, rassmejtes’, smechači 
O, zasmejtes’, smechači! in Alfonsov, 1999, p.71 
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As one can see, Chlebnikov's whole poem is constructed exclusively around an 
ingenious play on the morphological possibilities of the word “laughter” (“smech” in 
Russian). This English version only partially replicates the subtlety of the original, as 
English is a morphologically less rich language than Russian. The variants on the 
stem “laugh” are here all clear and somewhat arbitrary neologisms. By contrast, in 
the Russian original, Chlebnikov also has recourse to grammatically relevant and 
common elements, such as prefixes and suffixes which are used to alter the meaning 
of verbs, or to acceptable forms of nominalisation. As such, his poem takes on an 
extra layer, as it not only arbitrarily plays on the word “laugh” , but brings into 
contention and reveals the morphological rules and grammatical structures of the 
Russian language. 
Going even further than this play on the possibilities offered by conventional linguistic 
forms, the Russian Futurists also sought in many of their poems to completely divest 
language both of its conventional grammatical structure and of its usual functions of 
communication and signification. In the following poem by Kručenych, one can 
observe the process of language‟s progressive “liberation” from meaning and 
grammar: 
 
  If you are racking your brain and the malicious rhyme just won't come - 
Go and spit on your friend's pink vest! 
Brilliantine chains will start dancing in your throat 
(diamond wells) 
And teeth-smashing harmonies will scatter all around 





z-z-z    
 
(Krucenykh, 1919 in Barooshian, 1974, p.89)
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Esli b’eš’sja i zlaja rifma nikak ne vychodit 
Pojdi i pljun’ drugu na rozovyj ţilet 
Zatancujut v gorle tvoem brilljantinovye kolody 
(brilliantovye dolodey) 
I posypjatsja zubotyčiny sozvučij 






original also in Barooshian, 1974, p.89 
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The poem starts with a rather long, perfectly well-formed and meaningful verse, 
which even has a dramatic plot-like intention to it. The meaning of the next verses 
gets progressively more obscure, and they are also shorter, but they are still 
grammatically well-formed and can be interpreted fairly straightforwardly. From the 
5th line onwards, verses are reduce to bribes (“as from Olympus”, “a bicycle”) which 
seem disconnected from the preceding verses. Meaning is then completely 
abandoned with the appearance of meaningless words from verse 7, and the final 
line being reduced to an onomatopoeic, or phonetic sound. This structural 
decomposition from a well-formed, narrative sentence to a pure sound is underlined 
both by the shortening of the verse lines, and the meaning of the verses which 
actually have one, in which Kručenych eveb explicitly emphasises that the shackles 
of meaning should be disrespected (“spit on your friend‟s pink vest”) in favour of 
producing “teeth-smashing harmonies” and allow “diamonds” to come out of the 
“throat - well”.  
A similar destructive process is found at a morphological level in “The Poem about 









Ja.    
 
(Kamenskij,  in Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.145.) 
 
One begins with a well-formed adjective, “izlučistaja”, from which one first subtracts a 
morphologically relevant and meaningful component (“iz”, which is a common 
Russian prefix and preposition) to make a still well-formed adjective. Then a 
morphologically, meaningless irrelevant part (“lu”) is taken away, resulting in a 
further, still meaningful, but quite different adjective (“cistaja” – clean). The process is 
repeated, leaded to morphemes that are only remotely meaningfull (“istaja”, “aja”), 
reminiscent of another word (staja – stoja – standing), or actually have another 
meaning (taja – melting, ja – I). There is thus a constant interplay of meaning and 
loss of meaning, underscoring of grammatical, morphological links, and etymological 
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aberrations. Whole mechanisms, possibilities and lexical richness of association not 
commonly associated with common uses of language are demonstrated and 
explored. 
The Futurist‟s aim of achieving a pure form of poetry based and focussed on 
language itself, culminated with their most interesting and radical innovation, i.e. a 
totally meaningless, syntaxically incoherent language called "zaum" (or 
"transmental") language. The purest example of “zaum” is provided by the following 
poem by Kručenych: 
dyr bul ščyl 
ubešščur 
skum 
vy so bu 
                   r l êz   
 
 (Kručenych, in Alfonsov, 1999, p.206) 
 
The shortest of peeks in a dictionary should suffice even for someone totally ignorant 
of the Russian language to ascertain that this poem doesn't include a single 
meaningful word, with the exception of “vy” (“you”). It‟s only recognisable features are 
elements typical of Russian phonology, again with one small exception, “êz”, which 
does not appear in Russian. At the most basic level, such “zaum” poetry thus focuses 
exclusively on the phonetic building blocks of language and produces pure, abstract 
linguistic forms. The pure phonetic expressive force of language is underscored and 
conveys a striking sense of its aesthetical value as an autonomous phenomenon. 
Words are given and perceived "as such", as autonomous, concrete object totally 
freed from their conventional shackles and secondary semantic or syntactic 
functions. In that sense, Kručenych likens “zaum” to the abstraction of Malevič‟s 
Suprematism. According to him, zaum poetry achieves the purest form of language 
by reducing it to its primary components just as Malevic‟s abstract art reduces 
painting to shapes and colours.  
To a certain extent, one can interpret the Futurists‟ focus on the concrete features of 
language and linguistic form as the radicalisation of something which is in some way 
or other typical of any kind of poetry. Attention to formal properties such a meter or 
rhyme, as well as a certain freedom with syntax and a propensity for neologisms and 
obscure meaning is a common feature of poetry. But in addition to its radical 
reduction to linguistic form, zaum poetry also possesses an epistemological, almost 
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gnostic dimension. According to Futurists such as Kručenych, because zaum poetry 
presents language in its "original purity", it in turn allows for a "superior intuition" of 
the word (Krucenych, 1914, p.8). It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what Kručenych 
means by this, as his statements on the matter remain vague, if not downright 
obscure. Still, it is pretty clear that his main point is that, in zaum, words do not 
function at all as a medium or a relay for rational thought or communication. Instead 
of being conveyed derivatively by syntax, grammar and semantic convention, 
meaning is obtained through an unmediated, untainted act of intuition of the word in 
its pure, concrete form. Meaning, in zaum, is not a secondary function of a given 
word, nor is it in anyway separated from the linguistic occurrence. Rather, it 
crystallises and is made present, even tangible, “by” or “in” the zaum words 
themselves: it adheres to the pure, expressive form of the word. By way of 
consequence, this implies that there is no distinction in zaum between the linguistic 
form of a word and its expressive content or concrete meaning. 
To my mind, the Futurists' poetic experiments, and in zaum in particular, thus provide 
a concrete example both of Šklovskij‟s idea about the power of literature to produce 
and present concrete reality immediately, and of the intrinsically formal nature of the 
concrete reality thus expressed. On the one hand, indeed, zaum is capable of 
presenting words or verbal material directly, as concrete, material objects. The words 
or word-parts of zaum do not represent, symbolise or denote anything else than 
themselves: they are given as pure phenomenal manifestations. At the same time, 
this pure expression is possible for one reason only, namely, that the form of the 
word corresponds or is reduced to its contents, or rather, that the word's content is 
made present through its very form. Because it has no meaning, the form of zaum 
expresses nothing but itself, its pure, concrete form is its only meaning. As 
Eichenbaum states in “Introduction to the Formal Method” "verse form ... is not in 
opposition to any “content” extrinsic to it; it is not forced to fit inside this “form” but is 
conceived of as the genuine content of verse speech. Thus the very concept of form 
...emerges with a new sense of sufficiency" (Eichenbaum, 1999, p.15) 
Obviously, a perfect congregation of form and content as it appears in zaum 
represents an extreme case. Most language occurrences, whether in verse form, and 
especially in prose, which obey the rules of grammar and rely on semantic or deictic 
functions, do not express their meaning immediately, but indeed transitively and 
referentially. Linguistic and literary form, in such cases, is thus indeed different from 
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its meaning. It would thus seem that zaum and the Futurist poetry do not prove 
anything beyond themselves. In that sense, the new idea of pure, expressive form 
put forward by the Futurists and taken up by Šklovskij might seem resistant to 
generalisation – both to art (not all art is zaum and capable of inducing pure content 
renewal through pure form), and to reality, outside language (the form of objects is 
not equal to their content).93 Thus, for example, it certainly remains something of a 
stretch to understand how the formal-content properties of zaum actually relate to the 
case of Zoo and the strange relation between literary form and emotional reality 
which we found there. 
Having said that, by deconstructing the genesis of expression in language as the 
pure organisation of a verbal material, and giving us a tangible example of a 
"concrete form", zaum can in fact teach us – and did teach the formalists and the 
Prague phonologists – universal lessons as to the nature of perception, of language, 
of meaning and of aesthetic experience. What is more, Šklovskij‟s theory of plot 
seems to indicate that the same logic is at work on a grander scale. In contrast to 
what I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the outlook now is that, despite some  
of Šklovskij's more conservative viewpoints and hesitations, it might very much be 
possible to justifiably or adequately make use of the ideas of concrete perceptual 
form to describe his aesthetics in a systematic theoretical perspective, and to 
describe aesthetic experience and perception in general as possessing a monistic, 
structural nature. 
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 Cf. Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.124: Nach Engel'gardt erfüllt die reduktionistische "Einstellung" 
("ustanovka") auf die "zaumnost" eine durchaus konstruktive kritische Funktion, durch die 
jene dem Ästhetischen eigene "ustanovka na vyraţenie" (also die "Einstellung auf den 
Ausdruck") bloßgelegt wird (Engel'gardt, ibid. 67). Als "zaum"-sprachliche Struktur ist aber 
das Kunstwerk nicht als reale Erscheinung gegeben, sondern als das Objekt einer ästhetischen 
Untersuchung. Eine ähnliche Tendenz, das reale (wissenschaftliche, künstlerische) Objekt auf 
die "zaumnost", also die "dinglich-definite Struktur" ("veščno-dannaja struktura") einzuengen, 
beobachtet Engel'gardt auch in der modernen Linguistik, deren gleichfalls totaliesiertes 
hypothetisches Objekt um eine noch zu schaffene "funktional-teleologische Interpretation" 
(sic) zu ergänzen wäre (ibid. 69). 






Šklovskij’s Estrangement and Husserl’s Phenomenology 
 
The examples provided by the conceptual hesitations and developmental twists of 
Šklovskij‟s theory of literary prose and, especially, by the radical poetic 
experimentations of the Russian Cubo-Futurists constitute, I believe, sufficient 
illustration of the latent originality of the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic of estrangement 
in connection with the idea of the concrete expressive structure of perception itself. 
Briefly put, Šklovskij‟s theory of prose illustrates the permeability of the structure of 
artistic or literary forms with those of the empirical world itself, whilst the Cubo-
futurists “zaum” poems provide a maybe less general, but much more precise and 
compelling example of how form and objective content might sometimes be 
assimilated purely and simply – in this case in the concretely structured and 
intransitively expressive experience of a poetic, linguistic fact.  
These literary and poetic examples are of course still far removed from providing a 
full-blown philosophical explanation to Šklovskij‟s vague suggestions and intuitions. 
In effect, the literary concepts discussed in the preceding chapters – the devices, the 
material, poetic language or the Cubo-futurists‟ zaum language –, are all much too 
imprecise and indecisive to offer anything more than clues or cursory indications as 
to the full scope and implications of Šklovskij‟s aesthetic of estrangement. What is 
more, they represent but the symptoms, the specific concretisations of what 
effectively constitutes Šklovskij‟s more fundamental, underlying idea or “principle” – 
namely, that aesthetic experience involves perceiving reality in intransitive, 
expressive forms. In order now to take a step further and to evaluate the 
philosophical relevance and applicability of Šklovskij‟s aesthetic insights with regard 
to the formal, structural or expressive dimension of perception, one needs therefore 
to inspect the implicit and explicit implications of Šklovskij‟s conception of 
estrangement in a more thoroughly and clearly philosophical perspective (rather than 
the literary theoretical one favoured by Šklovskij himself). 
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On the face of it, the philosophical, explanatory potential of Šklovskij‟s theory of 
estrangement with respect to the nature of aesthetic experience appears to be both 
very promising and rather strong. This is so because notwithstanding Šklovskij‟s 
sometimes mangled descriptions and interpretations of the specific functioning of the 
literary devices themselves, the idea of estrangement as such involves an implicit but 
crucial methodological decision in the treatment it makes of aesthetic experience, 
which in itself raises a number of useful and innovative perspectives. This decision 
involved by the idea of estrangement, of course, is to correlate aesthetic or literary 
value with the standard act or process of perception itself. 
The methodological advantages of correlating aesthetic value directly to perception 
are numerous. For one, it becomes possible to theoretically isolate and define the 
specificity of aesthetic or literary phenomena whilst doing away with philosophically 
dubious transcendental criteria, or vaguely intuitive and purely subjective ones (cf. 
Erlich, 1955, p.250). Instead of confuse or imprecise categories such as the sublime, 
taste or beauty, Šklovskij‟s theory promises to define the aesthetic characteristics of 
a text or painting objectively, through an analysis of its concrete features. In addition, 
the perceptual dimension of estrangement promises to contribute to precisely situate 
and define the functions of literature (and other art forms) in relation to reality at 
large. This means, in short, that they offer a possibility to rigorously define both the 
broader, epistemic and cognitive function of the aesthetic process (cf. Gretchko, 
2003; Kelih, 2008, Miall-Kuiken, 1994, also Ingarden, 1962; Iser, 1976). Broadly 
speaking, it would appear that Šklovskij‟s aesthetics of estrangement constitutes a 
sort of embryonic theory of perception in itself, capable of thematising such important 
issues as the intentional role of the subject in the constitution of his own aesthetic 
experience, the structural properties of perception that make it susceptible to 
aesthetic actualisations and uses, as well as the epistemic, cognitive or even the 
ontological relations that exist between these aesthetic and the common (or 
everyday) modes of experience. 
Having said all this, one has to admit that the prospects of successfully and directly 
taking advantage of the methodological promises of Šklovskij‟s theory of 
estrangement as a coherent, philosophical account of aesthetic experience are in 
fact pretty meagre. When it comes to setting estrangement in a rigorous framework 
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and dissecting its various implications in a cold and precise conceptual light, one is 
immediately confronted with a grave problem, namely the patent flimsiness and 
absolute lack of theoretical foundations of Šklovskij‟s ideas and arguments. In effect, 
Šklovskij does not volunteer any kind of detailed account of the multitude of 
implications and aspects that his conception of aesthetics as estrangement both 
displays and depends upon with regard to perception. Far from that, Šklovskij‟s only 
argument in defence of the perceptual nature and attributes of estrangement consists 
of an unsubstantiated claim to the effect that perception undergoes a cyclical process 
of automatisation and de-automatisation. That claim itself, however, is hardly 
convincing or rigorous in any way and can fairly be said to raise more problems than 
it actually answers. 
To begin with, Šklovskij‟s assumption as to the tendency of perception to become 
automatised certainly does not rest upon the principles of an established tradition, 
whether in aesthetics, philosophy or psychology. As Erlich and others have pointed 
out, Šklovskij‟s argument is in fact essentially ad hoc. Worse, Šklovskij fails to 
compensate for the absence of an established and detailed conceptual framework in 
that he provides no constructive argumentation of his own to justify and explain the 
process of automatisation of perception. As we saw, he is content to introduce that 
idea cursorily, through a simple appeal to common sense: “If one remembers the 
sensations of holding a pen or of speaking in a foreign language for the first time and 
compares that with his feeling at performing the action for the ten thousandth time, 
one will agree with us.” (Šklovskij, 1988, p.20) Next to this statement of the allegedly 
obvious, no systematic explanations are forthcoming, either in "Art as Device", or in 
any latter text.  
By all accounts, Šklovskij displays no interest in the details of a problem that he 
considers to fall well outside his remit: the processes of automatisation and de-
automatisation of perception are only relevant to him as the backdrop and 
justification to his key aesthetic intuition, which is that art serves to freshen and 
actualise our perceptions. That intuition itself, what is more, is useful to him not so 
much as a definition of art and literature, but as a methodological basis for his 
autonomous theory of literature.94 The very unfortunate consequence of the carefree 
evasiveness of Šklovskij's statements on the questions of perception that underlie his 
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literary or aesthetic theories is that it is impossible to determine with any kind of 
accuracy what the process of automatisation and the mirroring effect of 
estrangement actually involve and signify. 
For instance, it might at first appear plausible to link automatisation and 
estrangement with the question of attention and explain both processes as purely 
contingent psychological mechanisms.95 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that Šklovskij understands automatisation as implying simply that objects or events 
drift out of the field of consciousness and lose their vivid contours and meanings 
because of the fact that we stop paying attention to them (through habit or other 
similar reasons). Such a convenient and straightforwardly psychological 
interpretation, however, remains both superficial and unsatisfactory. Simply saying 
that automatisation occurs through or because of lack of attention explains neither 
why nor how our impressions of given objects or events undergo qualitative 
transformations over time – as Šklovskij evidently thinks is the case. At best, the 
argument of attention simply provides a causal explanation as to why automatisation 
takes place at all. But it says nothing whatsoever as to how the process of 
automatisation actually affects the content of individual acts of perception. More to 
the point, if automatisation occurs only as the consequence of a lack of attention, 
there seems to be no reason to justify the recourse to the complex, elaborate forms 
of art and literature to trigger estrangement or de-automatisation and refocus our 
attention on given facts and objects. There are quite obviously much simpler, more 
effective ways of refocusing attention. What‟s more, it would remain rather unclear 
what would be “aesthetic” about this all too common process of focusing one‟s 
attention on something. 
In any case, one finds other indications in “Art as Device” that automatisation and 
estrangement effectively involve much more than a purely contingent, psychological 
mechanism. Typically, I mentioned earlier on that Šklovskij seems to attribute a 
positive, cognitive function to automatisation. In that sense, automatisation appears 
to essentially influence the modality of our experience of the world. As such, it 
requires to be understood and described as a truly epistemic or cognitive process (of 
abstraction, symbolisation, eidation, etc.), which derives not from the contingent, 
psychological mechanisms of perception, but involves fundamental problems as to 
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the possible conditions of our (sensual, perceptual, cognitive, etc.) awareness of, and 
interactions with, reality. To put it in different terms, Šklovskij‟s remarks on 
automatisation seem to require an explanation as to how the content of sensual 
perception is synthesised, generalised and organised intelligibly, whether in 
consciousness or in the mind.96 Obviously, the consequences of the reverse effect of 
estrangement on the formal contents of perception require similar explanation and 
justification as to their epistemic function and significance. 
Furthermore, one must also note that the processes of automatisation and 
estrangement take on not only an epistemic dimension, but a clearly existential, 
ontological one. Šklovskij, indeed, not only defines perception as being an intransitive 
end in itself, but, in the pure tradition of Russian Modernism and its transcendental, 
missionary dimension, he often assimilates it to a Bergsonian, intuitive and "lived" 
experience of the world. In that sense, the automatisation of perception must be seen 
as affecting our very sense of existence, the very “stuff” of our lives and the objects 
that constitute our world.97  
As we saw, Šklovskij alludes to this loss of concrete feeling and existence entailed by 
automatisation both through explicit statement of his own (“And so life is reduced to 
nothing. Habitualisation devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of 
war” (Šklovskij, 1988, p.20)) or by quoting Tolstoj (“If, however, no one was looking, 
or looking on unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of many people go on 
unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been” [my emphasis] (ibid., p 
20)). Conversely, estrangement clearly receives the function of redynamising and 
actualising our very sense of existence, “our sensation of life”. In that spirit, we saw in 
the last chapter that the power of art and literature to affect the very structures of our 
existence, of our emotions and of empirical reality itself becomes ever more explicit 
in Šklovskij‟s literary prose. 
The utter confusion surrounding the psychological, epistemological or even 
existential and ontological dimension of automatisation and estrangement is also 
reflected in Šklovskij‟s hesitance as to the precise field of application of the latter. We 
saw at length, for instance, that Šklovskij‟s texts remain mostly undecided as to 
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 This sense of loss of existence is a trope typical of Russian modernism as a whole (cf. 
Hutchings, 1997) 
- 100 - 
 
whether literary estrangement indirectly induces objective perceptions of the world in 
general (as is implied in “Art as Device”) or only of language and words as concrete 
and valuable objects in themselves (as is the case in “The Resurrection of the 
Word”). Even more problematically, it also remains unclear whether estrangement is 
reduced to operating on pure syntax and grammar or even on language‟s material – 
phonetic, graphic – substrate, or if it also affects language's semantic dimension, or 
indeed, whole complex discourses, narratives and cultural tropes. A similar 
ambivalence exists with regard to estrangement's impact on our general perceptions 
of reality: Šklovskij often seems to intend it to operate on pure empirical sensation 
and impressions (it makes the stone stony.). More often than not, though, he gives it 
the more "Brechtian" meaning of a V-Effekt and makes it apply to our cultural, social 
or moral representations of the world, rather than the empirical world itself (cf. 
Helmers, 1984, p.69).  
To top everything, Šklovskij doesn‟t seem to want to distinguish the purely linguistic 
or the more generally objective aspects of estrangement from one another, much 
less to separate the different layers of sensual, cultural, social perceptions it involves. 
In fact, the indefinite scope of automatisation and the very broad palette of 
estrangement‟s functions and powers do not seem to have worried Šklovskij in the 
least. By all accounts, he deems all the above-mentioned facets to represent 
possible and justified uses and applications of estrangement. They apply in different 
cases, different art forms or different literary genres, but all fall under the same 
general concept and imply the same basic process of reactivating and making (all 
possible types of)  experiences of the world fresh, conscious and vividly perceptive 
with the help of the differential effected provided by the artistic or literary devices. 
In other words, it would seem that the process of automatisation and the counter-
process of estrangement involve all at once the critical, sense-bestowing faculties of 
the conscious, perceiving subject, as well as his capacities for moral judgement and 
his social and cultural awareness; the expressive, meaningful and concrete structure 
of language itself; and the ontological dimension of our perceptive acts as an 
existential relation with the world. Critics have certainly highlighted each of these 
dimensions of estrangement in Šklovskij‟s work, and devoted interesting and 
insightful studies to their significance and implications (cf. Helmers, 1984; Boym, 
2005; Holquist-Kliger, 2005; Emerson, 2005, Sternberg 2006). On the up side, of 
course, one could seek to portray the very varied uses and applications of 
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estrangement as a sign of its conceptual richness, its versatility and its capacity to 
thematise or take into account the many facets of literature and aesthetic experience 
– and to provide a unifying principle characteristic of all aesthetic endeavours. On the 
down side, however, the methodological confusion and the sheer ambition of the 
scope of automatisation and estrangement mean that no single philosophical 
framework has been found to systemise them in a rigorous and coherent way, 
whether as a convincing theory of perception or, for that matter, as a convincing 
theory of literature.  
To put it in another terms, on the one hand defamiliarisation seems to request – as I 
suggested in my introduction – a hugely ambitious theory of perception as an onto-
morphogenetic constitution of meaning, or the progressive articulation and 
differentiation of concrete sensual data, positing a unity of structure and continuous 
development between raw sensual perception, emotional response, cultural 
interpretation, linguistic expression, etc. Because there is no indication as to how this 
should be achieved, and no sense on Šklovskij‟s side that such a theory is in fact 
requested, all one is left with is an array of thought-provoking insights and intuitions, 
which however remain very vague, and possess no value as a systematic theory (cf 
Erlich, 1955, p.249). 
 
Given the general confusion and the over-ambitiousness that accompanies the 
theoretical basis and scope of estrangement itself, it would seem that one is as far 
removed than ever from providing a solid and useful interpretation to the formalist 
idea that perception is essentially structural and expressive in nature. Surprisingly 
enough, however, one philosophical template has indeed been sometimes 
considered, at least indirectly, as being capable of providing a unified base to the 
motley and vague perceptual implications of Šklovskij‟s aesthetics of estrangement: 
Husserlian phenomenology (cf. Holenstein, 1976).98 To be sure, the hermeneutic 
advantages of Husserlian phenomenology with regard to Šklovskij‟s aesthetics are 
certainly appealing at first glance. Without having to go into the detail of Husserl's 
nuanced and complex philosophy, one can identify quite a few points of convergence 
between phenomenology and Šklovskij's aesthetics.  
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To begin with, rather than a mere psychology of attention, phenomenology offers a 
profound theory of the intentionality of consciousness. Husserl postulates that all acts 
of consciousness are intentionally directed at an object, and display what he calls a 
"noetico-noematic" structure. This means, in essence, that the object of an act of 
consciousness is essentially affected and constituted by the latter‟s “intentional aim”, 
i.e. the specific way in which it is “intended”. Because his phenomenology thus 
accounts for the fact that the content of an act of consciousness, for example of 
perception, is directly defined and animated by its intentional aim, Husserl is well 
placed to explain and justify in detailed philosophical terms a process such as 
automatisation – and the correlation it implies between our varying dispositions 
towards the world (which are affected by habit and repetition) and our way of 
perceiving it. 
Husserl's analysis of the noetico-noematic structure of consciousness also seems to 
promise a philosophically valid explanation to the epistemic functions that Šklovskij 
wants to attribute to automatisation and estrangement. In Husserl‟s phenomenology, 
perception is not conceived as a purely sensual act, but as one informed with 
meaning or sense (Sinn). As we just saw, the intentional acts of consciousness 
actually structure and confer meaning upon their object.99 This means, generally, that 
objects can be intended with a varying degree of generality and abstraction, and 
therefore take on more or less abstract and general meanings. This property, 
obviously, can be made to account for the abstraction and symbolisation features of 
the automatisation process. In the specific case of acts of perception, what is more, 
Husserl suggests that their objective content, the "noem" is stratified and can be 
analysed both in terms of its “hyletic” material, sensual strata, and its meaningful 
“morphic” one (Husserl, Ideen). At a pull, this analysis of the meaningful and concrete 
dimensions of perception can justify the lack of distinction made by Šklovskij between 
the purely perceptual and the social, critical dimensions of estrangement: if 
perception itself is seen as being animated with meaning, as being a first step in the 
constitution of a horizon of sense as Husserl would put it, then one can presume that 
there is only a difference of degree, rather than nature, between our perceptions of 
concrete objects, and our representations of cultural events.100 
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the historical process of the realisation of consciousness 
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Additionally, Husserl's phenomenology offers interesting perspective as to the 
existential aspects of Šklovskij's conception of automatisation and estrangement. 
Husserl is famous for enunciating that philosophy should return "to the things 
themselves" (zu den Sachen selbst). To him, perception offers an "originary" access 
to the world, it allows us to experience it immediately in its full presence, "in the flesh" 
(leibhaft). The task of phenomenology, as he understands it, is but to describe (rather 
than explain) the structure of that perceptual, phenomenal experience, or what he 
would later call the “Lebenswelt”. In this sense then, Husserl's phenomenological and 
descriptive account of perception offers philosophical credence to the existential 
implications of the process of automatisation and estrangement, which imply that 
modifications to our perceptions imply concrete changes to our lives, or at least, to 
our lived experience. To be more precise, it would seem possible to explain the 
existential dimension of automatisation and estrangement through phenomenological 
analysis – and to do so in a single framework, in coordination with its other, epistemic 
and intentional dimensions. Most importantly of all, this aspect of phenomenology 
concurs fully with Šklovskij‟s intuition that perception constitutes an end in itself, a 
primary, originary way of being aware of the world: in phenomenology as in 
Šklovskij‟s aesthetics, perception is not attributed a transitive, intermediary role, but 
constitutes all at once an existential, epistemic and aesthetic end in itself. 
 
When one scratches the surface of these apparently appealing arguments, however, 
one discovers that there are a number of serious problems involved with trying to 
corset Šklovskij's aesthetics of estrangement into the framework of Husserlian 
phenomenology. The first argument against such an interpretation is that the general 
mindset behind Šklovskij‟s idea of estrangement and perception is in fact far-
removed from that of Husserl, especially so in its early “logistic” version. To be sure, 
one finds not the glimpse of a reference or an allusion to Husserl in Šklovskij‟s 
writings. As Hansen-Löve has pointed out, Šklovskij's orientation and arguments are 
both vitalist and empiricist (Hansen-Löve, 1978, pp.180-184). His philosophical 
models, as far as one can attribute any to him, seem to be Bergson and a crude 
version of Humean empiricism. Thus, for instance, whereas Husserl is very nuanced 
in his description of how reality is given to us in perception (what with the complex 
noetico-noematic structure and the carefully differentiated hyletic and morphic strata 
of perceptual acts), Šklovskij seems to assume much more bluntly that our vivid 
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sensual impressions actually present the empirical world itself to us in its immediate 
concreteness and vitality. Revealingly, instead of using a subtle phenomenological 
vocabulary (experience - pereţivanie, sense - smysl, intuition - intuicija, etc.), 
Šklovskij is content with an unreflected empiricist one (impressions - vpečatlenie, 
feelings - oščuščenie).101  
These differences between Šklovskij and Husserl, moreover, do not simply boil down 
to the lack of philosophical sophistication of the former: they also involve substantial 
divergences between the two – with regard in particular to the "formal", meaningful 
aspect of perception. In effect, I have just highlighted that phenomenology works with 
concepts of meaning and sense: for Husserl, perception is an intentional act of 
consciousness, which therefore displays an ideal or eidetic structure. In 
phenomenology, objects are made present as perceptual noems, they are informed 
and suffused with sense in the act of perception itself. By contrast, Šklovskij insists 
on the raw, vibrant and immediate character of perception: his conception of 
estrangement clearly intimates that perception is not to be understood as being 
structured intellectually. The concrete-formal structure of perception, involves a 
mechanistic, non-semantic aesthetics, founded on the notions of rupture and pure 
difference: objects are made present not through their inherent, structured form, but 
through blind deformations that function by contrasting them to a given norm. Even 
the meanings of objects or situations are reactualised in such a way, without being 
involved or transformed as such.  
On the one hand, Šklovskij's rather primitive conception of perception as a series of 
raw impressions and of form as pure difference means one could be doing Šklovskij 
a favour and interpreting him in a richer way when giving a meaningful, 
phenomenological interpretation to his conceptions of perception and form. The 
specific, idealist nuances that Husserl‟s phenomenology brings with it, however, such 
as the fact that – despite correspond to an originary donation in the flesh – the 
“noem” does not constitute the real, sensual object, and that its meaningful aspect 
depends on synthesising, sense-bestowing properties of consciousness, distances it 
sharply from Šklovskij‟s insistence on the immediacy and concrete properties of 
aesthetic experience, and the crucial fact that it is the material structure of the object 
that imposes its perceptive form – not the sense-bestowing act of a conscious 
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subject. As such, although Husserl‟s phenomenology would certainly enrich and 
consolidate Šklovskij‟s conception of perception in some respects, it would do so by 
eliminating or strongly modifying the meaning of the correlation between form and 
perception (and especially, its vital objective sources) which constitutes the specificity 
of the latter's aesthetics.  
The particular perils involved in trying to interpret and adapt Šklovskij‟s aesthetic of 
estrangement through the prism of Husserlian phenomenology is best illustrated by 
the very different status of language and the crucial problem of linguistic expression 
in their respective theories. This, indeed, is where the originality and meaning of 
Šklovskij‟s conception of concrete form appears most clearly. As far as Husserl is 
concerned, it is well known that the question of language as such is almost 
completely absent from his writings (Bundgaard, 2010). What is more, when Husserl 
does deal with language, such as in the Logical Investigations, he does so without 
considering its specific expressive properties, but by binding it up with mental acts 
(Smith, 1987), or considering it in terms of a pure grammar. As Bundgaard puts it: 
„Language as dealt with in the First Logical Investigation is assessed by virtue of its 
being essentially a vehicle, serving the purpose of expressing and re-articulating 
already formed “ideas”, “Vorstellungen” or “expressible thoughts,” whereas in the 
second part of the Fourth Logical Investigation it is assessed as an autonomous, self-
contained symbolic system, whose formal consistency is based on laws that apply on 
categorical forms, not on expressed meanings“ (Bundgaard, 2010, p.21). In other 
words, language and expression appear only as a strange, neutral layer, with no 
influence either on the production of meaning or on the content of our perceptions (or 
mental acts) (on this, cf. Kristensen, 2010, p.15).  
In Šklovskij's theories by contrast, language occupies centre stage and is identified 
as a phenomenon of first importance. More to the point, Šklovskij‟s conception of 
language – and especially poetic language – directly contravenes both the ideas that 
it is a vehicle for already formed thoughts or that it is based on laws dependant of 
categorical forms. Instead, we saw that the great discovery of Russian Formalism 
and the Futurist poets is that language has its own inherent, “poetic” structure, its 
expressive Gehalt, which constrains and produces its own form and meanings (cf. 
Friedrich, 1993). As Jakobson puts it: “Das Wort [wird] als Wort, und nicht als blosser 
Repräsentant des benannten Objekts oder als Gefühlsausbruch empfunden. Die 
Wörter und ihre Zusammensetzung, ihre Bedeutung, ihre äussere und innere Form 
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[sind] nicht nur indifferenter Hinweis auf die Wirklichkeit, sondern [erlangen] ein 
eigenes Gewicht und selbständigen Wert. (Jakobson, 1989, p.79)“ 
This pure expressive power of language as a poetic phenomena is best revealed by 
the crassest experiments of zaum poetry: by reducing language to its concrete 
phonetic form, and freeing it of any transitive functions or logical fetters (whilst still 
letting it appear as language), it demonstrates that language owes its essence not 
primarily its derivative functions, but in fact originates from, and is therefore bound 
with the articulation of a concrete material. In Šklovskij‟s eyes, language must not 
only be understood as an autonomous, self-contained, but formally consistent 
symbolic system: its expressive power, its capacity to express meaning and 
communicate thought derives from its specific material structure and poeticity. In 
other words, instead of a pure vehicle of thought and pre-formed logical meaning, 
language appears as a concrete form, which, as such is the objective bearer of its 
own expressivity. It is in this sense in particular, that one must understand that form 
is understood as a concrete, material feature by Šklovskij, rather than an abstract, 
intellectual one.102  
Although a more detailed analysis would certainly reveal further isolated points of 
convergence and prove useful in some ways, I believe that the general 
incompatibilities between Šklovskij‟s empiricist aesthetic of rupture and pure 
difference and Husserl‟s idealistic phenomenology suffice to lay to rest the idea that 
the former might be adequately and faithfully interpreted as a whole in the terms of 
the latter. Since, furthermore, there seems to be no serious alternatives to 
phenomenology to explain the perceptual implications of Šklovskij's aesthetics and 
poetics, it would thus seem that it is not possible to account for his theory and 
assumptions, whether in respect to the concrete form of language or that of 
perception in philosophical terms.  
 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn – and the one that has consistently been 
drawn by interpreters of Russian formalism – from the clear impossibility of 
systemising Šklovskij‟s insights into a philosophical mould is that they are generally 
of little, it not of no worth at all philosophically, and condemned to oblivion and 
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irrelevance. If his idea of estrangement and its implications regarding perception 
cannot be given solid foundations, one assumes, then even its positive, promising 
aspects, such as the idea that aesthetic experience corresponds to the act of 
sensually perceiving reality (whether directly, as in poetic language, or mediatorily, 
through artistic devices) in its concrete, expressive form, are directly threatened in 
their validity and relevance, and probably unworthy of a closer philosophical 
inspection as a systematic theory.  
The suspicions against the relevance of Šklovskij‟s theory with regard to questions of 
perception is reinforced by the fact that despite their evident promises and originality, 
the insights he provides remain very sketchy and ambiguous. His theory represents 
the heroic attempt to give expression to a vague intuition stemming for Modern art, 
and is achieved by synthesising a number of insights and theories, most of which do 
not particularly distinguish themselves by their rigorous and coherent nature 
(Bergson, Potebnja, Steinthal, etc.). In short, Šklovskij‟s ideas are much too raw and 
unreflected and it is not surprising that they remain resistant to such a thoughtful and 
aspirationally “rigorous” model as Husserl‟s phenomenology.  
As we also saw, Šklovskij himself appears to have remained hesitant, unconvinced 
and, in some case, even surprised both by the philosophical implications of some his 
ideas, in particular the extent of the encroachment of form and objective content to 
which his theoretical assumptions seem to lead, and by the existential scope taken 
on by the formal features of literature in his own prose. His inclination certainly 
seems to be to restrict the validity of the most ground-breaking aspects of his 
concept of literary form to the more limited domain of poetic language.103 What is 
more, Šklovskij never fundamentally revised his ideas on the key matters of literary 
form and its relation to the outside world: one finds a surprisingly, almost 
unrelentingly consistent approach to literature and form in his latest work and in his 
ground-breaking, iconoclastic essays of the mid 1910s. 
Despite the impossibility of directly systemising Šklovskij‟s ideas in a philosophical 
perspective and despite his own personal reluctance to modify their obviously 
insufficient philosophical premises, however, I do not believe that this spells the end 
for the philosophical prospects of his definition of aesthetic experience as a concrete, 
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expressive act of perception. In effect, the overly ambitious, vague and 
unredeemably unsystematic nature of Šklovskij‟s perceptual arguments, including the 
concept of the cyclical process of automatisation – de-automatisation is not such a 
terrible problem after all. Contrary to appearances, it does not lead to the inevitable 
bankruptcy of Šklovskij‟s fundamental ideas on the perceptual functions of art and 
literature and the mechanisms of the reactivation of our detailed, formal perception of 
the world, nor does it necessarily preclude the possibility that they one might find a 
way to systemise them philosophically. 
The first reason for this is that, simply put, despite its importance in the conceptual 
tectonics of Šklovskij theory of estrangement, the idea of automatisation and de-
automatisation actually fulfils but one function. That function, in essence, is to defend 
the idea that the concrete acts of perception themselves do not only possess 
transitive, cognitive functions, but have an aesthetic worth in themselves. The worth 
of perception itself is underlined by the fact of automatisation, more than explained or 
justified by it. In that sense, the only really essential feature of Šklovskij‟s concept of 
automatisation is the reversal of the role of perception not as a secondary, transitive 
process, but as our primary way of accessing and experiencing reality. This “primate“ 
of perception, is of course a metaphysically ambitious gesture. But as I just pointed 
out in connection with Husserl‟s phenomenology, it is one that has foundations in 
rigorous philosophical thought and is not as conceptually suspect as Šklovskij‟s 
unfounded assumptions on the process of automatisation.  
What this means then, is that the weaknesses of Šklovskij‟s aesthetics of 
estrangement come down not to its broad philosophical assumption on perception, 
which is in fact defensible, but its specific details. Indeed, far from being pure 
theoretical speculation, the fact that the pure process of perception can be 
aesthetised and taken as an end in itself is practically demonstrated many times over 
by the concrete examples of Modern art and literature. What is not demonstrated and 
remains essentially problematic is the precise modalities in which perception is made 
into an aesthetic end, and especially, how its intrinsic structure can be put to 
aesthetic uses. Interestingly, Šklovskij‟s arguments with regard to the functional 
application of estrangement have nothing to do with the process of automatisation or 
questions of perception, but with the way he details estrangement functioning within 
literature, through the individual devices. In other words, far from resulting from its 
obvious and irredeemable philosophical weaknesses, the problems of Šklovskij‟s 
- 109 - 
 
theory are in fact connected with his literary theoretical prejudices. Put differently, 
one can say that the weaknesses of his definition stem from his detailed but 
unsatisfactory account of the nature and function of literature itself, rather than his 
hasty and vague conception of perception.  
That there are significant problems with Šklovskij‟s literary theory and his definition of 
the link between form and perception is certainly undeniable. In short, critics have 
flagged up two major problems. Firstly, critics have argued that Šklovskij‟s 
conception of the aesthetic value of literary works through the idea of the perception 
of form depends too much on their contrastive novelty, shock or surprising effect and 
the way they deviate from an existing norm. This overly strong correlation posited by 
Šklovskij's model of estrangement between aesthetic value, perception of form and 
norm-breaking novelty or shock effect, obviously, is descriptively only true of a limited 
types of artistic and literary practices (including, unsurprisingly, those of Russian 
Modernism), Much more importantly, it leads to the absurd conclusion that form 
(whether artistic, literary, linguistic, etc.) is only perceived and perceptible when it is 
new, strange or norm-breaking.104 
Secondly, and most famously, Šklovskij‟s idea of estrangement has also been 
attacked for weakening the concept of form itself and reducing it to a pure differential 
contrast, thereby divesting it of any semantic, meaningful function.105 On the one 
hand, this of course means that art itself has been divested of its cultural, social or 
political function. On the other hand, because it excludes the semantic, meaningful 
dimension of literature, Šklovskij‟s idea of estrangement entails both an increasingly 
ornamental, baroque complexification of literary form (as is best witnessed by 
Šklovskij‟s account of the evolution of plot), and an ever greater distance between 
standard, “normal” meanings and the ever stranger literary form as such (as 
witnessed by the Futurists‟ zaum poetry). To a large extent, as I mentioned, it is this 
semantic naivety that separates Šklovskij from a phenomenological interpretation, 
and prevents a richer account of the interrelation of form and content, both in the 
work of art, and in our acts of perception generally. 
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The crucial point here is that contrary to Šklovskij‟s ideas on perception 
(automatisation, etc.) which we have shown to be unredeemable, the literary aspects 
of his theory are very much open to improvement. In fact, because of the value they 
otherwise attributed to Šklovskij‟s insights, Šklovskij‟s formalist colleagues sought to 
refine and modify them. To say the truth, somebody like Jakobson, despite sharing 
some of Šklovskij insight, sought very early to explore another way a giving them 
coherent theoretical expression (quote, on NPP). Šklovskij‟s problems were thus 
taken head on by the other formalists, who offered very convincing, effective and 
influential solutions. Since, to a large extent, the conceptual limitations and 
philosophical problems of his idea of estrangement appear as the flip side of one 
problematic, literary theoretical coin, the improvement to his literary ideas also offer a 
renewed hope and prospect of giving a solid philosophical framework and a more 
precise meaning to Šklovskij‟s intuitions. As Hansen-Löve correctly points out:  
"Jedenfall war im FII eine Begegnung zwischen Strukturalismus und 
Phänomenologie wesentlich vielsprechender, als dies im FI möglich gewesen wäre" 
(Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.15).  
Paradoxically, this means that the philosophical answer both to the conundrums and 
enticing perspectives presented by Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement must come 
first and foremost in the formalists‟ literary theoretical assumptions.106 The obvious 
conclusion of all these observations on Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement – which 
should come as no surprise after my observations on that matter in Chapter 1 – is 
then that instead of a direct philosophical interpretation, one needs first to turn to the 
literary theoretical part of his work, and the specific perspectives they bring on the 
question of language and literature, rather than on perception in general. Because he 
did not provided this improvement, but his colleagues did so, I propose, in the second 
part of this study, to turn to  the developments undergone by his seminal ideas in the 
work of his formalist colleagues, especially Eichenbaum, Tynjanov, Jakobson, and to 
a lesser extent but with even more importance, Jakubinskij, Polivanov and Trubeckoj. 
Indeed, it is only through the work of Šklovskij‟s colleagues that one can show how 
Šklovskij‟s theories and ideas could be adapted into a more rigorous model and be 
given a coherent and more interesting  interpretation 
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 In fact, the paradox is not that great, since we saw that the formalists tried to keep the 
philosophical aspects of their theories to a minimum, and if anything are more confused than 
openly contradictory. 




Tynjanov, Jakobson and the Concrete Expressiveness of Linguistic Structure 
 
As mentioned in the last chapter, all the main commentators of Russian Formalism 
(Erlich, Hansen-Löve, Steiner, Striedter, etc.) have noticed and agreed upon the fact 
that the unmistakable weakness of Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement – even when 
one is otherwise prepared to accept his definition of perception and of literature‟s 
perceptive role and function – is its complete lack of a systemic understanding of the 
literary work as a compound, meaningful whole, and the resulting lack of a 
meaningful, Gestaltist conception of form. One recalls that Šklovskij considers the 
literary text as a mere sum of discrete devices, which each function on their own, 
independently of each others, mechanically producing their specific, differential or 
defamiliarising effect. Even his analysis of the relationship of the devices (through his 
theory of plot) remains crudely atomistic and specifies only their arrangement as 
linear, regressive or progressive sets, rather than a complex system of meaningful 
interrelations and cross-influences (Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.17). The obvious problem 
with such an “atomistic” account is that literary texts, even when considered in purely 
formal terms, definitely live from the nuanced relations between their various 
elements, and achieve their full force and significance only as cohesive, “organic” 
wholes. As we also saw, Šklovskij‟s lack of a systematic perspective also prevents 
him from giving a semantic account of the literary text. Because devices are defined 
but as isolated, independent switches, the literary text which they constitute can be 
understood only as a pure succession of synchronic effects, not as a potentially 
meaningful construct. 
In order to build upon Šklovskij‟s insights whilst being more truthful both to the holistic 
and semantic dimensions of the literary text, the obvious way forward for the 
formalists was thus to provide a more systematic account of the devices and their 
aesthetic function.  
The first significant move in that direction is to be found in Eichenbaum‟s seminal 
essay “How the Over-Coat is Made” (1919). Instead of analysing Gogol's famous 
short story as a sum of individual and independent devices, Eichenbaum points to an 
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overarching organising narrative principle in The Over-Coat, which he identifies as 
the traditional Russian narrative tradition of “skaz”.107 Eichenbaum‟s argument is that 
by shaping the whole of his text with the devices of skaz, Gogol achieves a general 
effect, which transforms the meaning of his short story, and gives it its characteristic 
tone and style. Without going into more details, the key difference of Eichenbaum‟s 
analysis with Šklovskij's idea of a "sum of device" is that it postulates a systematic, 
consistent use of the devices, which combine not only to produce a series of 
successive, “new” and “strange” effects, but to convey a particular colour and tone to 
the text as a whole. Instead of being simply new and unusual, the formal devices of 
The Over-Coat  also contribute to its definite texture and meaning.108 
In parallel to Eichenbaum's contributions in the field of narrative prose, the decisive 
break away from Šklovskij's atomistic conception of the device was accomplished by 
Tynjanov in the field of verse analysis.109 Put very briefly, Tynjanov's innovation – 
which he outlines in his two famous texts Problem of poetic language ("Problema 
stihotvornogo jazyka", 1924) and The Ode as an Oratory Genre ("Oda kak oratorskij 
ţanr", 1927) – was to replace Šklovskij's concepts of the device and its effect of pure 
difference with those of the "constructive factor" (konstruktivni faktor) and of the 
"dominant" (dominanta). In explicit contrast to Šklovskij‟s discrete idea of the isolated 
device, the constructive factors (such as rhythm, metre, rime, etc..) are presented by 
Tynjanov as structural elements in the dynamic hierarchy of a given verse, or what 
he calls a "literary system" or "literary serie" (rjad). What is more, the constructive 
factors carry out their aesthetic function not through effects of pure shock, contrast or 
difference, but through deformations or inflexions imposed upon the total hierarchy of 
a literary serie.  
According to Tynjanov, indeed, some constructive factors occupy a more important 
place in the hierarchical structure of a given verse and thus influence and transform 
the elements that are subordinated to them: they form the « dominant » of that text. 
In Tynjanov's own words: « It is absolutely clear that each literary system is not 
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 The skaz is an oral form of narration, in which phonetic elements are exaggerated. 
Eichenbaum’s interest for such a form is perfectly understandable, since it involves 
“concrete” elements, which clearly distort and transform the traditional narrative thread. 
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 On Eichenbaum’s role in the development of formalist literary theory, see Any 1994,  
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 The fact that these contributions came from the field of versology is not surprising, as 
verse offers the most compact form of language, where the different aspects of language 
(phonetic, syntactic, semantic) are bundled together more tightly. 
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constituted of a peaceful interrelation of all its factors, but that the domination, the 
pre-eminence of one of them (or a group of them), functionally dominates and 
colours the others. Such a factor bears the name, already introduced in Russian 
literary science (Christiansen, Eichenbaum) of « dominant »." (Tynjanov, 1977, p.48). 
In other words, Tynjanov considers the poetic work as a system of factors organised 
hierarchically and dynamically through a dominant.110  
Despite the clear divergences with Šklovskij's idea of estrangement, the latter‟s 
influence is still clearly observable in Tynjanov‟s conception. The function of the 
dominant, indeed, is to « deform » and « distort » the verbal material on which it 
exercises. The perception of this deformation of the elements subsumed to the 
dominant constructive factors, moreover, represents the artistic fact: « Without the 
sensation of the submission, the deformation of all the factors by the factor that plays 
the constructive role, there is not artistic fact. […] If the feeling for the interrelation of 
the factors disappears […], the artistic fact is also lost : it is automatised” (Tynjanov, 
2007, pp.9-10, my translation)" The concordance of the vocabulary used here by 
Tynjanov with that of the šklovskian estrangement and the perceptibility of form 
characteristic of aesthetic experience is absolutely obvious. The basic difference is 
that instead of estranging effects and the pure “sense of difference” derived from 
Broder Christiansen, he puts forward the idea of the "dynamic form" of the literary 
system. Hansen-Löve thus comments: "Tynjanov establishes right at the start of 
“Problem of verse language” a clear methodological link between the estranging 
principle of de-automatisation and the new principle of the dynamic-form, whose 
perceptibility guarantees the aestheticity of perception” (Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.318).  
To my mind, one needs go no further in the detail of Tynjanov's account of verse as a 
dynamic-form to uncover in what way it offers a more mature version of Šklovskij's 
aesthetics. One has seen enough to ascertain, firstly, that Tynjanov moves from an 
aesthetic of estrangement based on the idea of constant rupture and strangeness, to 
an aesthetic of dynamic, hierarchical or organised form. True, Tynjanov maintains the 
idea of the concrete perceptibility of form, whose actualisation he also still links with 
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 Incidentally, Jakobson took exactly the same perspective in “The Dominant”: " In the 
earlier works of Šklovskij, a poetic work was defined as a mere sum of its artistic devices, 
while poetic evolution appeared nothing more than a substitution of certain devices. With the 
further development of Formalism, there arose the accurate conception of a poetic work as a 
structured system, a regularly ordered hierarchical set of artistic devices" (Jakobson, 1981 
[1935], p.754). 
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the necessity for strong deformations and distortions. But the perceptibility of form 
characteristic of the aesthetic process is not as reliant on the effects of pure shock, 
innovation or surprise: an acute sense of the formal interrelations between elements 
is now what matters. Secondly, Tynjanov's systemic approach to verse allows him to 
move from Šklovskij's blind "sensations of difference" and the excessively narcissist 
formal play of laying bear the devices "obnaţenie priema", to a more meaningful, 
semantic conception of form. Because poetic effects result in a heightening of the 
sense of the interrelation of linguistic factors, they can involve the dimension of 
articulated meaning and sense. Tynjanov thus speaks for example of the process of 
"semiologisation", through which the meanings of a word are dynamically activated. 
Panning back to the philosophical discussion of the preceding chapter, Tynjanov‟s 
theory of verse seems to offer a much more powerful and precise perspective on the 
idea of “concrete perceptual form”. Indeed, despite reducing it to the confines of 
language, it seems capable of really taking into account the structural and meaningful 
dimension of literary form, whilst preserving its concrete sensual aspect. Instead of 
Šklovskij‟s model, in which sensual impressions were derived secondarily from the 
differential effects of isolated devices, Tynjanov‟s theory seems to offer a much more 
Husserlian conception in which it is form itself, conceived what is more as a 
meaningful hierarchical system of linguistic factors that is experienced through poetry 
and literature. Thereby, in keeping with Šklovskij and in opposition to Husserl, the 
emphasis remains on the concrete, sensual “objective” dimension of language and 
expression as such: the “dynamic form” that is perceived is not an intellectual one, 
but more like in zaum, the concrete, “material” one of the word itself. 
Having said that and despite its obvious improvements on the theory of Šklovskij, 
Tynjanov‟s idea of the dynamic form also remains broadly unsatisfying with regard to 
the question of the perceptibility of form and its philosophical significance. To be 
more precise, its major issue, which is reminiscent of the problems of Šklovskij‟s or 
Eichenbaum‟s models, is that it remains a rather vague and “literary” theory. Indeed, 
despite their relevance and insightfulness, one has to say that Tynjanov‟s concepts 
of the literary system, of the interrelation of the constructive factors, of dynamic form 
itself are based on a series of metaphors (cf. Ehlers, 1992) rather than on a stringent, 
theoretically grounded argumentation. For that reason, although they are perfectly 
sufficient to grasp the general trend of Tynjanov‟s idea, and characterise the basic 
features of poetic language, Tynjanov‟s concept lose a lot of their efficiency and 
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force, when one tries to apply in a strict framework. In particular, it is very difficult to 
explain how the constructive factors and the dominant actually affect expression and 
meaning, or – which is the same – how the poetic forms of language relate to the 
normal syntactic, semantic features of language. In fact, it would seem that Tynjanov 
retains the idea of difference as a contrastive, rather than a systemic effect. As 
Hansen-Löve suggests: "Weder die Montage des FI noch das Konstruktionsmodell 
des FII vermag aber aus phänomenologischer Sicht "Gestalt" zu bilden, da eine 
Sinngebung ausbleigt und damit die den Gegenstand konstituierende Wertung. 
(Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.17)111 
 
The limitations of Tynjanov‟s literary model of the dynamic form mean that it can be 
useful to us only as a first step in the analysis of the formalists‟ ideas relevance. If 
one is to gain a really precise example or definition of the ideas of concrete form and 
the implications of the aesthetic perceptibility of form, it would seem that an even 
tighter framework is called for in order to capture the whole potential of the formalists‟ 
insights. Because Tynjanov constitutes but an intermediary stage in the maturation of 
the formalists‟ insights on the ideas of form and perception, I believe that the 
formalists themselves provides such a framework, namely the variant of structural 
linguistics, suggested by the work of Roman Jakobson. Indeed, as I have suggested 
many times already, Jakobson appears as the most natural heir to the Russian 
formalists‟ ideas. What is more, the convergence and influence of Tynjanov‟s idea of 
dominant (and literary evolution) on Jakobson seems to confirm the existence of an 
ark in Formalism‟s development from Šklovskij through Tynjanov to Jakobson (cf. 
Steiner, op.cit.; Hansen-Löve, 1978). 
Jakobson‟s big improvement on Tynjanov‟s models is to integrate the ideas of 
estrangement or the dominant into the definition of language itself, in other words, to 
consider them as a part of linguistics. Jakobson, indeed, famously put forward a 
functional model of language and communication, which integrates the idea of the 
poeticity of language in its midst. In short, Jakobson's model of the functions of 
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 In Hansen-Lôve’s reconstruction of Russian Formalism, FI, or first phase of formalism 
corresponds more or less to the early work of Šklovskij and the rawest form of the theory of 
estrangement. The FII, or second phase, involves the earlier work of Tynjanov or 
Eichenbaum. Hansen-Löve adds a third phase (FIII), which corresponds to the later work of 
Tynjanov, and that of Jakobson. 
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language distinguishes six elements, or factors of communication, that are necessary 
for communication to occur: (1) context, (2) addresser (sender), (3) addressee 
(receiver), (4) contact, (5) common code and (6) message. To each of these factors 
corresponds a communicative function: (1) referential, (2) emotive, (3) conative, (4) 
phatic, (5) metalingual, (6) poetic. Jakobson‟s model is often presented in the form of 
the following diagram: 
 
Context (referential) 




In Jakobson‟s theories, the very broad and vague notion of estrangement, or even 
the Tynjanov's literary one of "dominant" are thus replaced by the more precise one 
of “poetic function”, which reiterates Šklovskij‟s double concern for perception and 
form, but specifies their relation within language. Instead of applying to perception in 
general as is the case of estrangement, the poetic function operates, as Jakobson 
puts it, “by promoting the palpability of signs” (Jakobson, 1981 [1968], p.355). 
Jakobson‟s underlying assumption is that, just as perception for Šklovskij is not a 
transitive, cognitive process but an aesthetic end in itself, so language is not a purely 
transitive medium of communication or thought, but a concrete, poetic phenomenon 
in its own right.112 Linguistic signs are concrete objects, whose pure expressivity and 
existence as sign derive primarily not from their transitive functions (cognitive, deictic, 
communicative, etc.), but from the poetic fact of being perceived as a systematically 
organised and differentiated material (phonic, graphic) structure. Put differently, the 
“palpable”, articulated structure of a sign must be perceived as such for it to express 
or mean anything at all, and even exist as a distinct, signifying instance. 
Crucially, it is my belief that this idea that a sign derives its meaning and existence 
from its expressive perceptual structuration is also to be found in Jakobson‟s 
scientific concept of the phoneme. For Jakobson, indeed, the phoneme is constituted 
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 One finds this idea of the specific materiality of language also in Tynjanov, Jakubinskij, 
Volosinov, Bachtin, even Vygotskij (cf. Friedrich, 1993) 
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of a hierarchy of distinctive phonetic features. In other words, one finds in this 
definition the hierarchical, concrete structure already implied by Tynjanov. On top of 
this though, that structure is now analysed in purely structural terms: the concrete 
form of the phoneme is an oppositive and meaningful structure. In short, despite 
restricting Šklovskij‟s ideas on aesthetic form and perception to the specific 
phenomenon of language and giving them a strictly linguistic interpretation, 
Jakobson‟s work highlights their relevance and their pliability to the structuralist 
notions of system, distinctive features and differential articulation: it presents us with 
a type of object, the linguistic sign, that displays the property of being essentially a 
concrete perceptual form, or rather, an expressive, systematically articulated 
structure. Much more importantly, it provides us with a model and a undoubtedly 
scientific example of “concrete form” that can be systemised in philosophical terms, 
or gives sufficient indications as to how to do so in an original fashion. 
 
I will come back to the question of the phoneme and detail its historical evolution as a 
concept, especially in the Soviet context, in order to catch a more clear glimpse of 
the idea of concrete perceptual structure it seems to demonstrate, and further 
discuss the implications of the structural theory of perception it seems to imply. 
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify the assumption that Jakobson's 
structural linguistics stands out as a mature, elaborate expression of early formalist 
aesthetic theory, and to add a few more observations as to why it provides a more 
mature idea of “concrete form”, such as anticipated in incoherent terms in Šklovskij‟s 
earlier aesthetic speculations.  
Such an assertion, indeed, is neither unproblematic, nor self-evident. True, as I 
mentioned, one can definitely attest of a transition from Šklovskij‟s to Jakobson‟s 
literary theory, through Eichenbaum, Tynjanov, and concepts such as the “dominant”, 
which appear explicitly and with the same definition in all their theories. Despite these 
obvious influences, however, there are problems with my assertion which, on top of 
the continuity of formalist literary theory, also presumes a conceptual passage from 
formalism to structuralism, and from literary theory to linguistics. Both of these 
passages, however, are somewhat delicate and controversial. In order to defend and 
specify the idea that Jakobson‟s linguistics does indeed result, or is coextensive with 
the aesthetic intuitions of Formalism on the poetic, concrete and formal nature of 
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language, I wish therefore to spare here a few thoughts on the role of linguistics 
within Russian Formalism, and its relation to the evolution and development of 
structural linguistics. 
One obvious problem with stating that Jakobson‟s structural linguistics, whether it be 
his function model of language or his phonology, appears as the crowning 
achievement of Russian Formalism, indeed, is that linguistics occupied a competing, 
separate role in the evolution of Russian Formalism. As is well known, Russian 
Formalism was made up essentially of two groups, the OPOJAZ in St-Petersburg, 
and the Moscow Linguistic Circle (in Moscow obviously). Traditionally, the OPOJAZ 
group is associated with the figures of Šklovskij, Tynjanov and Eichenbaum, and is 
profiled both as the real centre of Russian Formalism,113 and as clearly literary 
theoretical society. On the other hand, the MLK and Jakobson in particular are 
presented as the bearer of the linguistic tradition of Russian Formalism (Erlich, 1995, 
Aucouturier, 1994). Because of its isolation from the literary Petersburg group and its 
much lesser role, the role of the MLK, and with it of linguistics, seems therefore to 
have been secondary and somewhat exoteric to Russian Formalism. As such, it 
seems problematic to argue for an organic development of literary theory and 
linguistics within formalism, or to present linguistics as the summit of the Formalists 
achievements. 
Now, it should be said that the OPOJAZ- literary theory vs. MLK linguistics distinction 
is not entirely correct. it is important to note that the formalist linguists formed not 
one, but two quite distinctive groups: the institutional Moscow Linguistic Circle on the 
one hand, of which Roman Jakobson, Grigorij Vinokur and Nikolaj Trubeckoj were 
members, and the more loosely defined "St-Petersburg School of Linguistics" on the 
other, which mostly regrouped former students of Baudouin de Courtenay such as 
Lev Ščerba, Lev Jakubinskij, and Evgenij Polivanov. In that sense, linguistics and 
linguists must be said to have played a significant in the Petersburgian context itself. 
The presence of linguists in both the centres of Russian Formalism also seem to 
point to interactions between the literary tendencies of the OPOJAZ, and the 
linguistic one of the MLK that went further than the simple mediation through 
Jakobson. Indeed, I certainly believe that the St-Petersburg linguists such Jakubinskij 
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 If this thesis is seldom made explicitly, the amount of interest given to the triumvirate 
Šklovskij-Eichenbaum-Tynjanov in relation to the other formalists certainly makes that point 
implicitly (cf. Robel, 2005, p.3). 
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and Polivanov provide a number of extra valuable arguments attesting of the links 
and evolution between the OPOJAZ- Šklovskij theories and the structural linguistics 
of Jakobson. Unfortunately, that argument is also suspicious and contested. 
For one, the members of the two groups entertained friendly contacts, but their 
conception and practice of linguistics differed from the start and never converged. 
The St-Petersburg linguists stood at first under the influence of Baudouin de 
Courtenay's functionalist and psychological stance. They were also extremely 
interested in the social nature of language and the concrete, live contexts of its uses. 
As a result, they came in close contact with the Institute of the Living Word (Institut 
Ţivogo Slova) – of which Ščerba and Jakubinskij were collaborators – and developed 
a conception of language as living speech. Similarly, they profiled themselves 
(Polivanov in particular) as the forefathers of pragmatics. In the 1930s, most of the 
Petersburg scholars evolved towards a Marxist – in the case of Jakubinskij, even 
Marrist – conception of linguistics, edged on not strictly by political motives, but by 
their scientific interest in socio-linguistics. By contrast, the Moscow linguists were 
swayed by the prominent scholars Filip Fortunatov and Alexej Šahmatov, who 
worked in the tradition of Indo-european linguistics. They thus leant towards 
traditional topics, such as dialectology and the history of Russian and Slavic 
languages, and came to explicitly reject the psychological views of Baudouin de 
Courtenay and his followers. Far from turning towards the idea of language as living 
speech, their conception of language remained oriented towards formal questions, 
such as syntax and morphology. Crucially, it was solely linguists from the MLK, such 
as Jakobson and Trubeckoj, who eventually embraced structuralism and thus tied 
formalism directly to structural linguistics. 
Complicating the picture even more, neither the St-Petersburg School nor the MLK 
functioned as well-disciplined, monolithic groups: there were wide divergences 
amongst their own members. Each formalist linguist had his idiosyncratic conception 
of language and linguistics, with his own special fields of interest, not all relevant to 
formalism. Jakubinskij's most substantive work concerns the unformalistic theme of 
dialogical speech. Polivanov's main area of expertise was in Oriental languages, and 
one of his major contributions was to criticise a concept of general linguistics too 
exclusively orientated towards indo-european languages. Even Jakobson's work 
stretched to fields extraneous to formalism, such as Eurasian theory, an interest he 
shared with Trubeckoj. In the context of Russian formalism, such lack of consensus 
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is not in the least surprising. It confronts us in the field of linguistics with a situation 
similar to that of formalist literary theory, i.e. a loose conceptual framework 
encompassing an impressive number of diverging positions and interests, the 
diversity of which the formalists readily acknowledged. Nonetheless, the formalist 
linguistic output is too diverse and incoherent to provide evidence of the gradual and 
integrated evolution of a specifically formalist conception of linguistics towards 
Jakobson's structural model. Worse, some experts go as far as to doubt any 
significant influence from other formalist linguists (in particular from the St-Petersburg 
School) on the mature work of Jakobson and the structural trend he represents, 
laying that influence directly at Saussure's feet instead (cf. for example Koerner, 
1997, p.167). Reflecting such a view, the usual accounts of formalism's contribution 
to structural linguistics have often brushed aside the achievements of the St-
Petersburg School and focussed exclusively on the contribution of the "structuralist" 
MLK or, even more so, on Jakobson's and Trubeckoj's role within the CLP (cf. 
Fontaine, 1975, Toman, 1995, etc.). 
As it is, the disjunctive nature of the formalists' linguistic output and the apparent 
disconnection from the literary theoretical centre and the linguistic work of the St-
Petersburg OPOJAZ from the structurally-oriented Muscovites seem to spell serious 
trouble for the idea of a direct transition and significant influence of early formalism 
on Jakobson's structural linguistics. The want of a sufficiently persistent and well-
defined formalist framework makes it almost inevitable to attribute the source of 
Jakobson‟s structural ideas to Saussure's apparently much better defined and stable 
model. Instead of the formalist idea of concrete form and impressive difference, it 
would thus seem that the special status of the sign must be understood in 
Saussurean terms, as a distinction between signifier and signified. The established 
view in the canonical accounts of the history of linguistics is certainly that, except for 
the later work of Jakobson and Trubeckoj in Prague (who are mostly seen as echoing 
or subordinated to Saussure), Russian formalism plays a marginal role in the 
development of structural linguistics or the history of general linguistics (cf. Robbins, 
2001; Ducrot-Schaeffer, 1991, etc.). 
 
In contrast to these standard views of the separate role of linguistics in the evolution 
of Formalism‟s literary theory and its relative significance towards the Saussurean 
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paradigm in structural linguistics, I wish now to suggest that Jakobson‟s structural 
linguistics does appear as the crystallisation of its literary theoretical, or generally 
poetic and aesthetic assumptions and, consequently, as the product of a typically 
formalist conception of linguistics, which differs significantly from the Saussurean 
model. The obligatory starting point, when discussing the adjustment or development 
of formalist poetics into structural linguistics, has to be the opposition between 
formalist literary theorists and linguists. Obviously, one cannot simply state that 
formalist poetics naturally evolved towards linguistics when such prominent formalists 
as Šklovskij and Eichenbaum unreservedly rejected the idea that their theories 
should be systemised in a linguistic perspective. To them, poetics must remain a 
literary theory, i.e. an autonomous discipline, focussed on its specific object of inquiry 
and governed by its own, appropriate methods. As a result, the "linguistification" of 
formalist poetics appears, at first glance, as a methodological decision, which as 
such can be rejected, and firmly was in Šklovskij's or Eichenbaum's cases. 
Accordingly, one has to face the eventuality that linguistics does not play a 
necessary, consolidating role in the development of early formalist ideas in literary 
theory, but rather functions as a distinct alternative, providing an altogether different 
perspective on poetics.  
A closer look reveals that, quite to the contrary, formalist linguistic poetics was never 
really sundered from the insights of formalist literary theory, but directly builds upon 
the conceptual basis it outlines. For one, even Šklovskij, Eichenbaum or Tynjanov did 
not manage to trace a clear boundary between linguistics and literary theory. One 
can mention, for example, the matter of Šklovskij's natural resort to linguistic 
arguments in "Art as Device".114 This in itself, of course, does not compromise his 
rejection of linguistics as a conceptual model for literary theory: he makes only 
perfunctory use of linguistic facts or observations, and effectively grounds his theory 
not on linguistic premises, but literary and aesthetical ones (Potebnja, Veselovskij, 
Christiansen, Bergson, etc.). Generally speaking, Šklovskij suffered no qualms in 
using punctual linguistic observations as buttress for his theories, but objected to the 
notion that linguistics had a general, methodological significance for literary theory. 
As it happens, however, Šklovskij's seminal argument in "Art as Device", even 
though it does not rely on linguistics as such, does display strong general linguistic 
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implications. One recalls that his essential thesis is that poetic language, contrary to 
the interpretation defended by Potebnja, is not defined by its ties with extra-linguistic 
"images" (obrazy), but with the devices of language itself. Šklovskij's theory interprets 
literature or "literariness" as an artefact of the immanent properties of language, but 
not of symbolic meaning, or any other external factor. This radically new approach 
thereby clearly engages the definition of language itself, and its linguistic features. 
Šklovskij, by the by, was sufficiently aware of this linguistic significance of his 
idiosyncratic view of poetics to seek out the opinion of Baudouin de Courtenay. 
The fact of the matter is that, in the wake of Russian futurism, Šklovskij's formulates 
in his poetics a new and unconventional interpretation of the nature of language, 
which conceptualises properties unaccounted for by traditional linguistic theories. 
Moreover, as his primary sources come from literature or speculative aesthetics, his 
theory accordingly lacks a scientific, linguistic underpinning. The very definition of 
language and its properties being at stake, however, such linguistic foundations 
should be forthcoming. In other words, because of its obvious linguistic implications 
and even if one follows Šklovskij in refusing to make literary theory a methodological 
subfield of linguistics, one still must allow a degree of compatibility between the 
axioms of his poetics and those of a coherent theory of general linguistics. The 
relevant question here has shifted from the putative methodological autonomy of 
poetics from linguistics, to whether Šklovskij's poetics is conceptually solid enough to 
withstand a thorough linguistic analysis. 
When one does subject the conception of language present in Šklovskij's poetics 
even to a cursory linguistic analysis, it is found wanting in some fundamental 
aspects. For example, Šklovskij posits a substantial, hypostatic distinction between 
poetic and prosaic language, which he sees, in effect, as two separate languages. 
This opposition he adopts critically from Potebnja, justifying it in his own perspective 
through the objective differences in the uses and properties of poetic and prosaic 
language. But, patently, there is no linguistically founded argument for such an 
unambiguous and strong binary distinction. To be sure, there are linguistically 
significant divergences between poetic and prosaic uses of language, as Šklovskij is 
prompt to point out. But there is no obvious specifically linguistic reason for stopping 
at the prosaic-poetic distinction, and not defending the existence of a whole string of 
other languages (verse, scientific, rhetorical, etc.) on the simple basis of 
straightforward divergences in their uses. 
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The problem gets even worse when one considers the criterion used by Šklovskij to 
operate his binary distinction. That criterion is, of course, estrangement. For 
Šklovskij, simply put, poetic language defamiliarises, whereas prosaic language does 
not. In the first place, it is debatable whether estrangement is per se a valid linguistic 
criterion. But even if it were, it cannot be applied effectively and consistently to 
discriminate poetic from prosaic language. Indeed, any given language occurrence 
might defamiliarise in one case, and be processed automatically in the other, 
implying that the exact same language occurrence might be alternatively poetic or 
prosaic. As Jakobson points out later in "What is Poetry?", this holds true from 
language's smallest elements to the larger narrative structures of entire texts (cf. 
Jakobson, 1979, p.546). It is thus in fact untenable - whether on a linguistic or a 
literary theoretical basis - to define poetic language through estrangement and at the 
same time posit a substantial opposition between poetic and prosaic instances of 
language. 
It is not uninteresting to mention here that the separation of poetic from prosaic 
language is in fact one of the enabling theoretical moves made by the early formalists 
of the OPOJAZ. Indeed, they first tried to define their specific object of study by firmly 
isolating poetic language from other linguistic uses and occurrences. Part of the 
rationale behind the distinction of poetic from prosaic language, moreover, was to 
evacuate from the field of poetics the questions and problems of traditional linguistics 
- which the formalists thought were ineffective for poetical analysis - and confine their 
relevance to prosaic language. The paradoxical nature of Šklovskij's binary 
conception of language is a logical collateral consequence of such a move, since 
evacuating the general problems of linguistics obviously precludes providing a proper 
account of the status and role of poetic instances in terms of their relation with 
language (and for example meaning and semantics) as a whole. Interestingly, I also 
mentioned that Tynjanov‟s idea of the dynamic form suffers from the same problem, 
namely, it cannot account for the “dynamic hierarchy of linguistic elements” implied 
by verse in terms of the properly syntactic, semantic and morphological properties of 
language. 
In summary, the main failure of Šklovskij's or Tynjanov‟s theory, from a linguistic 
perspective, is that it does not properly account for the relation between language's 
poetic dimension and its more general properties. To put it another way, despite 
making poetry and literature a function of language, Šklovskij and Tynjanov refuse or 
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are incapable of grounding that function coherently on the properties of language, 
and hypostasise it into a different kind of language altogether. Most problematically, 
this crystallises in the obvious paradox of his conception of language, which in fact 
seeks to avoid the question of that relation altogether by postulating a clear 
divergence between poetic and non-poetic uses of language. It also leads to a 
general weakness of his literary theoretical assumptions, which lack the requested 
power and precision to suitably analyse the intricate effects of poetic uses of 
language. Obviously, therefore, and contrary to Šklovskij's instincts, a more complex 
linguistic approach of the general properties of language is definitely required, in 
order to achieve a satisfactory explanation of the role of the poetic dimension within 
the general economy of language, and consequently, to provide firmer grounds for 
the formalist poetics. 
In that respect, it is not possible to consider the linguistic trend of formalism as a 
mere methodological alternative to literary theory. On the contrary, it is a necessary 
component in the conceptual maturation of formalism as a whole towards a more 
elaborate understanding of poetic language. Again, this does not mean that poetics 
as a whole must or can be subsumed to linguistics and its methods. One has to 
agree with Šklovskij that many problems of poetics can find no answers on the terrain 
of linguistics alone and require the specific framework of literary theory. The point, 
however, is that some problems of poetics do require a linguistic investigation, and 
more generally, that there can be no consistent theory of poetics without a sound 
linguistic basis. 
Before turning to the question of how the linguists among the formalists proceeded to 
provide the linguistic basis missing in Šklovskij's or Eichenbaum's work, we must add 
a short comment on the latter two's reluctance towards linguistics. Indeed, one 
should understand that the linguistics on offer to the early formalists in the mid 1910s 
was, with the notable exception of Baudouin de Courtenay, a traditional brand of neo-
grammarian linguistics, which displayed all the features of positivism they were trying 
to fight off with their theory. Linguistics, in fact, offered formalists precisely what they 
did not want, i.e. a wide-ranging and disjointed array of facts and observations, but 
no unifying vision of what might be the universal feature of all poetic texts. In that 
respect, it is not all that surprising that they sought to keep it at arms length, and did 
not see in it a useful conceptual resource, quite to the contrary. 
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To nuance therefore the impression which might arise from our considerations so far, 
the fact that the Russian formalists did have to turn to linguistics should not be seen 
as a clear refutation of their suspicions towards it. In fact, the later formalist linguists 
did not make use of the established linguistics rejected by Šklovskij et alia, or 
adapted their poetics to its models. Rather, they sought to give shape to poetic 
insights such as Šklovskij's in a new linguistic framework, which they therefore 
directly contributed to create, and which sprung in great part from their specific 
concerns in poetics. This is especially true with regard to the two biggest problems 
we highlighted in Šklovskij's model, namely the need to conceptualise the relation of 
poetic language with language as a whole, and the need to explain the functioning of 
poetic devices at the level of their linguistic effectiveness. In both these areas, the 
formalists came up with their own original linguistic notions. 
 
Our brief discussion of the weak points in Šklovskij's poetics has outlined for us the 
main specifically linguistic problem pertaining to poetics which faced the formalists, 
namely the question of the wider role or function of the poetic dimension within 
language, and therefore, of the relation between the pure, concrete expressive forms 
of “poetic language” and their relation with the semantic, symbolic or denotative 
functions of prosaic language. In the perspective of formalist theory, that question 
takes on, as we have also hinted at, two main aspects. On the one hand, the 
formalists had to explain and justify at a general level the relation of poetic instances 
of language to non-poetic ones. On the other hand, they had to detail more precisely 
the features which define or enable poetic and literary uses of language, in terms of 
the inner structure of language, i.e. the relation between sound and meaning, or 
between syntactical form and semantics. 
Starting with the first of these issues, we saw that the main difficulty or paradox 
flowing from the theory of estrangement in that regard was that it couldn't account for 
the simple fact that a single linguistic occurrence might be respectively poetic or 
prosaic. Because of this possible alternation, poetic instances of language cannot be 
explained as inherently different from non-poetic ones, but require to be justified in 
relation to a unified definition of language and its properties. In other words, providing 
a coherent linguistic definition of the poetic dimension of language does not only 
imply uncovering it as a special facet of language (as Šklovskij had done). One has 
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to rethink altogether and profoundly modify the general definition of language, in 
order to account for and explain its poetic features in accordance and in relation (and 
not only in opposition) with its normal, prosaic characteristics.  
The formalist linguists successfully achieved the objective of integrating the poetic 
dimension of language to a theory of general linguistics only through a number of 
intermediary stages. A good example of an early, insufficient attempt is the work of 
Evgenij Polivanov. In his conception of linguistics, poetics is considered as relevant, 
but appears only as a peripheral field. The poetical forms of language are a sort of 
add-on property, an extra dimension, which does not have any wider bearing on the 
nature of language itself. Poetical questions are analysed by Polivanov with the tools 
of linguistics, but as such, they don't have any particular significance, nor do they 
provide conceptual feedback on the basic features of language. When considering 
questions of poetics, Polivanov is mainly interested in analysing the dependence of 
poetry and literature on the core linguistic features (syntax, morphology, phonetics) of 
a given language.115 Thereby, he very much neglects to consider the mirroring 
problem, i.e. the implications that the mere existence of poetic and literary forms 
might have for the understanding of these core linguistic features. 
In a perspective such as Polivanov's, poetics is thus completely subsumed to the 
conceptual framework of linguistics. This means it does not contribute anything 
conceptually to linguistics and, even more disappointingly, that the fundamental 
linguistic questions raised by poetics (e.g. the definition of poetic language, its 
relation to other language forms, etc.) are left begging. To a certain extent, it is also a 
conception of this type that prevails in the early work of Jakobson, who sought to 
define poetic language as a detached, autonomous dialect governed by its specific 
rules. There again, poetics and poetic language appear as a peripheral and well 
delimited field, fitting in without much conceptual ado into the framework of classical 
linguistics and having only very limited effect on the general definition of language. 
In the work of Polivanov's OPOJAZ colleague, Lev Jakubinskij, the picture presented 
by the place of poetic language within linguistics is already very different. Indeed, 
Jakubinskij is not content with devolving a certain amount of attention to problems of 
poetics. On the contrary, he recognizes that the existence of a poetic dimension 
actually influences the very essence of language itself and requires to be theorised at 
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the level of general linguistics. To be more precise, Jakubinskij's basic assumption, in 
fact, is that by its very nature, language occurs in a wide array of different instances 
and uses. A proper definition must therefore take into account this multi-faceted 
dimension of language. For Jakubinskij, poetic language is one amongst many 
language uses (scientific, rhetorical, etc.) and it is as such that it must be integrated 
to the definition of language. 
The key concepts which allow Jakubinskij to conceptualise the unity of language 
despite the multiplicity of its instances are those of function, which he takes from 
Baudouin de Courtenay, and, later on, of "speech form" (rečevaja forma).116 Indeed, 
according to Jakubinskij, language is always used in a certain function, which 
determines the specific pragmatic conditions of its use, as well as its formal structure 
and properties. Language occurs therefore in specific and extremely varied types of 
"speech form", the properties of which must become the object of specialised 
linguistic analysis. Jakubinskij himself went on to focus on the particular properties of 
"dialogical speech", but it is obvious from his model that poetic language can also be 
analysed as a particular speech form, resulting from a particular, literary functional 
use. 
The quantum leap between the šklovskian theory of a binary, substantial opposition 
between two hypostasis of language, and Jakubinskij's multi-functionalist perspective 
is that Jakubinskij view, there is basically just one, unified language. The manifold 
(and not only twofold) of its instances is explained through the variety of its functions 
and the resulting forms they induce. Thus, poetic language is not a separate 
hypostasis but rather the particular form that normal language takes when used in its 
poetic function. Similarly, prosaic language is not diametrally opposed to poetic 
language, but is itself the particular instance of language used in its daily, prosaic 
function. Jakubinskij's functionalist model is a very important step towards integrating 
the problems of poetics to the general definition of language. Poetic language is, 
probably for the first time in the history of linguistics, given a strong conceptual 
foundation within general linguistics and taken into account in the very definition of 
language. There is a drawback to this model, however, as it does not specify any 
possible modalities of the synchronic interactions between the different functions of 
language. Indeed, they seem to coexist next to each other, without interlocking. 
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 This concept first emerges in "On Dialogical Speech", 1921. 
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Language is used exclusively either in one function or the either, and the speech 
forms in which it is instantiated are thus also clearly distinguishable from one 
another. Correspondingly, it is also clearly inadequate to solve the problems linked to 
the versatility of language, i.e. its ability to be poetic on one occasion and prosaic on 
the other. This is due to the way in which Jakubinskij construes the concept of 
function. In his interpretation, the function defines the extra-linguistic telos or 
objective which is aimed at in a particular use of language. Thus, the specific 
features of a speech occurrence are not defined so much in terms of its internal 
structure, as in terms of the extra-linguistic, teleological context in which it occurs. 
Because the function of a speech occurrence receives its unity from the objective 
towards which the latter is oriented, it is not clear how several functions could 
interact, unless of course, a speech occurrence was made to pursue several 
objectives at the same time, and therefore fulfil several functions. But even then, it 
would seem that we are dealing more with a superposition, than a synchronic 
interrelation. 
Jakubinskij was not unaware of this problem and therefore introduced the concept of 
"speech form", where he tried, in a typically formalist gesture, to re-centre the 
linguistic analysis on the intrinsic properties of the concrete language utterance, 
rather than its external, teleological co-factors. This conceptual move, however, is not 
wholly successful, because, whatever it's other merits, it still considers the properties 
of a given speech form as a unity, as one particular aspect of language use, distinct 
as a whole of the others. The idea of a synchronic composition or interrelation of 
several forms or functions is still missing. Poetic functions or poetic forms thus still 
constitute one particular use of language, clearly distinct and different from all the 
others. In that sense, Jakubinskij's model is not that much dissimilar to Polivanov's, 
as poetics again appear as a regional field of study, which can (and in Jakubinskij's 
conception, should) be investigated separately. 
The model which does provide this integration and impact of the poetic dimension of 
language is Jakobson's. It is interesting to note that it builds on the Jakubinskij's 
functionalist perspective, via the communication model suggested by Karl Bühler, 
itself inspired by Jakubinskij. As we mentioned earlier, this linearity is a strong 
argument to indeed see a continuity within formalist linguistics, all the more because 
the adoption of the functionalist model is very much conditioned by the requirement 
of poetics. Indeed, in his earliest work, Jakobson seem to adopt a more typically 
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šklovskian position of separating poetic speech from prosaic one. This he did not do 
through defamiliarisation, but in an attempt to consider poetic speech as a kind of 
dialect, with its own rules and grammar. The failure of these attempts led him to seek 
another solution, which he found in the St-Petersburg functionalism. 
The difference between Jakubinskij's and Jakobson's functionalism is that Jakobson 
does not consider language as a bundle of different functions and forms, but sees 
rather all its functions implied together, but to varying extents and degrees in a given 
speech act. The functions defined by Jakobson are thus very different from those of 
Jakubinskij: they are much less orientated on the general contextual telos of a 
speech utterance, but on the specific conditions of communication.. Thus Jakobson 
does not arrive with "cultural" categories such as "scientific" or "rhetorical" speech, 
but much more precise functions detailing the process of communication itself 
(enunciation, reception, etc.). Now, because of this synchronicity and verticality of 
language functions, the poetic function is always implied in any given speech act or 
language occurrence. This means that poetics is now integrated at the core of 
general linguistics, since it analyses an essential, inevitable dimension of language. It 
is not only relevant in the analysis of clearly literary or poetical texts, in which the 
poetic function is dominant, but it also has an impact on "prosaic" texts, where its 
influence is minimum, but still conditions the very modalities in which language 
actually functions. From the point of view of the question of poetic - prosaic language, 
the problem is solved: there are indeed different uses of language, which depend on 
the relative dominance of a function on the others. They are not substantially and 
categorically distinct; there is an infinite shade of gray between the relative 
importance of functions. But on the other hand, the poetic function is still sufficiently 
distinctive to be studied on its own terms, and its existence within language has thus 
certainly been confirmed and justified. 
 




Jakobson’s Phoneme as a Concrete Expressive Sign 
 
In essence, Jakobson‟s functional poetics offers us two crucial insights with regard to 
the aesthetic assumptions of the early formalists on the perceptibility of form. Firstly, 
by singling out the “material” or "palpable" layer of language and integrating that 
dimension into a linguistic model as one of the essential features of its expressivity, 
Jakobson gives both a solid basis and further credence to the vague intuitions of the 
first formalists. Secondly, it provides us with a first glimpse of the adaptability of the 
early formalists‟ aesthetic or poetic insights into a structuralist mould. Much more, as 
a result of this integration to his linguistic model of the poetic perceptibility of 
language through the idea of the dominant, Jakobson confirms the potential 
originality of the structural model produced by the early formalists‟ insights. Indeed, 
the immanent poetic nature of language and the fact that its expressivity, according 
to Jakobson, is to be understood in terms of its concrete perceptibility as an 
articulated, hierarchical system both clearly marks it out as a structural model that is 
fundamentally distinct from that of Saussure. Instead of the classical idea that the 
value of the linguistic sign derives from pure differential oppositions, Jakobson‟s 
model seems to suggest that linguistic value derives from the concrete articulation of 
the sign as a perceptual, phenomenological given. 
Admittedly, Jakobson‟s considerations on the poetic or concrete expressivity of 
language remain somewhat vague. On the one hand, there is absolutely no doubt 
that he does consider language as being essentially poetic, or rather, that he sees 
the poetic function of language as an essential dimension of language, which 
influences its whole definition. His many attempts to provide a “grammar of poetry or 
a poetry of grammar” – a project already anticipated by Polivanov (Polivanov, 1963) 
– confirm this essential insight, that language and its traditional functions (descriptive, 
communicative, conative, etc.) cannot be considered independently of its poetic 
dimension. His functional model certainly says as much. On the other hand, however, 
despite the clear, central role given to poetics, and Jakobson‟s successful attempt to 
integrate it to the definition of language itself, this general importance accorded to 
poetics and the concrete expressivity of language remains too vague and imprecise, 
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especially with regard to its structural dimension, and the pure semantic of language. 
For that reason, I wish now in this chapter to turn my focus to a more limited case, in 
which the implications and meaning of Jakobson‟s conception of the concrete, 
structural expressivity of language can be highlighted precisely and in a more 
convincing way. That more limited case is that of phonology and the phoneme. 
One should not be surprised by the fact that it is phonology that can best 
demonstrate the “formalist” originality of Jakobson‟s conception of language and of 
the expressivity of the linguistic sign. The question of the phoneme, indeed, brings up 
with particular acuity the problem of the relation of sound and sense, or in other 
words, the relation between the “material”, phonetic aspect of language, and its 
formal, semantic dimension – and therefore the idea of concrete form. In fact, it offers 
a kind of paradigmatic case and an opportunity to assess that problem in a very 
limited and condensed context (Holenstein, 1976), instead of the infinitely complex 
and multi-layered one of poetic language and literature. What is more, the question of 
the phonetic nature of language is none the less tightly connected in Jakobson‟s 
work with that of its poeticity. Typically, as Kiparsky underlines, “the idea of a system 
of relevant phonological oppositions appears there [O češskom stixe] and is shown to 
account for otherwise puzzling differences between Russian and Czech versification, 
years before its application to historical phonology and in the Remarques (1929) 
(Kiparsky, 1983, p.20) 
 
Now, in order to outline Jakobson‟s conception of phonology and comment on its link 
with the idea of concrete form and the "palpable" expressivity of the sign, one must 
again turn to his connection with Russian Formalism. On the one hand, indeed, there 
is no question that phonology was a privileged field of inquiry of the linguistically-
oriented formalists. Next to poetics, it is the single topic to which they devoted the 
most attention: the near entirety of Trubeckoj‟s and well over half of Polivanov‟s work 
touch upon questions of phonology and phonetics. Šcerba, Jakubinskij, Bernstein, 
Kušner and, of course, Jakobson, all wrote extensively on the subject. Moreover, it is 
a field in which they realised some of their most long-lasting and widely recognised 
accomplishments. Trubeckoj‟s “Grundzüge der Phonologie” in effect laid down the 
very foundations of the discipline. Quite simply put, when considering matters in this 
way, it seems there would be no phonology as we know it without the formalists. 
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However important the role played by phonology – or phonological considerations – 
in the work of the Russian Formalists, though, one must again confront the problem 
of the links of Jakobson‟s phonology in particular, with the tradition of Russian 
Formalism. Just as was the case with his functional model of linguistics, indeed, the 
links of his phonological ideas to the Formalists core tenets, or indeed, to the work of 
his formalist colleagues are contested. To a certain extent, one even has to admit 
that the relations between Jakobson‟s phonology and Russian Formalism is even 
more contested than his links to the formalists poetics. In effect, whereas, from a 
linguistic point of view (the literary theoretical links are perfectly well accepted), 
Jakobson‟s debt to Russian Formalism is more often than not neglected in 
connection to the poetic aspects of his linguistic model (along with that poetic aspect 
itself, one should add), the connections of Jakobson‟s phonology with the other 
Russian Formalists, or anybody else than Saussure, has in fact directly been 
attacked and called into question (cf. Koerner, 1997; Harris, 2003). 
The obvious problem, of course, is that much of the central contributions made by 
“formalists” to phonology were not made before the late 1920s – a time when 
formalism was already at its agony – and most of them actually came much later. 
Trubeckoj‟s Grundzüge, to take the most flagrant example, dates as far back as 
1939. Jakobson‟s first decisive contributions to the topic, “On Czech Verse” also date 
from the mid to late 1920s. In fact, even the work of the Prague Circle itself did not 
start until 1928: “phonology was not really the most popular theme in the earliest 
days of the Circle. Lectures on arguably phonological topics began to appear only in 
1928, in connection with preparations for the congress in the Hague” (Toman, 1995, 
p.145). In other words, it would seem as if phonology is in fact a purely structuralist 
phenomenon, with barely any input from the Formalists. True, one might want to 
name Polivanov‟s, Jakubinskij‟s and Ščerba‟s work as being more closely identifiable 
with formalism. But, the theoretical ties of these thinkers with formalism are far from 
straightforward. Moreover, their linguistic ideas betray the influence of Baudouin de 
Courtenay more than that of formalism, and neither of them formulated or discussed 
any of the significant tenets of the OPOJAZ (by contrast, for example, with 
Jakubinskij, who made the famous distinction between poetical and practical 
language). Because they do not explicitly state formalist hypothesis, or are presented 
as specifically formalist, it is therefore a bit of a long shot to categorise their work on 
phonology as specifically formalist. 
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These arguments against assigning a significant and specific role to formalist ideas in 
respect to the evolution of phonology do not mean one should discard their 
importance right out of hand. Indeed, formalism spans a decisive period in the 
development of phonology – from the early 1910s, the publication of Saussure's 
Cours and Baudouin de Courtenay's latest work to the 30s and Trubeckoj's 
Grundzüge – which corresponds to the birth process so to speak of the new 
discipline. On top of this chronological relevance, formalism also provides the 
personal links between the very first phases of phonology (Baudouin de Courtenay 
and the Kazan School) and the mature structural phonology of Trubeckoj and 
Jakobson: Polivanov and Ščerba were the foremost propagators and continuators of 
Baudouin de Courtenay's psychophonetics, and it was from a gradually more critical 
position towards these views that Trubeckoj and Jakobson developed their own 
theory. As a delivered "end product", phonology might therefore be essentially 
structuralist, but during its embryonic phase, one might want to speculate that it went 
through more typically formalist stages, or profited from formalist influences. There 
are two elements in particular we want to consider in respect to this hypothesis. 
The first is the context in which phonology arose, namely the epistemological crisis of 
the early XXth century, during which the tenets of positivism were sharply criticised 
and new paradigms put forward, next to the empiricism of the natural sciences 
(Husserl's phenomenology, Dilthey's hermeneutics, etc.). Phonology itself emerged 
as a direct product of this crisis of empiricism, more specifically, as a result of the 
inability of experimental phonetics to discriminate linguistically relevant data (cf. 
Sériot, 2003). Its rise was moreover supported and made possible by the shift in 
linguistics – which was in tune with the general epistemological upheaval – from the 
"organistic" view defended by Schleicher and the naturalist, positivist model of the 
Neo-grammarians to the "systemic" and what might want to term 
“geisteswissenschaftlich” approaches put forward by Baudouin de Courtenay and 
Saussure. Now, as has long been shown by Peter Steiner and others (Ehlers, 
Tchougounnikov), Russian formalism – itself yet another manifestation of a general 
reaction against positivism – also went through this paradigmatic shift from an 
"organic" to a "systemic" metaphor; in a way, formalism itself evolved (or dissolved) 
into structuralism. In that sense, one can see it as accompanying the development of 
phonology towards a structural perspective, and providing a favourable maturation 
environment or laboratory. 
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Secondly, one has to take into account the fact that there is one aspect of the 
formalists' work which is absolutely germane with phonology (or phonetics), and that 
is their interest for the sound aspects of poetical language and the relation between 
sound and meaning in poetry. Indeed, there are even examples of a specifically 
phonological or phonetic concern for poetic matters in articles by Jakubinskij and 
Polivanov (on can cite Jakubinskij‟s "Sound-Gestures in the Japanese Language" or 
"The Sounds of Poetic Language".). These articles, moreover, correspond to the 
earliest phase of formalism and take up typically formalist theses on the nature of 
poetic language (impeding of articulation, intrinsic value of spoken sounds, etc.): the 
link between formalism and phonology is here absolutely straightforward. Jakobson 
displays the same fascination for such topics, witness his articles on the futurist 
zaum, and later, in an already more mature and important text, on Czech and 
Russian verse. 
In summary, the case of Russian formalism and phonology seems contrasted. On the 
one hand, there seems to be plenty of reasons to assume that phonology is indeed 
tightly connected with formalism and that Jakobson‟s theory might very well express 
its aesthetic idea of the perceptibility of form in an original and coherent way. 
However, the lack of integration of phonology within formalism, plus the lack of 
coherence of formalist linguistics means that, if one is to draw useful and convincing 
parallels between the formalists‟ aesthetics or poetics and Jakobson‟s phonology, 
one will have to proceed with an indirect argument, by retracing the evolution of 
phonology itself and proceeding then to a comparative exercise between its evolution 
and the principles of formalism. Indeed, as I have just mentioned, it is not possible to 
present phonology as a direct emanation of formalist thinking. The best one can do, 
and which, in my opinion is enough, since my point is not to defend the idea of a 
causal evolution, but rather highlight the plausibility of a conceptual development, is 
to underline how it relates to formalist aesthetic ideas, and differs from other standard 
conceptions of structuralism, especially Saussure. 
 
In effect, one of the biggest problems in defending the originality of Jakobson‟s 
phonology is with regard to his position vis-à-vis those of Saussure. As was the case 
with Jakobson‟s functional model, the lack of coherence of the “formalist linguistics” 
means that the biggest influence on his conceptions of phonological structure, 
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opposition, etc. have been traced back to Saussure. The fundamental assumption of 
my hypothesis on the particular concrete expressivity of Jakobson‟s conception of 
language and the phoneme, though is precisely that it is not abstractly Saussurean, 
but formalist. Now, for obvious methodological and thematic reasons, I will not 
venture here to offer a full-blown history of phonology. My ambition here is only to 
quickly re-contextualise the circumstances that presided to phonology‟s rise in order 
to distance it from traditional interpretations that rely to heavily on a saussurean 
perspective, and then to highlight a number of conceptions of the phoneme, which 
point both to the originality of Jakobson‟s conception, and its ties with the logic of 
Russian Formalism‟ aesthetics.  
In order to make my point in the most convincing possible way, it is useful to start 
here by recalling a number of conventional wisdoms about the history of structural 
phonology.117 The first of these is that the Prague Circle is universally recognised as 
having given birth to structural phonology. The Russians contributions at the 
conference in The Hague in 1928 and Trubeckoj's Grundzüge der Phonologie are 
acknowledged as the "manifestos" of the discipline. Secondly, the structural 
phonology of Prague – as Prague structuralism in its entirety and all the other 
influential structuralist schools (Copenhagen, Paris, etc.) – is generally presented as 
being fundamentally influenced by Saussure and the Geneva School of linguistics. 
Some suggestions are that the Prague linguists were the first to apply Saussure's 
general and abstract principles to a concrete field of linguistics (Fontaine, 1974). 
Others, such as Steiner's is that "the work of F. de Saussure was one of the 
fundamental sources of inspiration of the Prague Linguistic Circle, and the 
saussurean idea which influenced it most was the concept of "langue" (Steiner, 1978, 
p.357). Thirdly, it is assumed that the fundamental methodological decisions taken by 
Trubeckoj in the Grundzüge, is to ground the distinction between phonetics and 
phonology and the Saussurean opposition between langue and parole (Trubeckoj, 
1986, p.4). 
This third conventional wisdom, which is obviously confirmed by Trubeckoj's own 
statement, and serves so to speak as a confirmation for the two other assumptions 
about Prague phonology, is of course particularly embarrassing in view of defending 
the idea that the Prague conception of the phoneme owes in fact much to the 
                                                 
117
 On all these point, see also Sériot (1999) 
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formalist idea of the perceptibility of form. In effect, especially if it is based on the 
Saussurean distinction between langue and parole, and then situated on the side of 
langue, the phoneme and phonology appear as abstract objects and discipline. As 
such, it is an "object of knowledge", which results of an ideal "system of relations" 
and is opposed to the "real" object of parole, far removed from the material conditions 
of its production and reception, from its "palpable" and concretely expressive 
dimension. In other words, if one is to accept this saussurean characterisation of the 
phoneme and phonology as disciplines of langue, one must also renounce to 
investigate the phoneme as a phenomenological object, as the "palpable" concrete 
sign realising the union of sound and sense. One has to understand it as an abstract, 
analytical object, useful only to the linguistic analysis. 
Now, as Patrick Sériot has pointedly highlighted, Trubeckoj's reference to Saussure, 
although it is very explicit and comes in the "bible" of phonology, namely the 
Grundzüge, is in fact the only time Trubeckoj's refers to Saussure in such positive 
terms (Sériot, 1999, p.235). Sériot thus points to the "palimpsest" nature of 
Trubeckoj's texts and the presence of many more influences on Trubeckoj's ideas, 
which are in turn very different from those of Saussure. These sources connected 
with the German Romantic "organicist" thought, and the Russian "Eurasist" theory 
point to a totally different conceptual universe, which is, as I pointed out in the 
introduction, ontologically oriented, and considers therefore the phoneme as a "real" 
object, and not only as a linguistic abstraction. What is more, Sériot insists on the fact 
that the idea of "structure" itself, which is apparently so important for the Prague 
structuralists and has an allegedly Saussurean origin, emerges in their theories in a 
totally difference way, through the interplay of the idea of "totality" and that of 
“organism”. 
I will not repeat Sériot‟s argument here, although it is obviously extremely helpful with 
respect to my attempt to present Jakobson‟s concept of the phoneme as a concrete 
object (rather than a linguistic abstraction). More modestly, I will simply further 
underline the “ontological” problem raised by the phoneme by recalling that the 
beginnings of phonology are linked with a crisis in another, closely linked discipline, 
phonetics. The origin of this crisis was the advent of experimental phonetics and its 
endeavour to measure and describe the sounds of language with mechanical, 
instrumental precision. As a matter of fact, it fulfilled its objective with great success 
and effectiveness, but this very success produced a paradoxical result: most of the 
- 137 - 
 
precise acoustic and physiological information thus obtained did not have any 
linguistic relevance. Indeed, by focusing on the detail acoustic and physiological 
properties of sound, the experimental phoneticians all but lost sight of their object of 
inquiry, human speech, in an overflow of data they were incapable of interpreting 
linguistically. In reaction to this, "the basic idea of phonology [was] to oppose a 
limited number of sound-values (Lautwerten) to the quite unfathomable amount of 
produced and hearable sounds" (Häusler, 1976, p.19). In other words, the founding 
task of phonology was to find a way to isolate and define the linguistically relevant 
elements of sound. It had to redefine an object that had been lost in the opaque 
mass of data collected by experimental phonetics. That object, of course, would be 
the phoneme, a concept which appears with Baudouin de Courtenay.  
Now, from the very manner in which phonology comes into being, one can see that 
this new object, the phoneme, promised to be quite problematic. Jakobson himself 
thus volunteers: “Kaum finden wir in der Lautlehre, ja sogar in der ganzen 
Sprachtheorie des vergangenen Jahrzehntes, einen Begriff über welchen mehr 
gestritten wurde als über das PHONEM.“  (Jakobson, 1971, p.281). On the one hand, 
it couldn't be a purely empirical, acoustic phenomenon, as had just been shown by 
the failure of experimental phonetics to isolate the linguistically relevant features of 
sound at the acoustic or physiological level. On the other hand, it should not be a 
pure abstraction, since it was supposed to designate sound-units someone can 
actually hear (and recognize) or articulate (and reproduce). From an epistemological 
or even ontological point of view, the phoneme is thus a very delicate notion as it 
apparently oscillates between an abstract or ideal linguistic form and a concrete, 
phonetic substance. 
To illustrate the acuity of this problem and the varying solutions that different linguists  
sought to bring to it, I now will quickly mention a few concrete examples and their 
evolution in the Russian context – without, I again insist – postulating too much of a 
“genetic” or “causal” link between these different ideas, since although such links 
probably do exist, they are still contested by linguists and historian of linguistics, and 
that such considerations would bring me too far onto the terrain of linguistics itself. 
My only goal, I also repeat again, is to underline the non-saussurean, clearly distinct 
from the dual “langue” and “parole” or phonological and phonetic solution aspect of 
the phoneme, in order to point to the originality, or rather, the original consequences 
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of Jakobson‟s solution and its correlation with the aesthetic idea of the expressive 
perceptibility of form suggested by the formalists. 
The first definition of the phoneme is due to Baudouin de Courtenay and more 
generally the Kazan School (cf Kramsky, 1974, p.23). To be precise, one should say 
they gave the phoneme several definitions, moving from a morpho-etymological 
perspective to the later and better known psycho-phonetic interpretation. For 
Baudouin de Courtenay, in this last conception, a phoneme is "the psychical 
equivalent [or image] of a speech sound (Sprachlaut)" (Baudouin de Courtenay, 
1895, p.9). A telling aspect of this definition is that it wrenches the phoneme away 
from the empirical conception that made it an object of the natural sciences. This was 
an important objective for Baudouin de Courtenay, and as we have seen, was 
significant in the rise of phonology. As a result of this need to detach the phoneme 
from its empirical, positivist framework, Baudouin de Courtenay's definition also tries 
to answer the question of the mode of existence or nature of the phoneme, and does 
not treat it only through its linguistic function. One sees that it answers the 
form/substance conundrum through a dualistic solution, by opposing the psychic to 
the physical, despite the fact that for Baudouin de Courtenay, the physical and the 
psychical connect in the sound aspect of language (Häusler, 1976, p.95): indeed, the 
modality of this connection is equivalence or image, not an inherent imbrication. 
Baudouin de Courtenay's psycho-phonetic conception of the phoneme was taken up 
by his students, Ščerba and Polivanov, as well as by Trubeckoj. The two first-named 
scholars worked within the mould of Baudouin de Courtenay's conception, and 
continued to defend his interpretation of the phoneme as being a psychic 
representation or image. Polivanov in particular, however, tended to limit the impact 
of psychology in his considerations, and provide a methodologically reduced account 
of the phoneme as a linguistic phenomenon. Polivanov was thus the first to suggest a 
systematic theory of phonetic evolution (Leontev, 1983), yielding such important 
concepts as phonetic divergence and convergence (taken up later by Jakobson); he 
also described the two basic rules or constraints influencing that evolution, namely 
the articulatory “laziness” of speakers and the minimum requirements for 
communication. 
Trubeckoj, whilste also starting from Baudouin de Courtenay's conception distanced 
himself from Baudouin de Courtenay even more, and, along with Jakobson, criticised 
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his psychological argumentation as a way of shipping over to another discipline 
problems that should be treated linguistically (Kramsky, 1974, p.40-41). In fact, both 
Jakobson and Trubeckoj were suspicious of definitions more concerned with the 
nature of the phoneme than with its linguistic functions. Trubeckoj solution, in a 
reduction move quite typical of the Russian Formalists, was therefore to proceed to 
provide a definition which considered and defined the phoneme only in terms of its 
functions within a linguistic system. Thus, Trubeckoj's mature definition of the 
phoneme is wholly functional: "The smallest phonetic unit in a language that is 
capable of conveying a distinction in meaning" (Trubeckoj, 1939, p.12). As 
mentionned, it would thus seem that the phoneme, in Trubeckoj's conception, is a 
linguistical abstraction; it is not identical with an actual sound, but only with its 
phonologically relevant properties. A phoneme cannot be "spoken", but has to be 
"realised" through a speech sounds, the properties of which are determined by 
phonetics, not phonology. Phonology and phonetics, as has already been pointed 
out, are furthermore two totally different disciplines in the eye of Trubeckoj. In 
consequence, there is here a clear gap between phonological "form" and phonetic 
"substance". 
Whatever the true state of the opposition between phonology and phonetic in 
Trubeckoj‟s theory – if one believes Sériot, the answer to that question much more 
complex than the limpid saussurean opposition between langue and parole seems to 
allow – his model was given another important twist by Jakobson. Jakobson's 
conception of the phoneme, indeed, attempts to bring phonetic elements back into 
the phonological theory. He sets off from Trubeckoj's conception, defining the 
phoneme as the smallest oppositive unit in a language system. But he then goes on 
to break the phoneme down into smaller constituents, its "distinctive features", that is, 
specific acoustic or articulatory properties of sounds, structured in binary oppositions 
(voiced/voiceless, grave/acute, sharp/non-sharp, compact/diffuse, etc.). A phoneme, 
in Jakobson‟s definition, is thus a hierarchy of phonetically distinctive features – 
every phoneme distinguishing itself from the others through at least one distinctive 
feature.  
Now, there is obviously much to say about Jakobson's conception of the phoneme as 
a hierarchy of distinctive traits, which remains, one should add, a highly influential 
and accepted idea to this day. From the perspective of the status of the phoneme, 
one could argue that the phoneme as Jakobson defines it is an even more 
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linguistically abstract object, as it is itself composed of units, the nature of which is 
unclear. Indeed, the distinctive features themselves are not objective empirical 
elements; they also imply an abstraction, an "ideal" linguistic carving out of the 
phonetic properties of sound. In effect, Jakobson firmly situates his analysis at an 
abstract structural level, as evidenced by the neat conceptual formality of the idea of 
"binarism". Jakobson, however, does not claim that we actually hear the distinctive 
features themselves. To be honest, he leaves the question of how the distinctive 
features combine to form the phoneme one actually hears and articulates in real 
speech is left undecided.  
To summarise, the basic problem which we see both phonetics and phonology 
struggling with is the question of the meaningful segmentation of the sound 
continuum: discrete entities need to be isolated in order to proceed with a linguistic 
analysis. As our brief overview of the most important early conceptions of the 
phoneme has made clear, there is no obvious solution to how this cutting up of the 
linguistic reality should be done, or what makes it actually possible. Phonetics could 
not accomplish this task at a purely empirical, objective level, which underlined the 
need for a phonological approach. But similarly, phonology proves incapable of 
finding a clear object, and has to rely on a phonetic analysis (the distinctive features 
of Jakobson are the product of a phonetic analysis): we see therefore a close 
interaction between the disciplines, apparently to produce a bipolar object, both form 
and substance. Up to now, however, far from giving birth to such a concept, both 
phonetics and phonology in effect have produced a series of abstract concepts, all of 
which, one should add, present significant drawbacks – significant enough to 
question the ultimate validity of the objects they describe, even today. 
 
Turning from the pure questions of phonology as a linguistic discipline to considering 
the problems it raises in a broader epistemological, philosophical perspective, one 
can observe a general trend from this short overview: linguistics and phonology 
progressively vindicate their status vis-à-vis the natural sciences but with that 
methodological security comes a weakening of the concern for the epistemological 
foundations of the phoneme. Whereas Baudouin de Courtenay felt the need to 
clearly statute on the non-natural-empirical status of the phoneme, Trubeckoj and 
Jakobson mostly dispense with such considerations, considering them as non-
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specifically linguistic. One notices here a Saussurean-Husserlian move, towards 
bracketing out the empirical. Attention is concentrated on the functional properties: 
any statement on the phoneme (such as its constitution from distinctive features) is 
made from a structural analysis of its "behaviour" within language, not from a priori 
considerations of the function of the mind or perception.  
In short, one works from within the strong linguistic framework that structuralism has 
helped to establish and now provides. This trend is confirmed if one takes a look at 
generative phonology, which adopts the idea of distinctive features and goes on to 
develop a very formal theory of how syntactical deep structures are "transformed" 
into phonetic surface series. The interest of generative phonology has shifted 
completely away from the nature of the phoneme as an indefinite object oscillating 
between form and substance, to consider only its formal properties (based on an 
abstract phonetic interpretation) and their linguistic functions. 
It is undeniable, though, that the phoneme as an object raises an epistemological 
problem, it highlights a "special" mode of reality – which linguistics, by retreating into 
its own bounds, leaves unanswered. It is one thing to analyse structurally "distinctive 
features" and phonemes, or in other words, to state that sound has a certain number 
of phonetic features which can function so as to form a linguistic system and then to 
modelise more or less successfully, precisely and exactly how this functions: it is 
another to explain the general epistemological framework in which such a relation to 
reality (which is undeniable, since language exists) is actually possible. Now, from a 
linguistic perspective, this neglect of epistemological questions cannot be considered 
as a considerable tar: after all, it is not the subject of linguistics to study such things. 
As we can see however with the generative grammarians‟ forays into the field, and 
their tries at answer in mentalist, psychological, epistemological terms the dualism 
their linguistic analysis has thrown up, such questions cannot be completely allayed. 
The trend against the abstract formalism of classical generative theory, and the need 
to understand the "natural" processes does show however, that such questions 
should not be kept too far away from the field of linguistics. In all this, one has to see 
a weakness of the structuralist paradigm, which too comfortably evacuates such 
concerns.  
Now, if one compares this perspective to the outlook of formalist aesthetics, one 
seems to be promised to a disappointment: one finds no obvious trace of the  ideas 
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of the perceptibility of form or the concrete expressivity of language in the 
developments of phonology. A closer look at Jakobson‟s idea of the phoneme as 
hierarchy of distinctive traits, however, reveals that a functional, structural analysis of 
the phoneme might not be fated to “abstractness” after all. True, the distinctive traits 
might be considered as abstract elements, isolated intellectually through analysis. 
The important point  of Jakobson‟s conception, however, is that it is indeed the 
phoneme one hears, and not the distinctive traits. In that sense, Jakobson seems to 
imply that the phoneme is a Gestalt, a whole constituted over its part, a concrete 
acoustic form, whose meaning derives from its pure articulation as a perceptual 
whole. In that sense, he does seem to suggest that phonological form devices or is 
produced by a phonetic substance, thus presenting the phoneme as a concrete, 
expressive form. What is more, this also seems to imply that the perceived object 
does not have to correspond perfectly to its “intellectual” form, it does not have to be 
perceived as such as a hierarchy, as a pure “signal”. Durand puts it as follows: 
« L'analyse est la suivante: le signal "brut" n'est pas un objet linguistique. Dès lors 
que nous nous intéressons au langage, tout signal est un signal interprété. Nous 
n'entendons pas un signal, mais du langage. » (in Nguyen, 2005, p.191). 
To confirm this analysis, one can mention the importance in phonology of the ideas 
of external and communicative constraints. These ideas are based on the following 
observation : « Clearly, languages somehow monitor the development of their 
phonologies, and check segments and inventories off against two very general 
guidelines : « Don‟t make things difficult for the speaker » and « Don‟t make things 
difficult for the listener ». That is, the best systems are those in which contrasts are 
maximally distinct with the least amount of articulatory effort. The reasons for specific 
statistical tendencies may therefore be either articulatory or perceptual” 
(Gussenhoven, xxxx, p.30). In other words, the principle of phonology is not to 
produce pure objects or signal, but to instate as clear a difference as possible (with 
the least effort) between acoustic signals in order for it to produce meaning, and be 
expressive 
Now, if one thus accepts that the « distinctive trait » is, as such, an abstract notion 
resulting from analysis, but the phoneme which its constitutes is a 
« phenomenological » one, or in other words, that the phoneme is indeed perceived 
as « language », i.e. as something meaningful, then one does seem to have an 
interest object on our hands. Indeed, the analysis reveals that on the hand, the 
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phoneme owes its existence or meaningful mode to the fact that it corresponds to a 
specific structuration of an acoustic given. Although the notion of distinctive trait 
might itself be an ideal abstraction, it certainly highlights the fact, however, that the 
phoneme relies on such a structuration of its acoustic substance. What is more, on 
the other hand, this structuration cannot be said to be purely empirical: it results from 
the capacity of a listener to isolate and differentiate the acoustic substrate of the 
phoneme. As is well known, indeed, different listeners from different linguistic 
backgrounds will interpret a phoneme differently. 
As I am well aware, my considerations here have only touched the surface of the 
intriguing and unresolved problems of phonology and phonetics. I have not even 
provided a convincing or satisfying account of Jakobson‟s concept of the phoneme 
and all its implications. The fact of the matter, however, is that Jakobson himself 
does not provide these details, and that one would now have to tread down a 
speculative road when trying to assess his philosophical conception of the phoneme. 
In any case, my point here has been to show but two things: firstly, to highlight the 
proximity and continuity of Jakobson‟s phonology with his work in poetics. Secondly, 
to hint at the fact, that a good explanation to his concept might be the 
phenomenological road, a road which has not been explored by specialised linguists 
and phonologists. Indeed, the new development in phonology, since more or less 
Chomsky and Halle‟s The Phonological System of English, have been oriented 
towards the cognitive sciences and neglected the “naturalistic” or phenomenological 
aspect of the phoneme. In that sense, it is better to move back to the context of the 
1920-30s, and question Jakobson‟s phonological work more in the context of its 
production, and in relation to the question of the palpability of form, etc. and to check 
what kind of philosophical model were available at the time, and might therefore 
provide further fodder for an analysis of the phoneme as the emblem of the idea of 
“concrete form”. 




Meaning and Presence: Husserl, Derrida, Špet, Merleau-Ponty 
 
Inasmuch as Jakobson‟s notion of the phoneme can be said to provide a rigorous 
conceptualisation of the idea of intransitively expressive perceptual structure initially 
suggested in Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement, it remains to be shown whether the 
phoneme‟s concrete-formal features possess any generality beyond the particular 
case of language and its phonological system, and thus can truthfully characterise 
perception as a whole. Starting from Tynjanov‟s theory of verse through Jakobson‟s 
concept of “poetic function” to the ideas of distinctive features and the phoneme 
itself, we have certainly observed a progressive reduction of the scope of the 
Russian formalists‟ theories to the field of language, then linguistics, then phonology. 
As such, we have definitely moved away from the ambitious structural theory of 
perception which remains necessary to justify the aesthetic vision formulated by 
Šklovskij in his earliest texts. The last step to take now in order to demonstrate the 
conceptual value and applicability of the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic intuitions, is 
therefore to show that one can generalise the perceptual attributes of the phoneme 
back into a genuinely philosophical framework. 
An obvious difficulty with this last step is that – in contrast to what has been the case 
up to now – one cannot take support on the Russian formalists‟ work to justify it. For 
instance, one finds no word in Jakobson‟s work to the effect that the qualities of the 
phoneme have larger implications beyond phonology, or that the idea of the 
expressive palpability of the linguistic sign might extend beyond language. Neither he 
nor any of his colleagues offered further philosophical ideas in relation to it, or to its 
philosophical significance and indeed, explicitly refused to explore that path. By all 
accounts, Jakobson's phonology and the idea of the distinctive features constitute the 
most mature and systematic conceptual point of development reached by the 
Russian formalists' considerations on the notions of form and perception.118  
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 This does not mean, obviously, that the phoneme represents the acme of Russian 
formalism thinking as a whole, much a less a synthesis of all its ideas. There are many aspects 
of Russian formalism that are totally alien to the problems of phonology. 
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Jakobson‟s lack of interest for the implications of his concept of the phoneme does 
not mean, of course, that a philosophical analysis of his notion is not possible. In 
some ways, the notion even requires such an analysis, as one needs to justify 
philosophically the possibility of the existence of such a strange object or 
phenomenon. We also saw earlier on that a definite philosophical background is 
implicit in Jakobson‟s consideration on the phoneme, and that it is that background 
which, to a certain extent, underpins his conception of language and phonology. 
Because the jump to a full blown interpretation of the philosophical element of the 
phoneme, of poetics or linguistics was never attempted by Jakobson or any other 
formalist or Prague structuralist, however, one needs now to leave the historical 
terrain of the Russian formalist theories and their evolution and set them, as Russian 
formalism itself never did, in the context of philosophy and the general problems of 
meaning and perception, raised either specifically by the phoneme or by questions of 
language more generally. 
The methodological decision to set the Russian formalists theories and their 
phonological heritage squarely in a philosophical perspective, although not 
uncontroversial, is facilitated, even justified, by two states of affairs. Firstly, and more 
circumstantially, one can mention that Jakobson in particular entertained rather close 
ties with Gustav Špet. As mentioned already, Špet‟s phenomenology of language is 
often cited as one of Jakobson‟s most important sources of inspiration (Dennes, 
1999; Haardt, 1993; Hansen-Löve, 1978, p.183). Without even having to explore the 
historical ties between Jakobson and Špet particularly attentively, this means then 
that one can turn to Špet‟s work as a first point of reference in order to situate the 
philosophical scope and assess the viability of Jakobson‟s conception of the 
phoneme and of language more generally. 
The second reason facilitating the philosophical contextualisation of the Russian 
formalists‟ ideas on language is that they fit interestingly, or rather, raise issues that 
are highly relevant to some of the key problems of phenomenology. To recall, I made 
the point in Chapter 1, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 that there exists a number of 
convergences and personal proximities between the formalists and phenomenology. 
In particular, the affinities of Jakobson with Husserl have been mentioned. In 
connection to Husserl, of course, one encountered a number of problems, which 
spoke against a too strong assimilation of formalist ideas to his brand of 
phenomenology. This was particularly the case of the early, radical formalist ideas of 
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Šklovskij, whose empiricist, vitalist and atomism could not be squared with Husserl‟s 
systematic, idealistic phenomenology. We also discovered though that even 
Jakobson‟s more mature and systematic idea of language and expression did not 
concord with those of Husserl (especially the Husserl of the Logische 
Untersuchungen) on several important point (sense-bestowing through language 
rather than consciousness, meaning through concrete expression rather than 
intuition, etc.) – which we saw explained the resulting antagonism between 
structuralism and phenomenology after the war and the questions of the subject, the 
structure of meaning, etc.  
The discrepancies with Husserlian phenomenology, however, should be considered 
more as an opportunity than a problem. Indeed, because it obviously contributes 
original concepts with regard to language, expression and their relation to perception, 
Jakobson‟s structuralism offers the prospect of casting a interesting light on what can 
be considered as blank spots in Husserl‟s phenomenology. This is especially true for 
two reasons. Firstly, because the problem of sense-bestowing capacity of 
consciousness and its relation with the originarity of perception as a source of 
knowledge, as Derrida‟s pointed critique of Husserl in “La Voix et le phénomène” has 
long revealed, is one of the crucial issues or rather problems of Husserlian 
phenomenology. Secondly, because the work of Gustav Špet, to whom Jakobson 
was so close, offers insights precisely in that respect, and precisely in the sense of 
Jakobson‟s conception of the phoneme as a concrete, expressive sign. 
 
In philosophical terms, one could say that problem involved by Jakobson‟s notion of 
the phoneme, in essence, is that of meaningful presence. In other words, it is to 
explain how an object can be adequately given phenomenally not, as the tradition of 
Western metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology understand, not as a fullness, 
as fully present, but as a partial, signifying structure. According to Jakobson‟s 
definition of the phoneme, indeed, on the one hand, we have an adequate perception 
of it, and it is therefore “present” to consciousness as an objective, intentional and 
meaningful content. On the other hand, though, because it is necessarily given as an 
expressive structure – which moreover, relies on a wider horizon or system that is not 
given in the perceptive act – it also remains incomplete, it is never experienced 
“totally” so to speak, or rather, it does not exist on the mode that one associates with 
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objects, as “lawful fullness”:119 the phoneme owes its presence to an act of synthetic 
sense-bestowing and differentiation in a systematic horizon. If one is to justify the 
existence of such a meaningfully present object, one must thus give an account of its 
mode of presence as a sign. 
As these brief remarks already make quite clear, a philosophical grounding of the 
phoneme as an object understood as a concrete sign – and the generalisation of this 
semiotic, expressive status to objective reality or perception as whole – must involve 
a thorough epistemological and ontological investigation. In effect, what one requires 
here is a model that can explain how a meaning can be expressed and experienced 
concretely, as the pure articulation and differentiation of a “physical”, “material” or 
“sensible” given. By all means, it involves crucial issues of meaning and perception, 
which are at the heart of philosophy. To convince oneself of this, and to outline in 
slightly more detail the problems involved here, it is useful to turn back to Husserl 
and the problem of presence and meaning in his phenomenology, such as it is 
uncovered by Derrida. Indeed, the perspective that an account of the phoneme as a 
concrete, expressive sign is possible, indeed reasonable, is corroborated by the fact 
that, as I have just mentioned, it is the point where Derrida attacks Husserl‟s account 
of phenomenology.  
According to Derrida, indeed, one of the seminal acts of Husserl‟s phenomenology, 
which Husserl makes in the first of his Logical Researches, is to distinguish between 
two types of signs (Zeichen): the indication (Anzeichen) and the expression 
(Ausdruck). The notion of expression (Ausdruck) is at the centre of the First Logical 
Research. It is defined there by Husserl as a sign (Zeichen) possessing a 
signification (Bedeutung), or expressing a meaning (Sinn). The expression is distinct 
from the indication (Anzeichen), which is a sign that refers in an unmotivated or 
unfounded way to something. Kristensen comments as follows: "L'expression 
désigne la dimension signifiante du langage, à savoir le fait que l‟acte de signification 
possède un rapport interne avec l‟objet qu‟il vise, par contraste avec la notion 
d‟indication dans laquelle le rapport à l‟objet est accidentel" (Kristensen, 2010, p.13). 
This apparently benign distinction, according to Derrida, "commande rigoureusement 
toutes les analyses ultérieures" and therefore constitutes an essential element of the 
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 This is my ungainly translation for the common French expression « plénitude de droit », 
which signifies the concept that the object is ideally conceived as being a full entitity in its 
own right, or rather, of necessity. 
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philosophical edifice of the Logical Researches (Derrida, 1967, p.2). Much more, 
Derrida also argues that the whole fate of husserlian phenomenology is at play on 
this question. The distinction between expression and indication has the 
consequence, indeed, of neutralising the role of language as layer of signification, 
and to legitimise Husserl‟s fundamental idea, namely, that the full and originary 
intuitions of consciousness give and presentify us the world in its meaning, thereby 
building an adequate intuitive and perceptive ground (Boden), which functions as the 
source of right for understanding. 
Husserl makes the point that expression and indication are mixed in our acts of 
communication. For example, in language as an inter-subjective event, any 
expressive sign is also indicative, and all expression is mediated by an indication. In 
other words, the linguistic sign does not express its meaning directly, but through an 
indicative reference to a signification. By contrast, in what Husserl terms “the solitary 
life of the soul” (das einsame Seelenleben), expression can appear in isolation, 
independently of any mediating indication. In other words, Husserl assumes the 
possibility of a “language of consciousness”, in which meaning and signification are 
present immediately, i.e. without the mediation of an indication, in a subjective act of 
pure expression, so to say of consciousness to itself. This means that language as a 
concrete act of communication, which is different from pure expression only through 
the layer of indication (which is itself neutral in relation to meaning), is an 
unproductive layer and does not modify signification whatsoever. Much more, it 
would appear that expression itself is neutral with regard to signification. Indeed, 
Husserl presumes that there are ideal significations (Bedeutungen), which are 
“expressed” and can be descriptively isolated in what in calls sense-bestowing acts 
(sinngebender Akt) of subjective consciousness – but which are not affected by their 
concrete expression in these acts. 
Without going here into the complex details of Husserl‟s analysis of this problem in 
the Logical Researchs, one can summarise – as I mentioned earlier on – that for 
Husserl language and expression are but the vehicle of a logical meaning that is 
already formed and given.120 This meaning, somewhat paradoxical, is actualised in 
intentional acts of the subject, it results from a meaning-intention (meinen) and a 
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 Cf, Kristensen, 2010, p.20: "les mots expriment fidèlement le sens noématique pur, ils ne 
font que refléter ce sens ou en portent l’empreinte selon une « conceptualité préexistante » 
(Derrida 1971, p. 196)." 
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donation for and by the subjective consciousness. In other words, the crucial moment 
of the experience of meaning happens through the sense-bestowing act of the 
subject, which realises the ideal significations, or rather, experiences them 
intentionally. In order to make sense, this theory must presuppose a homological 
relation or a strict correlation between expression, signification and the intentional 
object: the meaning instituted by the intentional act of the subject is also that of the 
object, as it is perceived noematically. Similarly, this meaning can be expressed 
descriptively, without modification, originary: "Indem die Beschreibung die 
ursprüngliche Gegenbenheit des Beschriebenen vermittelt, ist sie selbst ursprünglich. 
Beschreibung und Gegenstand fallen zusammen." (Husserl, 1980, p.106) 
The Derridian critique of this Husserlian conception of the presence of the meaningful 
object immediately to consciousness is to question the neutrality of the layer of 
language, and the hypotheses that in the solitary life of the soul, language is indeed 
heard as pure expression. Without going into the detail of Derrida‟s analysis, one can 
mention that he puts forward the idea of the “voice”, namely of a “inner language of 
consciousness”, which he finds, does institute a difference between the meaning 
given to an object, and its perception (Derrida, [1967] 2003). According to Derrida, 
the experience of consciousness is not a pure, adequate intuition, capable of 
grasping the meaning of the object, but is mediated through the voice, which needs 
to reflect and re-articulate the meaning of that object. In that sense, the object is 
never given originally and intuitively as a fullness to consciousness, but is always 
“differed” (difference) by the meanings it is given through the “voice”, or in other 
words, through its mediation through language. The ultimate and famous 
consequence of this linguistic critique of the phenomenology of consciousness is 
thus that objects are in fact never perceived, never given or “present”, but always 
mediatised through meanings that are not theirs entirely: as in Kant, a “noumenal”, 
hard object remains unreachable to consciousness, hidden behind its meaningful, 
phenomenal appearance and linguistic or meaningful articulation to consciousness 
as a given something. In short, there is no meaningful presence to Derrida. 
 
The Derridian critique of Husserl‟s notion of expression, I believe is fundamentally 
correct and justified, and throws much light on the very problematic relation between 
meaning and presence (or in more classical terms, between intelligible and sensible, 
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form and matter, etc.). Its sceptic conclusions, however, are not warranted. There are 
indeed very different possibilities to answer the problem of the deficit of presence 
implied in the fact that we perceive objects as expressive signs, rather than as fully 
given entities. One very different answer to the quandary faced by Husserl (next to 
the development of Husserl himself in his more mature works, which brought him to 
bring much more subtle and nuanced answers, but still always remaining indebted to 
his “principle of principles”) is brought by Gustav Špet. 
As Špet is a much less well-known figure than the Russian formalists (although 
interest in his work has been growing in recent years, much as with the rest of the 
Soviet thought of the 1920-30s), a few words of biographical introduction are required 
here. Gustav Špet was a Russian philosopher, student of Husserl, who is credited 
with having introduced the work of his master to Russia, and having laid foundations 
for Soviet semiotics. His early work is a clearly phenomenological inspiration, but he 
soon veered to a more hermeneutical orientation, distancing himself from Husserl 
whilst keeping the basic discoveries as to the structure of expression he made in his 
earlier works (cf. Dennes). His work was also strongly influenced by the thought of 
Humboldt (which much more than Saussure, account for the “structuralist” orientation 
of his thought, for instance through key concepts such as the “internal form”) and 
unsurprisingly given the context he worked in: Hegel. One of his key interests, next to 
the problems of language which constituted his central interest, were matters of 
aesthetics. Rather than to the Cubo-futurists, though, he was closer to the Symbolist 
and Acmeist traditions. During the 1930s, he was targeted in Stalin‟s purges, was 
arrested and executed in Tomsk in 1938. His work was almost completely forgotten 
until the 1960s, when it enjoyed a first, limited revival (through the Soviet semiotists), 
and has picked up speed and importance in more recent years. 
Špet's work fits in mainly for two reasons within the movement towards the 
philosophical understanding of perceptual sense sketched out here. On the one 
hand, one of his central themes is the sense of concretely lived experience, a 
problem which appears to be similar to that of the perceptual sense. In Appearance 
and Sense, Špet tries to describe in a unifying way the structure, both intelligible and 
sensible, of our relation to the world. He does not, however, concern himself directly 
with the problem of perceptual sense, but rather of "the logic of the constitution of the 
historical and cultural world" (Dennes, 2006b, 177). What interests him is the world 
given as a lived horizon of sense. The problem of perceptual sense is thus implicated 
- 151 - 
 
in his thought, but only secondarily. On the other hand, Špet was a key interlocutor of 
Jakobson; he influenced, for example, the latter's reception of Husserl's work. Špet 
thus fulfils a historical role as provider of philosophical foundations to the Prague 
Structuralists. In this regard, one could expect to find in Špet further clues on the 
philosophical implications of Jakobson's theory, and in particular, on the source of its 
weakness pertaining to perceptual sense. 
Špet's reflexion on the sense of the concrete given starts with a critique of the very 
important Husserlian notion of sense-bestowing (Sinngebung) by an intentional 
consciousness. According to Špet, Husserl does not provide in Ideen..I any 
justification for this faculty of consciousness (Haardt, 1993, 100ss). Since, to his 
eyes, it is impossible to consider this faculty as the pure power of a transcendental 
subjective consciousness without falling into the error of Kantian idealism, he has to 
look for the source of that sense somewhere else, in experience itself. Špet sees this 
source in the existence of an "intelligible intuition", in other words, a third type of 
intuition, which grasps what Špet calls the "entelechy" of the object, its "internal 
sense", thanks to which the object constitutes itself concretely for consciousness, in 
the meaningful unity of its multiple appearances. 
Along with this idea of an intelligible intuition and its correlate of "internal sense" or 
entelechy, Špet also postulates that some objects, in order to be perceived 
adequately, require to be intended and grasped as "signs". In certain passages of 
Appearance and Sense, Špet goes as far as to say that all objects are given also and 
foremost as signs. The intentional consciousness is thus always placed in a horizon 
of concrete sense, originarily given by the intelligible intuition. In other terms, Špet 
postulates here a true logic of experience itself. We seem here very near to Merleau-
Ponty's idea of a systematic intelligible articulation of the sensible world. But this 
analogy should be handled carefully. 
The "internal sense" is construed by Špet in Appearance and Sense teleologically 
and functionally, as is clear from his choice of the term "entelechy". Consequently, it 
is difficult for him to justify extending the intelligible intuition to objects that are not 
determined by any functional horizon, as for example, the objects of physics. What is 
the internal sense of these objects, what is their logical content? To answer these 
questions, one should have to postulate a teleology of the physical world, which is 
indeed a speculative and radical solution. Therefore, Špet hesitates with regard to 
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the extension of the intelligible intuition, and the hierarchy of the three intuitions – 
eidetic, empirical and intelligible – becomes problematic. 
Indeed, on the one hand, Špet considers the intelligible intuition to be the only 
originary intuition; the eidetic and empiric intuitions are derived, and in a certain 
sense, abstract. But this vision is endangered, as we have just seen, by his 
teleological conception of sense, which does not allow him to explain the sense of 
non-functional objects, in other words, of those objects that have a purely perceptual 
sense. On the other hand, Špet seems to suggest that all three intuitions are 
originary and provide a "layer" of the concrete experience, which is therefore 
adequately given when it is synthesised in an act which grasps them together. If one 
chooses this much less original interpretation, one is immediately taken back to the 
Husserlian problem of perceptual sense, since in this case, the physical object is 
given by the empirical intuition in the fullness of its determinations, non-mediated by 
any sign. We know that a Derridian sword of Damocles hangs over this conception. 
Špet, I think, favoured the idea that the intelligible intuition was the sole originary act. 
This idea underlies his later hermeneutical research and explains, in particular, his 
endeavour, in the narrower framework of his philosophy of language, to redefine his 
problematic teleological conception of "entelechy" through the Humboldtian concept 
of "internal form". With regard to this last concept, one should ask if its introduction 
allows Špet to dispel the dilemma, linked to perceptual sense, which his functional 
approach of sense brought about. Indeed, the "internal form" implies a structural 
conception of sense, as a relation between sensible exteriority and intelligible 
interiority, which can apply even to physical objects. In this interpretation, every 
object would possess "originarily a basic structure", (Spet, 1999, p.41) meaningful 
and concrete, given in the intelligible intuition or hermeneutical act. 
This perspective is promising but only hypothetical, as Špet applies his concept of 
internal form only to words, not to physical objects. It would, moreover, have a 
significant fault. Indeed, Špet conceives of the hermeneutical act as an adequate 
intuitive act, which grasps the object in the fullness of its determinations. However, 
this is contradictory, since the very recourse to an interpretation, the necessity of a 
hermeneutical act, implies by definition an incompleteness of sense, an lack of 
determinations. If the object is given originarily only through the prism of a 
meaningful structure, can it be given in its full presence? Is it not always also the sign 
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of something else, which, precisely, is not there, is given only derivatively, 
incompletely, inadequately? If, following Špet, who is fully confident in the "positivity" 
of his philosophy, we wish to construe the object as a fullness of determination, and 
the intelligible intuition of it as an adequateness, then it must seem that the 
hermeneutical act loses its ground, because it never can fully grasp the object, which 
is always, would say Derrida, deferred in its presence. In other terms, Špet seems 
very vulnerable to a sceptical and relativist critique. 
To summarize, Špet's position on the question of perceptual sense is ambivalent, it 
goes only half the way. On the one hand, he problematises the question of the lived 
sense, and opens up philosophical possibilities on the structural and concrete 
constitution of that sense – which were immediately applied by Jakobson to 
language, and taken up indirectly by Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, he does not 
criticise the metaphysical idea of the object as a fullness of determinations and 
therefore doesn't achieve a satisfying conception of perceptual sense, which, it 
should be reminded, interested him only indirectly. This last point is made particularly 
evident by the limitations of his hermeneutical thought. Indeed, he has a pre-
heideggerian take on hermeneutics and does not engage towards a hermeneutics of 
facticity (Faktizität). This lack of interest for the materiality of things is also evident in 
his aesthetics. Far from adopting the modernist ideas defended by the formalists, he 
goes back to a symbolist, "neo-classical" aesthetics. For him, the field of aesthetics is 
the domain of the sign, the symbol, the interplay between logical sense and 
expression, but not of the sensuous "matter". In this respect, he distances himself 
from the existential dimension of estrangement. 
In conclusion, insofar as Špet's thought is pre-heideggerian and pre-structuralist, his 
contribution to the philosophical understanding of perceptual sense should none the 
less be underlined here. The mere existence of his work stands as a confirmation 
and illustration of the historical development of that undertaking, in the shadow of 
structuralism. It suggests very clearly, that in order to shed more light on the question 
of perceptual sense, a double perspective, phenomenological and structural, is 
required. Moreover, Špet's role, because his work is situated at the intersection of 
both phenomenology and structuralism, is very important. This would appear even 
more clearly, if on top of the question of presence, to which we have devoted our 
attention here, one also put forward the importance of two other themes: the first, is 
the development of a structural and systemic understanding of sense and signs 
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within formalism (a conception very different from that of Saussure, since it produced 
a notion of "system" in which the terms do not simply possess an oppositive value, 
are not per se negative). The second is the development by Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty of an "aesthetical" conception of perception in the sense of the Greek 
aisthesis. The first point would reinforce the historical importance of Špet. The 
second would nuance it, but would help in understanding the complicated evolution 
towards a coherent conception of perceptual sense. 
 
These considerations on the complicated and endlessly discussed problem of 
meaning and presence clearly show that if one to give a successful, sceptical-proof 
foundation to the Russian formalists‟ conception of concrete, expressive form, one 
must engage into the territory of non-objective metaphysics. As we saw, Heidegger is 
the first to offer such a thing. He would seem obvious point of focus, and has been 
considered so by people interested in presence (Gumbrecht, Mersch). Rather than 
Heidegger, however, who in many aspects is too different from the Husserlian 
question of expressions and the possibilities offered by Jakobson and structuralism, I 
will now turn to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, whose critique of the 
Husserlian concept of perceptual noem, and Heideggerian turn towards a 
phenomenology of embodiment and existentialism, as well as his strong interest for 
language and the work of Saussure make him an evident choice here. 
As Kristensen puts it, for Merleau-Ponty, "l‟expression est un rapport entre les 
choses et non pas entre le mot et la chose. Les choses sont dans des rapports de 
renvois entre elles et me suggèrent ainsi leur sens en tant qu‟elles s‟offrent à moi, 
sujet agissant, comme objets d‟un usage possible. En bref, l‟expression est la 
propriété des choses en tant qu‟elles me suggèrent leur sens. Cet usage du terme 
est proche du concept leibnizien d‟expression et du concept heideggérien du "als" 
herméneutique". The decisive element of this definition of expression is the notion of 
the body. Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, the expressivity of things depend upon the 
motricial capacity of the body. He rejects the idea of pure intentional acts of 
consciousness, which can catch signification that exists “for themselves”, and 
replaces it with the idea of an operating intentionality of the body. Kristensen further 
remarks: "l‟analyse de la perception devient herméneutique sans que cela n‟entraîne 
la réduction du contenu perceptif à un contenu linguistique. Le signe perceptif est 
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purement sensible, livré aux organes du corps et son expressivité est liée 
intrinsèquement aux mouvements et modulations du champ phénoménal." (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945, p.131). 
In other words, what Merleau-Ponty suggests is a theory of expression which, on the 
one hand, takes into account its “material” dimension. As we have just seen, 
meaning is a function of the “modulation of the phenomenal field”. As such, his 
definition ist clearly compatible with the phenomenon of language as it is presented 
by Jakobson. Language “expresses” not by founding relations between things and 
words, but by the relations and articulations it creates between words themselves 
(considered here, as by Jakobson and the Russian formalists, as quasi-objects). On 
the other hand, the subject and the ground of experience are found again, since the 
“modulation of the phenomenal field” does not “induce its reduction to a linguistic 
content” which maintains a distance to the world, but corresponds to the lived-
experience itself. As such, subjectivity is understood as a “world inherence” 
(inhérence au monde); there is no pure affection of the matter of the world, which 
would then be doubled by a sovereign position by the affected subject. In that sense, 
one finds again the husserlian ambition of a presence of meaning (a 
phenomenology), whilst respecting Jakobson discovery of the structure of 
signification (and Derrida‟s criticisms). The step that needs to be taken in order to 
achieve this result, as I mentioned, is to criticise the hypostasis of the subject, 
conceived as transcendental to a constituted reality and to replace it by the idea of an 
“expressive” subject, engaged in the articulation of the concrete meaning of his own 
experience. 
 





On the evidence of the considerable difficulties that marred the development of early 
Soviet thought and prevented a fully adequate elucidation of many of its idiosyncratic 
and unusual aspects, I set out in this study to demonstrate that the philosophical 
implications and scope of the seminal aesthetic idea of the Russian formalists – 
namely, the principle of estrangement – have been either overlooked or 
underestimated. Contrary to the standard view, I volunteered, the principle of 
estrangement does not involve only a weak, vaguely psychological account of 
perception, tailored towards providing an ad hoc theoretical justification to the 
particular artistic and literary practices of the Russian modernists. Rather, it implies a 
compelling but insufficiently explored and unexploited philosophical vision of the 
nature of aesthetic experience (and indeed, of experience in general), which can 
provide theoretically solid foundations to the Russian formalists‟ insightful but 
tenuous and speculative assertions on the essence of art and literature. To recall, I 
suggested that “from the typically modernist and not uncommon assumption that 
perception can be an intrinsically aesthetic and “valuable” act in itself, Šklovskij‟s and 
the Russian formalists‟ theory of estrangement leads up to the ambitious and general 
thesis that perception functions as a kind of aisthesis, “an opening onto the world, a 
primal contact with it”, which happens as the intransitive onto-morphogenetic 
crystallisation of reality in a series of concrete, “materially” expressive forms or 
structures”. 
The first hurdle that needed to be cleared in order to ascertain the validity of my 
suggestion as to the unearthed philosophical scope and systematic potential of 
estrangement was of a methodological and historical nature. Notwithstanding the 
turmoil experienced by early Soviet thought in the late 1920s and beyond, I promptly 
had to admit that the work of the Russian formalists itself has in fact been both widely 
acknowledged and extensively criticised. Similarly, neither could I deny that its 
theoretical legacy has quite justifiably been deemed to contain very important 
weaknesses and limitations, which unquestionably renders it outdated in most 
respects. Since, to top it all, the Russian formalists themselves never managed, nor 
even attempted to produce a full-blown and consistent aesthetics (their only ambition 
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being to provide a theory of literature), it appeared that my proposed endeavour to 
present the Russian formalism‟s central tenet as the bearer of a potentially general 
and systematic but neglected philosophical vision of aesthetic experience might 
prove essentially futile and wrong-headed. 
My answer to these strong and valid objections was to point out that although a direct 
reassessment of Russian formalism might be neither warranted, useful nor possible, 
one could nevertheless fruitfully and legitimately extract a consistent interpretation of 
the principle of estrangement by reconsidering its conceptual links with structuralism. 
Since much of the Russian formalists‟ legacy was successfully recycled and 
developed by the Prague structuralists in a much more mature theoretical framework, 
I argued, structuralism promised to provide a more credible template for a rigorous 
“aesthetic of estrangement”. I found, moreover, that the problematic circumstances of 
Russian formalism‟s transition to structuralism and the widespread neglect or 
ignorance in the West of the originality of the Prague Schools‟ brand of structuralism 
strongly indicated that the specific structuralist potential of the Russian formalists‟ 
aesthetics ideas (especially beyond their strictly linguistic expression) has remained 
unsatisfyingly exploited and acknowledged to this day, and was therefore more than 
susceptible to productive reassessments. With an eye to the clearly ontological and 
empirical perspectives offered by the neglected “Slavic” structuralist tradition, I 
suggested that one could hope to achieve a systematic account of estrangement by 
interpreting it as an original structuralist theory of perception, which would differ on 
significant points from similar, more mainstream models such as Gestalt psychology 
or Piagetian constructivism and might (or might not) contribute fresh insights into the 
scope of structuralism as a whole (Chapter 1). 
Having both established the plausibility of my hypothesis from a general, historical 
point of view and defined the required methodological orientation of my study, I 
proceeded to outline the details of the Russian formalists‟ aesthetic of estrangement 
and specify exactly how it gives rise to the above-mentioned vision of perception as a 
concrete and expressive crystallisation of reality. This I did by concentrating 
exclusively on the early work of Šklovskij (The Resurrection of the Word, 1914, Art as 
Device, 1917) which, to my mind, presents both the most clear and the only 
unmitigated exposition of the aesthetic principle that in one form or another underlies 
all the Russian formalists‟ thinking on literature and art.  
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In essence, my exposition of Šklovskij‟s arguments did not diverge in any significant 
manner from the canonical accounts (Aucouturier, Erlich, Hansen-Löve, Steiner, 
Striedter, etc.). In accordance with these scholars, for instance, I highlighted the 
existence of two, apparently contradictory theoretical streaks in Šklovskij‟s theory of 
art as estrangement: on the one hand, his Bergsonian, modernist concern for the 
sensual, pragmatic, “lived” even “living” dimension of our experience either of the 
world and its objects or of language and words as such; on the other hand, the 
defining and seminal effort of Russian formalism to isolate the specific, inherent 
properties of art or literature in order to submit them to an autonomous, purely artistic 
or literary analysis. In further agreement with standard interpretations, I mentioned 
that Šklovskij sought to merge these two contrasting aspects of his theory, or rather, 
that estrangement conceptually depended upon the concatenation of the formal and 
the sensual layers of aesthetic experience. Needless to say, I pinpointed this unusual 
concatenation of form and perception in aesthetic experience as the source of 
estrangement‟s original philosophical implications, in particular its suggestion that 
perception happens as a concrete, sensual act immediately and intransitively infused 
with form, structure and meaning (Chapter 2). 
At this point, I turned my attention to the fact that despite its (vague but) apparently 
radical suggestions as to the immanently formal, expressive nature of concrete, 
sensual perception, Šklovskij‟s definition of estrangement actually remains much 
more conservative than at first suspected with regard to the extent of the interaction 
between expressive form on the one hand and concrete perception on the other. In 
effect, although Šklovskij‟s theory definitely implies that our concrete, sensual acts of 
perception are affected and transformed by the formal, expressive structure of given 
works of art or literature, it does not go as far as to state that our concrete, sensual 
acts of perception themselves possess a formally expressive structure. Rather, what 
Šklovskij states is that the artificial, expressive structure of the work of art influences 
the process of perception indirectly, through a functional, differential and therefore 
derivative and secondary effect. In other words, Šklovskij appeared to instate a clear 
distinction between the formal, expressive level of the artistic, literary work of art, and 
the blunt, amorphous one of empirical perception. More generally, I noted that in 
accordance with the general thrust and ambition of his theory towards isolating the 
properties of literary and artistic facts, Šklovskij emphasises the difference between 
the realms of the aesthetic and the everyday.  
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That Šklovskij would choose to characterise estrangement through a functional 
relation between the formally-defined work of art and the concrete, sensual 
perceptions it induces, I concluded, is as such perfectly reasonable. If anything, such 
a decision seems necessary in order for his theory to be able to account for the 
semiotic nature of the work of art or literature: because a work of art is obviously 
different from what it represents (inasmuch as it represents anything at all), it would 
be absurd to suggest that the concrete perceptions it induces through its formal, 
“estranging” structure are coextensive with that of an objective, external reality 
(represented or not by that given work). Unfortunately for my own hypothesis as to 
the original philosophical promises of estrangement, however, the clear separation 
and isolation of the formal aspects and nature of the work of art from the amorphous 
act of concrete perception decided by Šklovskij also appeared to reduce the 
originality of his pronouncements on form and perception. As it is, that separation 
seemed to preclude the idea that the process of perception might itself be formally, 
expressively structured: in this account, the only thing that displays formal, 
expressive features is the work of art itself and its devices. 
To confront this new problem and prove that estrangement does imply original 
perspectives on perception, I turned to Šklovskij‟s theory of prose and his own literary 
production. These, indeed, show that his apparently so clear-cut distinction between 
artistic form and everyday world is in fact conceptually fragile and unsustainable. For 
one, since the idea that all art is purely and absolutely formal is absurd, Šklovskij had 
to find a way to explain the relation between artistic form and objective content in the 
work of art itself. This he did through the categories of the “literary device” and “extra-
literary material”. I showed, however, that these categories are porous: Šklovskij is 
progressively led to admit that non-artistic, crude “material” can function as a formal 
device and, more significantly, that even the most radically formal devices can 
express an objective, extra-literary “content”. Despite its insistence on maintaining a 
strict difference between the two, it thus appeared that Šklovskij‟s theory implies a 
surprising inter-changeability and analogy of structure between the artistic, formal 
aspects of the work of art, and its non-artistic, non-formal elements. Much more, 
some of Šklovskij‟s pronouncements seemed to indicate that the inter-changeability 
of form and content, of device and material does not apply only to our (artistic or non-
artistic) representations of the world, but indeed to our concrete emotional and 
perceptual experience of the world itself.  
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Next to the hesitations of Šklovskij‟s theory of prose regarding the exact relation of 
artistic form and objective content (whether perceptual or representational), I also 
highlighted another “perceptual” issue with the principle of estrangement, namely the 
question of the nature of the act of concretely perceiving the work of art itself. In 
effect, although estrangement does not imply that a work of art makes one perceive 
the world itself, it does imply that the work of art itself appears as a concrete, 
intentional object of perception, whose formal mode of existence both reveals or 
requires an explanation. This problem, moreover, is not a secondary one to the 
Russian formalists, who specifically confronted it in relation to the concrete nature of 
poetic language. In their account of the perception of a poem, attention is focussed 
more on the material aspect of language itself, rather than on any of its denotative or 
communicative functions. In the extreme case of the Cubo-futurists “zaum” poetry – 
which strongly influenced Šklovskij and the Russian formalists – one even finds an 
example in which the semiotic status of the work of art is so completely reduced that 
the whole expressive, intelligible form of the poem corresponds rigorously to its 
concrete, material perceptibility (Chapter 3). 
The series of examples provided by Šklovskij‟s theory of prose and the Cubo-
futurists‟ “zaum” poetry, I concluded at the end of the first part of this study, constitute 
enough evidence of the original implications of the principle of estrangement with 
regard to the relations of form and perception in aesthetic experience. On their own, 
of course, they did not allow me to draw any general conclusions as to the 
conceptual solidity and relevance of these perspectives. But they did undoubtedly 
outline how the idea of a formal, expressive dimension of perception itself is dormant 
and implicit in Šklovskij‟s theory, and that a systematic interpretation of estrangement 
would certainly bring it to light in much more striking terms. In any case, I decided 
that these examples warranted a closer look at the presuppositions and implications 
of estrangement with regard to the question of the interrelation of form and 
perception, this time in a purely philosophical light. 
 
Beginning in earnest with the conceptual assessment of estrangement‟s implications, 
I first noted that, superficially at least, Šklovskij‟s principle appeared to be 
philosophically promising, because it defines the question of aesthetic experience 
squarely in relation to the precise (and precisely analysable) problems of perception 
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– instead of the traditional vague and subjective concepts such as the sublime, 
beauty, taste, etc… On closer inspection, however, I found that such as it is 
presented by Šklovskij, estrangement is resistant to a serious philosophical 
interpretation, not least because of its crass lack of conceptual foundations, and 
Šklovskij‟s evasive, almost nonchalant approach to the crucial problem of the 
process of perception itself. To be more precise, the essential problem is that 
Šklovskij attributes a vast array of “perceptual” functions to estrangement, which he 
fails to justify or explain. On the one hand, he implies that estrangement can affect, 
all at once and in no particular order, our cultural and social representations, the 
cognitive processes of abstraction, generalisation or recognition, our responses to 
pure sensual data or emotions, the expressive structure of language and even our 
existential feeling of living and being in the world at all. On the other hand, the only 
explanation he volunteers to explain these extraordinary powers is a few remarks on 
the automatisation of habitual perception. 
Following suggestions that have been touted by a number of scholars, I briefly 
considered whether one could have recourse to Husserl‟s phenomenology as an 
interesting option for systemising the apparently incoherent theory of estrangement 
and its various claims as to the structure and nature of perception. After highlighting 
a number of reasons why one could indeed conclude to similarities and 
convergences between phenomenology and Šklovskij‟s aesthetic, however, I 
underlined that Husserl‟s subtle philosophical considerations diverged from 
Šklovskij‟s ideas on one critical point: whereas Husserl presented perception as an 
intelligible process, informed with sense and meaning, Šklovskij saw it only as 
succession of impressions, structured by blind differential and contrastive effects 
(Chapter 4). I also debated whether Husserl could be considered as an improvement 
on Šklovskij, but concluded that the advantages brought by his phenomenology 
would come at the cost of adequately reflecting the essence of Šklovskij‟s aesthetic. 
It would fail in particular to reflect the radically empirical, sensualist and vitalist 
dimension of Šklovskij‟s theory. 
In the face of the unsurprising impossibility of giving a direct philosophical 
interpretation to Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement, I moved on, as my introductory 
considerations had indicated I would have to, to considering indirect ways of giving 
more solid foundations to estrangement. Specifically, I raised the question whether 
the problem might not lie so much with the fundamental assumption of estrangement 
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itself, namely that perception is an intransitive process which can be formally affected 
through artistic practices, than with the manner in which Šklovskij characterises the 
functioning of estrangement. In effect, critics have long pointed out that Šklovskij‟s 
notion of the device and with it, of the functioning of estrangement – without even 
speaking of the “existential” hesitations mentioned earlier –, present a number of fatal 
limitations. In particular, it fails to take into account the systematic nature of the work 
of art, thus reducing it to a sum of isolated features. This lack of systematic thinking 
results in an impoverishment both of the idea of estrangement itself, which can only 
be understood as the production of a differential but blind and necessarily surprising 
effect, and that of form, which loses all semantic or “Gestaltist” qualities. To a large 
extent, I found, it is this mechanistic, blind nature of Šklovskij‟s theory that 
distanciates it from a phenomenological interpretation, and therefore, a coherent 
philosophical interpretation in general. 
Since the weaknesses of Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement seemed to pertain more 
to its specific description of the devices than its broad principle, I then proceeded to 
examine whether it could not be bettered. To be more precise, I mentioned that 
Šklovskij‟s crude insights had in fact indeed received ameliorations, brought by the 
Russian formalist themselves. I thus highlighted the progressive “semanticisation” of 
the concept of form and the process of estrangement in the work of Eichenbaum, 
Tynjanov and finally Jakobson (Chapter 5). In particular, I volunteered that Jakobson 
structural linguistics provided an example of a systemised and powerful version of 
estrangement, in which we found a concrete example of a structurally expressive, but 
concrete object: the phoneme. Although the links between Jakobson‟s ideas of poetic 
function and estrangement are well-known, I corroborated this interpretation by 
showing the development of the linguistic paradigm within Russian formalism, thus 
demonstrating how the original aesthetic ideas of Šklovskij came to be integrated and 
perfectioned in the narrower field of language and linguistics. I then went on to 
demonstrate this in even more detail through the example of phonology and the 
phoneme itself (Chapter 6). 
Having thus demonstrated that Šklovskij‟s theory of estrangement could be 
systemised and his notion of form enriched to include a properly semantic, Gestaltist 
dimension, I proceeded to the last step of my analysis, namely providing a properly 
philosophical grounding to the notion of phoneme. Indeed, although Tynjanov‟s and 
Jakobson‟s work had refined and bettered Šklovskij‟s raw ideas, they had reduced 
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their scope to that of language, linguistics and finally only phonology. It thus 
remained to be seen whether the particular, rigorous example provided by 
Jakobson‟s phonology could be generalised to characterise the structure of 
perception as a whole. In order to accomplish this re-generalisation, I had to leave 
the terrain of Russian formalism and its evolution, and place its ideas in a wider 
philosophical context. Because of the proximity of the issues discussed by the 
formalists with the core debates of structuralism and phenomenology and the 
problems of language, meaning and perception, I suggested, this step could be 
legitimately be done by mentioning the particularity of the formalists positions and its 
usefulness in that context. 
My method was to turn to weaknesses in Husserl‟s phenomenology. These 
weaknesses – also pointed out by Derrida‟s critique of the Logical Inverstigations –, 
corresponded to the question of expression and the nature of the sign – problems to 
which the Russian formalists and Jakobson in particular brought totally different 
solutions. Turning attention to the work of Špet, I even suggested that these solutions 
appeared as complementary solutions to Husserl‟s phenomenology. Indeed, by 
taking into account the particual “materiality” of language and the sign, Špet offered 
an interpretation of the concept or act of expression which could avoid the Derridian 
critique of phenomenology. The vital suggestion posited by Špet in this context was 
that our originary intuitions of the world, including our acts of sensual perception, are 
in fact structured intelligibly, through words and language. At this point, I also 
remarked that Špet‟s interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology is also limited by 
the fact it fails to be sufficiently critical of the traditional metaphysical concept of the 
object. But I found that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, thanks to its more 
Heideggerian conception of ontology, did provide such a critique, a thereby 
suggested a philosophical base for the idea that sensual perception itself is 
structured intelligibly. Having arrived at this conclusion, I did not go much further into 
the details of the analysis provided by Merleau-Ponty, which have in effect nothing to 
do with Russian formalism and open a number of problems (the nature of the 
perceiving subject, the role of the body, etc.) which go far beyond the scope of this 
study. I believe, however, that these considerations were sufficient to demonstrate 
the philosophical depth and viability of the vision of aesthetic experience suggested 
by the Russian formalists‟ estrangement, and to bring further elements as to the 
exact nature and possibilities of that vision. 
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